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CHAPTER 1 RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
 
In this Ph.D. dissertation, I explore different industrial development trajectories among 
latecomer countries using a historical approach to explain the causal relationship between 
government’s behavior, particularly the political elites, and the industrial catch-up pursuit. In 
this writings, industrial catch-up pursuit refers to the effort to increase indigenous technological 
capabilities, through foreign technological learning and development, to support indigenous 
manufacturing firms’ upgrading. Initially, this strategy can be found within the developmental 
states’ industrial policy (e.g., Japan, Taiwan, South Korea). Currently, under the global 
economic system, this also has become the ideal mechanism of the national innovation system, 
manifested as Science, Technology, and Innovation (STI) policy. I do not seek to simply 
discuss variants of institutional arrangement (e.g., regime type) or measuring predatory 
behaviors within the government (e.g., corruption, political rents). Instead, I look into the 
political-historical foundation behind political elites’ choices of industrial development 
strategy at their initial stage of national economic planning. This first chapter provides the 
background which leads to the construction of the research problem.  
 
1.I. Industrial Catch-Up and the Long-Run Growth: The Cruciality of an Indigenous 
Technology-Driven Manufacturing Upgrading to Support Structural Change 
We are living through an amazing technological revolution. We have seen that 
growth is not explained very well by accumulation of inputs like machines. The 
major part of growth is the residual, which includes technology. […] 
Technological change is indeed a powerful force behind economic growth, 
which is all about creating new goods and new technologies. A side effect of this 
growth, however, is that it destroys old goods and old technologies.  (Easterly, 
2001, pp. 172-173) 
 
Since the first Industrial Revolution, indigenous technological advancements within the 
manufacturing sector have been the key driver for industrial catch-up throughout history. 
Scholars on late industrialization, from Gershenkron (1962) to Amsden (2001), continue to 
emphasize the crucial role of government to support indigenous technological advancements. 
The discussions of late industrialization have been intertwined with the success of 
developmental states’ industrial policy, particularly through the cases of Japan, South Korea, 
Taiwan, and, to some extent, China. The developmental states’ success gradually becomes the 
 2 
accepted norm of industrial catch-up studies1. Scholars offer various policy recommendations 
on the base of developmental states’ experiences. From the promotion of export-oriented 
industrialization into a promotion of efficient national innovation system (i.e., triple-helix 
coordination) in this globalization era (Wade, 1990; The World Bank, 1993; Amsden, 2001; 
Lee, 2013; UNIDO, 2015). Efficient institutions remain at the core of various policy 
recommendations for latecomer countries, suggesting that the government needs to prioritize 
economic growth pursuit, especially with the current issue of the middle-income trap (Fig. 
1.1.). 
 
Fig. 1.1 Relative Income Trap 1950 to 2016 
Notes: author’s calculation based on (Agénor, et al., 2012) 
Source: Maddison Project Database version 2018 (Bolt, et al., 2018) 
At a larger scope, the scholarly obsession to duplicate the developmental state’s 
arrangement (e.g., their policy selections, their political institutional arrangements) is tightly 
linked to the rapid growth experiences in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Complimenting 
 
1 As comparison, the Washington Consensus, offered by Williamson in the 1989, proposed different idea on what 
the developing countries, particularly Latin American countries, should do. Washington Consensus mostly rely 
on free trade or trade liberalization with less government’s intervention as part of structural adjustment programs 
(Williamson, 2004). The Washington Consensus provoked a controversy as it neglected the structure of 
developing countries. 
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earlier work on developmental states such as Johnson (1982), Amsden (1989), and Wade 
(1990), a report by the World Bank (1993) on the “East Asian Miracle” offers a model for 
developing countries to emulate the developmental state’s high growth. The report suggests a 
set of policy recommendations which they believed to be the success recipe for Northeast Asian 
countries’ high growth. The report contrasts policy arrangements between the Northeast Asian 
countries and those from Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa which have been plagued by 
recession and uncertainty. The report states that the High Performing Asian Economies 
(HPAEs) were able to achieve high economic growth mainly because the governments had 
accomplished three main functions of growth: accumulation, efficient allocation, and rapid 
technological catch-up (The World Bank, 1993b, p. 10). 
A strong institution is their precondition for efficient selective interventions through 
various set of policy instruments, which build upon the conception of developmental state. 
These sets of policies can be categorized into two types: 1) fundamentals or traditional 
government obligations (i.e., adequate infrastructure and education or human capital, and 
secure financial institutions including savings and investment); and 2) interventions (i.e., mild 
repression of interest rates, state capitalism, mandatory savings mechanism, and socialization 
of risk). The report suggests several lessons for other developing countries, which includes 
how they need to get the fundamental essentials (e.g., savings, human capital, macroeconomic 
management, price distortions) to support rapid productivity. With regards to industrial 
development, the 1990s saw a promotion of export-oriented industrialization strategy (or 
export-push strategy under free-market regime) for developing countries that want to emulate 
the rapid economic growth of developmental states (The World Bank, 1993, pp. 292-346). This 
coincided with globalization and the global production network expansion.  
Yet, the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis led to a growth stagnation in Asia, in which 
Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand received a large hit. Among these countries, 
currently only South Korea which has escaped the middle-income trap while the Southeast 
Asian countries have been growing at a relatively slower speed. For more than two decades, 
middle-income trap studies have been gaining momentum, with some popular works such as 
the World Bank report on China 2030 (2012) and the work of Gill and Kharas (2015). These 
works have similarities in comparing the income growth between East Asia and Latin America. 
While there is a broad definition of the “trap” itself, there is a consensus that manufacturing 
upgrading is the key driver, from the perspective of structural change to sustain a long-term 
growth, particularly under the current global economic system. There is a notion that industrial 
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policy becomes more important at the middle-income stage2 (Gill & Kharas, 2015, p. 12). But 
now, instead of picking winners, the discussion gradually transforms into how to construct an 
efficient STI policy to build up technology sophistication. 
The United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) highlights that the 
transitions of developing countries into developed countries within the past 40 years had been 
accompanied by technological upgrading3 within the manufacturing subsectors (UNIDO, 
2015). An over-reliance over natural resource-centric development strategy will lead to a 
slower growth and declining national competitiveness. Harvey et. al., (2010), following the 
Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, provide four centuries of evidence on the long-run negative trend 
in relative prices of the primary commodity. In addition, Lee (2013) points out that resource-
based development strategy is risky due to resource unsustainability. While the growth of the 
primary sector (e.g., agriculture, fisheries) and low-technology service sector (e.g., tourism) 
might contributes to poverty reduction, these sectors are not sufficient to support long-term 
growth to escape the middle-income trap.  
The manufacturing sector plays a key role because of its ability to generate jobs, both 
directly in another manufacturing sectors and indirectly in manufacturing-related services. 
Thus, it enable economic growth to spread to more people (UNIDO, 2015). In the context of 
structural change within the current global market setting, countries are trapped in the middle-
income trap when they “can no longer compete internationally in standardized, labor-intensive 
commodities because wages are relatively too high, but it can also not compete in higher value-
added activities on a broad enough scale because productivity is relatively too low” (Paus 2018, 
p. 65). At the middle-income level, a country can no longer rely on low-technology 
specialization based on low wage labor force.  
[…] with weak local capabilities, industrialisation has to be more dependent on 
FDI. However, FDI cannot drive industrial growth without local capabilities. 
The neo-liberal approach favoured by the Washington consensus which leaves 
 
2 However, there are also economic scholars who voice out their disagreement on the duplication of Northeast 
Asia’s developmental state-style industrial policies particularly under the globalization era. Noland and Pack 
(2003), for example, argue that in order to reproduce the industrial policy, countries need to have dedicated and 
competent bureaucracies and policymaking apparatuses who cannot easily swayed by lobbying pressure. They 
suggest the other alternative growth-enhancing policies such as “large expenditures on primary and secondary 
education, the building of large and efficient social infrastructure, a favorable attitude toward international 
technology transfer, including both technology licensing and direct foreign investment, and a substant ial 
investment in public technology institutions” instead of selective industrial policy (Noland & Pack, 2003, p. 101). 
On this PhD Dissertation, I share the idea that selective industrial policy is difficult to be reproduced in other 
developing countries, my reasoning involves more than a lack of dedicated and competent bureaucracies and 
policymaking apparatuses.  
3 This is based on the ISIC REV. 3 Technology Intensity Definition (OECD, 2011).  
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capability development to free market forces provides few realistic answers. It 
can result in slow and truncated technological development, with gaps between 
countries rising. Some upgrading does take place, but is slower and more limited 
than with the promotion of local capabilities. Given the speed at which 
technologies are changing and path-dependence and cumulativeness in 
capability building, it can lead to latecomers being mired in low growth traps. 
(Lall & Narula, 2004, p. 457) 
 
Successful industrial catch-up cases (i.e., Japan, Taiwan, South Korea) relied on the 
indigenous technological development to support the growth of their indigenous manufacturing 
firms instead of continuing to rely on multinational companies (MNCs). Through the wave of 
globalization and the expansion of global production networks, the manufacturing sector 
growth in developing countries is driven by the MNCs. However, the problem is that this often 
is followed by a passive FDI-dependent strategy by latecomer countries. Often, they 
underestimate the difficulty of internalizing technological spillover without a proactive 
indigenous innovation effort. As consequences, foreign technology remains to be a static 
technology, which is embedded in imported machinery (Fu, et al., 2011, p. 1210). As the 
manufacturing sector in latecomers continue to be MNCs-driven, not only that the highest 
values go to the MNCs, the technologies also remain to be concentrated in the developed 
countries. The latecomers continue to struggle with the technological convergences, which 
leads to relatively slower structural change and growth. Various studies on Latin American 
development trajectories already show this problem (Gereffi & Wyman, 1990; Kharas & Kohli, 
2011).  
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Fig. 1.2 Share of Foreign Value Added (FVA) and Domestic Value Added (DVA) in Value 
Added Export from ASEAN (Manufacturing Subsectors) 
Notes: The classification of manufacturing subsectors into technology level follows OECD’s 
ISIC Rev 3. Technology Intensity Definition 
Source: ASEAN-Japan Center’s Database on Global Value Chain (ASEAN-Japan Centre, 
2018) 
A relatively similar circumstance is also happening in Southeast Asian countries (i.e., 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN countries). Through taking into account 
their strategic significance in the global production network, the MNCs from the ASEAN’s 
external partners are still dominating the medium and high technology-level manufacturing 
subsectors in the region (Fig. 1.2). The ASEAN countries’ share of manufacturing value added 
in the GDP remains weaker than the latest successful catch-up case such as South Korea (Fig. 
1.3). In addition to this, based on the UNIDO Competitive Industrial Performance Index 
(2018), a large portion of the manufacturing sector’s composition in three middle-income 
ASEAN countries (i.e., Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia) is still resource-based and/or in 
low-technology sector. Among the three, Indonesia has the largest share of resource-based 
manufacturing value-added and smallest share of medium-high technology activities in total 
manufacturing value-added (Fig. 1.4). Various innovation reports such as the Global 
Innovation Index (Cornell University; INSEAD; WIPO, 2018) and the OECD Science 
Technology Innovation outlook (OECD, 2016a), show that these countries also remained to 
have weak technological capabilities. 
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Fig. 1.3 Share of Manufacture Value Added 
to GDP of Selected Countries from 
Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and Latin 
America 
Source: World Development Indicators 
(2018b) 
Fig. 1.4 Share of Manufacturing Value 
Added within Manufacturing Export in 2016 
Selected Countries from Northeast Asia, 
Southeast Asia, and Latin America based on 
its composition4 
Source: UNIDO Competitive Industrial 
Performance Index (CIP) (2018) 
Current scholarly discussion over the national innovation system mostly involves 
promotion on effective triple-helix coordination (i.e., government-universities-industries). 
Initially, according to Lundvall and Borrás (2005), we can trace it back to a separate origin 
between science policy, technology policy, and innovation policy5. Historically, the origin of 
science policy stems from the government’s interest in using science to improve resource 
efficiency to support welfare distribution and to provide a foundation of fundamental 
knowledge6. As science-based technologies (e.g., nuclear power, space technology, computers) 
begin to play a more significant role to promote economic growth, governments start to pay 
more attention towards their technology policies. Countries in different developmental stages 
(high-income advanced countries versus catching-up countries) conduct different technology 
policies. The focus of technology development shifts to innovation activities as it seeks to 
improve the capacity to produce the most recent science-based technologies (Lundvall & 
Borrás, 2005, p. 8). Gradually, ministries of economic affairs or ministries of industries tend 
 
4 The data provided by the index shows the share in manufacturing value-added within the manufacturing export 
divided by four classifications: resource-based, low technology, medium technology, and high technology.  
5 This provides an understanding of why current STI policy can be analyzed with different lenses which can also 
overlap with each other (e.g., natural resource conservation, public health, industrial catch-up). 
6 Ministries of education and research often act as main policy agents, alongside some degree of involvement 
from other ministries (e.g., ministry of health, defense, energy, transport) (Lundvall & Borrás, 2005, p. 7). 
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to be at the center of innovation policy (i.e., national innovation system) as the STI policy is 
integrated with the pursuit of economic growth. 
The current discussion over STI policy centers on the construction of an ideal STI 
policy to support a technology-driven structural change7. This notion requires governments to 
assume effective roles and efficient STI policies8. South Korea and Taiwan, as two examples 
of successful catching-up countries, have relied on the effectiveness of government-funded 
research institutes (GRIs). The GRIs have disseminated technology to private manufacturing 
industries since the mid-1970s (Shin, et al., 2012; Lee, 2013; Taylor, 2016). Therefore, under 
a technology-driven structural change concept, the national government is expected to 
prioritize indigenous manufacturing subsectors upgrading within their STI policy above low-
technology development (e.g., agriculture sector, resource-based industry). Table 1.2 below 
shows a classification of manufacturing subsectors based on their technological level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 Following Gabardo et. al., (2017), who summarize various prominent works on structural change and growth 
theory, structural change refers to a “a broader economic process that encompasses changes in the structure of 
production and employment within and between all sectors of the economy as well as the emergence of new 
sectors and the disappearance of old ones” (pp. 392-393). They summarize that there are different channels to 
explain structural changes from demand-driven to technological progress. Overall, there are two approaches on 
structural change based on its origins or sources: 1) based on the differences in income elasticities of demand 
across sectors or the utility-based (i.e. increases in real per-capita expenditure levels affect the sectoral expenditure 
shares leading to the reallocation of labor across sectors); 2) based on the changes in relative price or the 
technological explanation or the supply-side perspective (i.e. relative price changes affect the expenditure 
structure whenever the elasticity of substitution across sectors is different from one) (p. 400). The idea of structural 
change in this context is under a neoclassical approach who neglects the role of government. The technology-
driven structural change in this Ph.D. dissertation refers to the idea that the government plays an important role 
in supporting the technological upgrading within the indigenous manufacturing sectors in the latecomer countries 
under the assumption that the manufacturing sector is the key engine for economic growth (relative income level).  
8 However, other perspective might argue on different thing. If we follow a laissez-faire approach, then market 
incentive should be enough to provoke structural change. The problem, however, the laissez-faire approach 
ignores “the possibility of successive introduction of big innovations that create new industries or radically alter 
methods of production”, therefore a country will be trapped in poverty when they failed to start modernization on 
a large scale (e.g. Latin American countries) (Yifu Lin, 2009, p. 3). 
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High-technology industries 
1. Aircraft and spacecraft 
2. Pharmaceuticals 
3. Office, accounting and computing 
machinery Radio, TV and communications 
equipment 
4. Medical, precision and optical instruments 
Medium-high-technology industries 
1. Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c. 
2. Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
Chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals 
3. Railroad equipment and transport 
equipment, n.e.c.  
4. Machinery and equipment, n.e.c. 
Medium-low-technology industries 
1. Building and repairing of ships and boats 
2. Rubber and plastics products 
3. Coke, refined petroleum products and 
nuclear fuel Other non-metallic mineral 
products 
4. Basic metals and fabricated metal products 
Low-technology industries 
1. Manufacturing, n.e.c.; Recycling 
2. Wood, pulp, paper, paper products, 
printing and publishing  
3. Food products, beverages and tobacco 
4. Textiles, textile products, leather and 
footwear 
Tab. 1.1 ISIC REV. 3 Technology Intensity Definition 
Source: (OECD, 2011) 
 Overall, there are abundant policy recommendations since the late 1990s, from policies 
to tackle market failure to innovation policy, yet there are more latecomers which are 
technologically stagnant. There remain only a handful of successful cases in industrial catch-
up and a sustained high economic growth. While the Northeast Asian countries often perceived 
as the ideal examples, Latin American countries are often being used as the failed case. 
Meanwhile, the Southeast Asian countries find themselves somewhere between the two. 
Southeast Asian countries are relatively younger nation-states which have not been trapped as 
long as the Latin American countries. Also, the Southeast Asian countries’ proximity to the 
Northeast Asian countries provides them with a strategic location for their manufacturing 
sectors. 
Southeast Asian countries, particularly Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia have been 
benefited from the expansion of the Northeast Asian global production network since the 
1980s. Yet, resource-based and low-technology manufacturing sectors are still dominating 
their share of manufacture value-added to GDP. They also remain to be within the middle-
income trap. In comparison, South Korea, which also started their economic development in 
post-World War II have managed to escape the middle-income trap with better manufacturing 
value-added performance (Fig. 1.1., Fig. 1.3., Fig. 1.4.). If duplication of successful policy 
works, which have been promoted since more than twenty to twenty-five years ago, then we 
need to explore why latecomer countries with large economic potentials and strategic 
positioning have yet to have more advanced industrial capabilities. 
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1.II. Problem Discussion: What Did We Miss? 
“If we see the importance of institutions for collective action as at the core of the 
developmental state, we are of necessity back on the terrain of politics as much 
as economics” (Haggard, 2018, p. 83) 
Abundant works by economic scholars often stop at promoting efficient institutional 
arrangements by latecomer countries’ government. Various policy recommendations on 
national innovation systems or STI policy often place their focus on how to duplicate ‘the best 
practice’. Ulrich (1991) states that innovation issues are depoliticized and reduced to technical 
issues (p. 339). As most of the current STI policy recommendations are originated from the 
duplication of successful industrial catch-up cases, thus they often refer to the success of 
developmental states. Similarly, developmental state literatures by economists place more 
focus on how to duplicate the institutional and political arrangements. They seek to duplicate 
the successful policies without going back further into what were the political and historical 
context that initially provoked the emergence of these institutional arrangements.  
While there are abundant studies on how to replicate the institutional arrangements 
found in the Northeast Asian developmental states (The World Bank, 1993; Amsden, 1989; 
Lee, 2013), less attention has been given in obtaining a better understanding of what provoked 
the emergence of efficient institutional arrangements as a precondition for industrial catch-up 
in the first place. In addition to this, most comparative studies on different development 
trajectories among latecomer countries often simply compare the institutional arrangement 
difference between the high-growth developmental states and less successful latecomers. They 
tend to focus on measuring the state’s predatory level (e.g., degree of democratic consolidation, 
degree of education spending or human capital development, corruption level, or degree of 
economic openness) (Gereffi & Wyman, 1990; Kharas & Kohli, 2011; Acemoglu, et al., 2001).  
Lack of attention has been given to the historical context or environment that gave birth 
to such an “efficient” institutional arrangement. In this regard, the main unit of analysis of this 
Ph.D. dissertation is the political elites’ behavior at the initial stage of national economic 
planning and how they develop through time. Through a comparative approach, I seek to 
answer: “What was the political and historical context that motivate the ruling political 
elites (government) to prioritize or to not prioritize an indigenous technology-driven 
industrial catch-up strategy?” 
The purpose of this Ph.D. dissertation is to challenge the foundation of normative policy 
recommendations for latecomers in economic development study, specifically industrial catch-
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up study. Abundant works of literature emphasize a dichotomy between strong government 
(developmental state) versus weak government (predatory state) as the leading cause for 
different economic development trajectories. I argue that the government will behave in the 
same manner once they face similar environments. Instead of the strong-weak or efficient-
inefficient dichotomy, I seek to propose a different level of urgency to pursue indigenous 
technology-driven industrial catch-up that occurred in each country’s critical juncture period. 
I aim to challenge the core idea of policy recommendations to duplicate an industrial catch-up 
success. I seek to open debate into whether a successful industrial catch-up strategy is simply 
the outcome of a national survival strategy. 
 
1.III. PhD Dissertation Structure 
 To answer the research problem, first, the following chapter reviews key literatures in 
order to construct a more comprehensive method of comparison in which will be discussed 
further in the third chapter. Specifically, the focus of the second chapter is to point out what 
are the research consensus and gap in the study of industrial catch-up with an emphasis on the 
ruling political elites’ behavior. Furthermore, it also highlights that the systemic vulnerability 
concept (Doner, et al., 2005) offers the most comprehensive analysis on developmental states’ 
origins because it incorporates the interaction of different historical dynamics that influence 
coalitional politics, instead of relying only on one or two determinant factors (e.g., colonial 
legacy, clientelism). However, I do not simply argue that systemic vulnerability does not exist 
in other countries; hence their “failed industrial catch-up”. In Chapter 3, I construct a method 
of comparison through the incorporation of the time horizon. It includes conducting a series of 
comparative case study on seven countries from three different regions by revisiting the initial 
period when the ruling political elites first construct their national economic strategy (i.e., the 
critical juncture period). Through this method of comparison, I seek to present that the political 
elites in the other latecomer countries were exposed to different historical dynamics, which 
present them with an alternative economic growth strategy other than industrial catch-up 
prioritization; hence their weaker indigenous manufacturing firms’ performances.  
Chapter 4 discusses Japan and South Korea as two case studies from Northeast Asia, 
which are often dubbed by scholars as the successful industrial catch-up experiences. Chapter 
5 discusses Argentina and Brazil as two case studies from the Latin America region; the region 
that is often perceived as the failed region. Chapter 6 discusses Malaysia, Thailand, and 
Indonesia as three case studies from Southeast Asia, as the region currently received abundant 
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attention from scholars due to their strategic positioning in the global economy. Based on these 
three chapters, I seek to show how the political elites in these seven countries faced different 
levels of urgency to pursue industrial catch-up strategy since their critical juncture period or 
the initial stage of their national economic planning.  
Chapter 7 selects Indonesia as a sub case study to discuss the problem of economic 
nationalism discourse within their national STI policy. Geographically, Indonesia is the largest 
countries among the three cases of middle-income Southeast Asian countries, a condition that 
granted them the largest economic potentials (i.e., abundant natural resource materials and 
labor) to pursue industrial catch-up. Adding to that, Indonesia is the world’s third largest 
democracy. The end of the New Order regime in 1998 marked Indonesia’s political transition 
into a democratic political system, which supposedly end the problematic patron-client 
relations in the New Order, specifically between the political elites and natural-resource 
oligarchs. Yet a change in the government has yet to be followed by a change in economic 
development strategy. Through this chapter, I focus on the economic nationalism discourse as 
an observable mechanism to highlight how the policy preference over national resource-centric 
economy continue to be maintained. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEWS 
The Neglected Puzzle Piece: The Political-Historical Foundation of Industrial Catch-Up 
 
In this literature review chapter, I explore the linkage between developmental state 
literatures, industrial catch-up literatures, and the current popularity of the national innovation 
system literatures. Since the 1980s, the discussion on latecomer countries’ industrial catch-up 
has been tightly linked with the literature on developmental state institutional arrangement, 
particularly with the rise of East Asian Miracle and their industrial policies. The “good 
governance” and “efficient institutional arrangement” gradually become the accepted norms or 
the recipe for successful industrial catch-up. Thus, scholars who conduct comparative studies 
on different industrial development trajectories tend to use the case of Northeast Asian 
developmental states as ideal indicators. This leads to a dichotomy between developmental 
(strong) state and predatory (weak) state; hence the abundant number of literatures that seeks 
to analyze the origin of predatory state behavior and what exacerbates it (e.g., causalities 
between colonialism and state formation, the supremacy of democratic regime, and also 
resource curses).  
Along with the wave of globalization and open trade regime, the new generation of 
developmental state literatures then expand into a discussion over industrial upgrading in the 
global economic regime (i.e., national innovation system). This is tightly connected to the 
middle-income trap studies from the perspective of structural change. Developmental states’ 
successful industrial policy relied most heavily on an effective indigenous technological 
development through foreign technological learning to support manufacturing upgrading. In 
recent years, this has translated into what scholars often refer to as national innovation systems 
based on triple helix model (university-government-industries cooperation). It is often 
evaluated through STI policy. OECD and UNIDO are two examples of prominent international 
organizations which largely promote this.  
The problem is, because it is originated from the success of Northeast Asian 
developmental states, these policy recommendations are constructed upon a precondition of 
“good governance”. Therefore, when recent literatures conduct a cross-country comparison on 
the relations between the national innovation system and indigenous manufacturing 
development in the latecomer countries, they often come up with the same conclusion that 
some latecomers have weaker national innovation systems due to inefficient policies or 
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inefficient bureaucratic arrangement. Consequently, the discussion keeps on going back to the 
same old problem of predatory state behaviors (e.g., political rents, clientelism, corruption, and 
transparency problem) which has been addressed for decades. Is there a better method to 
compare different industrial development trajectories? 
To begin with, I start by reviewing earlier literatures on developmental state including 
its extension to middle-income trap and industrial upgrading under globalization. Following 
that, I summarize several prominent scholarly reviews on developmental state literatures that 
criticize the lack of discussion over the political foundation of developmental states. These 
scholarly reviews help us to understand two important points. First, these developmental state 
literatures emerged as a critique of the neoliberal approach on growth by focusing on 
institutionalism (government’s role). Second, however, only a little attention has been given in 
understanding the emergence of developmental states’ efficient institutional arrangement due 
to the existing scholarly obsession to find a recipe for faster growth (i.e., policy selection, a 
certain type of institutional arrangement).  
This brings me to several works that use political approach to understand the politics 
behind technology policy. Here, I highlight Doner et. al., (2005) and their systemic 
vulnerability concept that provide the most complete analysis on the emergence of 
developmental state’s industrial catch-up pursuit. The next question is how do we explain the 
emergence of “non-developmental”? In order to resolve this problem, I evaluate the existing 
prominent scholars who compare the high-growth Northeast Asian developmental states and 
other countries that have weaker growth performance records or weaker industrial development 
trajectories. By the end of this chapter, I provide a literature mapping to construct a method of 
comparison (see Chapter 3) that can provide a better explanation of different industrial 
trajectories among latecomer countries. 
 
2.I. Developmental State and Industrial Catch-Up 
There are abundant works of literature on the developmental state. These works of 
literature have different focuses, ranging from the institutional arrangement, the historical-
political-economic foundation of the developmental state, and also the expansion of its agenda 
into the middle-income trap and industrial upgrading. In this section, I divide a selected number 
of developmental state literature into two categories. The first category consists of earlier 
prominent literatures such as: Johnson (1982), Amsden (1989), Deyo (1987), Wade (1990). 
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They investigate the latecomer countries’ industrialization experiences in Northeast Asia 
countries (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) to emphasize the significance of efficient industrial 
policy to support industrial catch-up. These works of literature lead to a publication by World 
Bank on The East Asian Miracle, from which an efficient institutional arrangement gradually 
becomes the accepted norm for latecomers’ successful industrial catch-up. From this point, 
there are more works by scholars and international organizations that incorporate the 
developmental states’ experience in industrial catch-up to expand the discussion from 
industrial policy into industrial upgrading issues in the context of globalization and middle-
income trap.  
The second category consists of various scholars who evaluate and also criticize the 
earlier works on developmental state arrangement, such as: Öniş (1991), Moon and Prasad 
(1994), and Haggard (2018). These are some of the important scholars who bring the discussion 
on developmental state beyond policy selection and institutional arrangement to support faster 
industrialization and economic growth. They question the political and historical foundation of 
developmental state arrangements. Based on these works, this subsection also includes the 
works of scholars who use political approach on examining both the developmental state 
(Doner, et al., 2005; Doner, 2011) and the national innovation system (Acemoglu & Robinson, 
2006; Taylor, 2016). Here, I seek to emphasize the importance of the systemic vulnerability 
concept proposed by Doner et. al., (2005). 
 
2.I.a. Initial Literatures on Developmental State Concept and Its Expansion   
 In 1993, the World Bank released a report on the “East Asian Miracle”, which offers a 
framework to understand the high growth of East Asian countries particularly Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. The report states that the High Performing Asian Economies 
(HPAEs) were able to achieve high economic growth mainly because the governments had 
accomplished three main functions of growth: accumulation, efficient allocation, and rapid 
technological catch-up (The World Bank, 1993b, p. 10). A strong institution is their 
precondition for efficient selective interventions through various set of policy instruments, 
which build upon the conception of developmental state. These sets of policies can be 
categorized into two types: 1) fundamentals or traditional government obligations (i.e., 
adequate infrastructure and education or human capital, and secure financial institutions 
including savings and investment); and 2) interventions (i.e., mild repression of interest rates, 
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state capitalism, mandatory savings mechanism, and socialization of risk). The report suggests 
several lessons for other developing countries, which includes how they need to get the 
fundamental essentials (e.g., savings, human capital, macroeconomic management, price 
distortions) to support rapid productivity.  
These efficient institutions gradually become the accepted norms for latecomer 
countries as the preconditions to pursue rapid economic growth. Yet, decades later, instead of 
looking into more successful catch-up experiences, the latecomer countries government is 
facing another problem: middle-income trap. There are more developing countries that failed 
to sustain high growth. Development discussions then pay more attention to a sustained 
structural change. The topic of indigenous manufacturing upgrading and technological catch-
up receives more attention along with the rise of innovation studies in the era of globalization. 
One of the examples is the report by UNIDO (2015), which promotes the idea on technology-
driven industrial catch-up. The precondition remains the same: a strong institution. Only this 
time, it is manifested in a form of effective triple-helix coordination (i.e., government-
universities-industry). Yet again, this is based on the successful industrial policies in Northeast 
Asian developmental states. 
First, let us start with the initial works of literature that gave birth to norms of “strong 
institutions”. Some of the most prominent works on developmental states are Johnson (1982), 
Amsden (1989), and Wade (1990). With regards to the “recipes for high growth success”, these 
works show some similarities in policy selections and institutional arrangements that support 
high economic growth in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. They mainly focus on industrial 
policy, with a focal point on indigenous technology development. 
Johnson (1982) Amsden (1989) Wade (1990) 
Japan (1925-1975) South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan 
(with comparison to Brazil, 
Turkey, India, and Mexico) 
Taiwan 
(with comparison to Japan, South 
Korea, and Hong Kong)  
MITI, Industrial Policy, 
Technology centrality, Plan-
rational state (traced back to Meiji 
Restoration 1868) 
Learning-based industrialization, 
State-Big businesses (heavy 
industries) close relation, Labor 
relations  
Governed Market  
Institutional arrangement: 
Developmental state or the high-
growth system: 
• self-control: state licenses 
private enterprises to 
achieve development 
goals 
• state-control: a separation 
between management 
Institutional arrangement: 
1. An interventionist state 
2. Large diversified 
business groups, an 
abundant supply of 
competent salaried 
managers, and  
Institutional arrangement: 
1. Unified political power 
2. Unified groups’ 
commitment on 
industrialization 
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(under state supervision) 
and ownership 
• public-private 
cooperation (selective 
access to governmental 
financing, targeted tax 
breaks, government-
supervised investment, 
equitable allocation by 
the state of burdens 
during times of adversity, 
governmental assistance 
in commercialization and 
sale of products and when 
an industry begins to 
decline) 
3. An abundant supply of 
low-cost, well-educated 
labor 
 
Three facets of growth: 
1. Diversification (new 
industries) 
2. Stabilization (short-run 
macroeconomic policy) 
3. Growth momentum 
(technological 
discoveries) 
Other aspects: The U.S.’s strategic interest that works hand-in-hand with industrial development 
Tab. 2.1 Summary Points of Johnson, Amsden, and Wade 
Source: Author 
Johnson (1982) is one of the most prominent works on Japanese post-war rapid 
economic growth. Johnson mainly centers his analysis on the supremacy of Japanese 
institutions, particularly through the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and 
their industrial policy. There are several important points from Johnson’s work that I would 
like to highlight. First, Johnson argues that Japanese rapid industrialization as a latecomer was 
a result of its characteristic as a plan-rational state, or what is now referred to as a 
developmental state. In Johnson’s definition, a plan-rational state, as opposed to a market-
rational state such as the U.S., gave “greatest precedence” to an ever-increasing domestic 
industrial competitiveness as a “goal-oriented” national economic strategy. Its trade policy 
seeks to obtain economic advantage instead of general foreign policy purposes (pp. 19-20). 
Second, the central component within this efficient development planning is the importation 
and development of foreign technology to support its high-growth industries. MITI was in 
charge to manage the flow of foreign technologies entering Japan, which came in a scheduled 
time, and to nurture domestic industries (Johnson, 1982, pp. 16-17). Third, Johnson points out 
that the origin9 of this plan-rational state went back to the 1868 Meiji Restoration, in which the 
Meiji government sought to gain economic independence after their contact with Western 
power (p. 52).  
  Another prominent literature on latecomer countries’ industrialization is Amsden 
(1989) on South Korea. Amsden places her focus on the importance of learning-based 
 
9 Ohno (2018) provides thorough explanation on how the external threat push the Meiji government to pursue 
industrialization, which later became the basis for Japanese rapid industrialization in post-World War II. 
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industrialization. State plays a crucial role to discipline the large firms to be innovative and to 
internationally competitive. According to Amsden, late industrializing countries such as South 
Korea experienced faster industrialization relative to European emulators in the 1700s to 1800s 
because of three institutions: an interventionist state, large diversified business groups, an 
abundant supply of competent salaried managers, and an abundant supply of low-cost, well-
educated labor (Amsden, 1989, p. 8). As Amsden emphasizes the importance of technological 
learning, similar to Johnson, I would like to point out that South Korea’s current indigenous 
technological advancement also started from developing imported foreign technologies. 
Similar to Japan, underneath this strategy lies the government’s objective to attain 
technological independence (Amsden, 1989, pp. 20-21). Therefore, both Johnson and Amsden 
highlight that the efficient institutional arrangement (e.g. state-large firms’ coordination) and 
effective policy selections (e.g. education spending, labor control) steamed from the 
government’s motivation to pursue industrial catch-up through foreign technological 
development (i.e., government support over indigenous industrial upgrading).  
 Wade (1990), under the same line with Amsden and Johnson, also discusses how strong 
government role contributed to the economic development success in Taiwan. He argues that 
the government of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have selected similar policies and 
institutional arrangements that are intended to build up indigenous industry competitiveness in 
the international market. The focal point of his book is how and when the government 
intervenes, especially concerning the neoclassical view. His book discusses much on the 
economic effect of a governed market. He points out that there is a unified political power and 
groups of people who are committed to industrialization within this ‘governed market’. 
Political power cannot be fragmented between different groups whose interests are against 
industrialization. He also points out the connection between political survival and the need for 
productive investment or industrial policy (Wade, 1990, p. 33).   
However, while Wade and Amsden clearly promote the idea for other developing 
countries to follow the success stories of the Northeast Asia, Johnson does not share the same 
sentiment. Amsden states that South Korea can be used as a model for late industrialization 
(Amsden, 1989, p. vi). Wade places his focus on identifying the policies, which were adopted 
by the successful countries, and then offers prescriptions for other developing countries’ 
government (Wade, 1990, p. 348). Meanwhile, Johnson’s Japanese model is not intended for 
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duplication10 as he points out that the Japanese developmental model was built upon a 
“situational nationalism of its people during the 1950s and 1960s” (p. 307). This situational 
nationalism is something that cannot be borrowed by other states. Thus, Johnson’s model 
building (i.e., Japan’s priorities and institutions) is not intended for a duplication (p. 322). 
 All of these earlier scholarly attention towards developmental states focus on the 
government’s intervention to boost rapid economic growth through industrialization. They 
discuss a variety of policy selections and a variety of institutional arrangements. Gradually, 
these become the ideal strategy for the latecomers, in which industrial growth is at the center 
of the rapid economic growth strategy. Ironically, however, the free trade regime and the wave 
of globalization11 (including the expansion of global production network) are simultaneously 
constrain latecomer countries’ effort to duplicate the same industrial policy (e.g., tariff 
protection, subsidy). Nevertheless, the consensus over the importance of indigenous 
manufacturing upgrading remains. Thus, developmental state studies started to incorporate a 
discussion on industrial upgrading within an open international economy. This also relates to 
the middle-income trap study from the perspective of the structural economy.  
 Among various approaches within the study on the middle-income trap (Kharas & 
Kohli, 2011; Gill & Kharas, 2015; Pruchnik & Zowczak, 2017), generally, there are two 
approaches to understand the ‘trap’. The neoclassical economic approach, which seeks to find 
a universal determinant for economic slowdowns, and the structural-evolutionary economic 
approach, which emphasizes the nature of the productive structure of the economy and 
technological learning process within the context of international competitiveness (Paus, 
2018). Indigenous manufacturing upgrading has become the principal focus of the second 
approach. This leads to the importance of indigenous technology-driven manufacturing 
 
10 It is important to note that when Japan implemented their policy in the 1960s, MITI also faced an external 
pressure to liberalize the Japanese market from the international organizations and their allies. Johnson (1982) 
states that MITI did see how liberalization challenged their raison d'etre as a bureaucracy (p. 249). However, at 
the same time they also acknowledged that liberalization provide an opportunity for Japan to move up into high-
technology industries. Thus, as they started the liberalization process, MITI also took various measures to tackle 
the negative impact on their industries, such as the establishment of Industrial Structure Investigation Council in 
1961 (p. 253). Overall, Johnson points out that the efficient dynamics between government and businesses played 
important role in facing the pressure of trade liberalization. Johnson argues that the legacy of MITI from the 
1960s, from figure like Shigeru Sahashi, is how Japan was able “to change its industrial structure in order to meet 
changes in the economic environment, and how to do so without relinquishing the advantages of either democracy 
or competition” (p. 274). This offers different experiences with the laissez-faire approach. 
11 The essential feature of globalization is mostly about the economic interpretation of globalization. Bisley 
(2007), referring to Bhagwati’s definition, puts it as an integration process of national economies into the 
international economy through channels such as trade, FDI, short-term capital flows, flows of workers or human 
resources, and flows of technology (p. 19).  
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upgrading in the latecomer countries which are stuck in the middle-income trap (Lee, 2013; 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 2015). 
 There is a growing number of works focusing on the technology spillover from 
multinational companies (MNCs) into indigenous firms12. From the angle of developmental 
state studies (i.e., the strong role of government), there is a consensus that latecomer countries 
need to avoid a passive FDI-dependent strategy. Such a passive, outward-looking, FDI-
dependent strategy often underestimates the difficulties of internalizing technological 
spillovers (Narula & Dunning, 2010, p. 272). The FDI-dependent strategy will lead to 
difficulties in terms of manufacturing upgrading capabilities (Lall & Narula, 2004, p. 461). As 
argued by Fu, Pietrobelli, and Soete (2011), “without proactive indigenous innovation efforts, 
foreign technology remains only static technology embedded in imported machines which will 
never turn into real indigenous technological capabilities” (p. 1210). Therefore, the recent 
discussions and policy recommendations focus more on the latecomer governments’ role to 
support indigenous manufacturing firms upgrading. It is done through a mechanism such as 
triple helix coordination (government-universities/R&D institutes-industry) within STI policy 
to develop foreign and to transform it into indigenous technological capabilities. 
 Yet again, the problem of these new generation of developmental state literatures are 
that they have the same precondition: a developmental ‘plan-rational’ state whose main 
objective is rapid economic growth through industrialization strategy. Scholars often assume 
that state (or the political elites) are willing to sacrifice short-term narrow interest for long-
term economic interests such as industrial catch-up as a strategy to pursue growth. If we simply 
follow these developmental state literatures then the answer to the failed industrial catch-up is 
a lack of efficient institutional arrangement or a wrong policy selection, with the developmental 
state as the ideal. In this regard, it is helpful to look into prominent scholarly works who review 
the developmental state literature and point out their weaknesses, particularly if we seek to 
construct a comprehensive cross-country comparison. 
 
 
12 With regards to a free trade regime, recent trend on multilateral trade agreements and an open market-led 
economic regionalism, such as ASEAN, facilitating FDIs for developing countries can provide more opportunities 
for national governments to increase their national technological capabilities as a foundation for a sustained 
economic growth. 
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2.I.b. Reviews and Critiques on Developmental State Literatures 
 In this section, I summarize three works that provide important evaluations and 
criticisms on the existing developmental state literatures, which are Öniş (1991), Moon and 
Prasad (1994), and Haggard (2018). Haggard’s review is particularly essential because it is one 
of the latest and one of the most far-reaching. Öniş’s writings, one of the earliest review, 
complementing the work of Johnson (1982), Deyo (1987), Amsden (1989), and Wade (1990), 
which are referred as the new emerging counter critique on neoliberal vision of East Asian 
growth (institutionalist) in that time period (p. 110). According to Öniş, the fundamental 
element of the developmental state approach is how an autonomous state’s prioritization on 
industrialization process, with a well-defined technology policy at its center, managed to 
constrained market rationality (Öniş, 1991, p. 110). Öniş states that developmental state 
literatures contribute mostly to the development of the institutionalist framework13 that 
challenges the neoclassical logic of government-market relations.   
 Moon and Prasad (1994) also highlight the same point on how the developmental state 
paradigm acts as a strong alternative to the neoclassical and dependency approach on growth. 
However, Moon and Prasad express their concern over a “success cases-centric” approach to 
the political economy of growth. They argued that the developmental state approach “did not 
ask the right questions” as it was originated from “historically sensitive cases studies” on the 
“interrelations among politics, institutions, and choice” (pp. 380-381). They make an important 
point that while politics can be structured by institutions, institutions can also be constructed 
by political actors and their conflict of interest (pp. 380-381). Their focus is on the need for a 
discussion over the ontological foundation of the East Asian political economy.  
 This brings us to Haggard (2018). Haggard’s review on developmental state literatures 
provides important insight into how we should understand not only the political foundation of 
developmental state, but also the non-developmental state ones. Haggard states that the 
developmental state approach gradually goes further than the institutional factors. Current 
proponents of the developmental state have been incorporating the historical foundation of 
development states and non-developmental states. Haggard emphasizes the critical 
 
13 Öniş argues further that the strength of the Northeast Asian developmental state comes from the formation of 
political coalitions with the domestic industry. He perceives that a meritocratic form of recruitment contributed 
to how these countries attract the best managerial talent in the bureaucratic elite. He states that “Hence the 
bureaucrats were imbued with a sense of mission and identified themselves with national goals which derived 
from a position of leadership in society” (Öniş, 1991, p. 114). However, I found that this explanation is too 
simplistic and exaggerated, particularly because nationalistic behavior can manifest in a different form depending 
on countries’ specific experiences. 
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contribution of these scholars is their emphasis on an international context that can constrain a 
“potentially predatory state elites” (p. 6). In this regard, Haggard points out that among various 
developmental states’ origin literatures, Doner et. al., (2005) (i.e., systemic vulnerability) is 
one of the most important works because it describes the interaction between different 
circumstances (i.e., the context) comprehensively. 
For Haggard (2018), the survival of developmental thinking to these present days 
tightly relates to the continuous debate over the relations between state and economic growth 
in a changing international dynamic (e.g., global financial crisis, middle-income trap, global 
production networks deepening), especially through continuous comparative studies14. He 
points out several lessons from developmental state literatures. First, it is important to see 
growth through a micro lens instead of a macro process as claimed by the neoclassical growth 
model, which was based on developed countries' experiences. He argues that it is important to 
understand the different conditions faced by developing countries. According to Haggard, the 
most challenging task for scholars is “how to think about the coalitional foundations of 
successful economic development” (p. 85). Therefore, state’s capacity and the social 
foundation of long-run growth are important elements. This is where he sees the potential of a 
good comparative historical approach, which avoids pragmatism and has a better definition of 
“best practice” (pp. 94-95). Haggard’s conclusion helps the construction of this research’s 
method of comparison in the third chapter. 
 Let us draw four important points that can be extracted from these three reviews. First, 
that developmental state studies emerged as an alternative approach to neoclassical perspective 
on growth. Second, beyond the discussion over institutional arrangement and policy selection 
within developmental states, lies its basic foundations: actors coalitions and their consensus to 
prioritize rapid economic growth through industrial catch-up. Third, the historical approach 
hence necessary to understand where the broad coalition was started and what provoked its 
emergence. Therefore, we need to pay attention to domestic structures (e.g., state-businesses 
relation, state-labor relations) and international context15 (e.g., international – global economic 
regime). Fourth, most of the existing historical comparative studies build their argumentation 
 
14 Haggard also points out that the developmentalist thinking re-emerged, even after the neoliberal victory in the 
post-Cold War, due to the recent concern among developing countries on premature deindustrialization and 
middle-income trap. 
15 In this regard, Cummings (1984) argues that Northeast Asia’s industrial catch-up experiences was “a regional 
phenomenon in which a tripartite hierarchy of core, semi-periphery, and periphery were created in the first part 
of the 20th century and then slowly recreated after the World War II” (p. 38).  
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from how to explain the ‘developmental states’ and the ‘non-developmental states’ (predatory 
states); resulting on a success-failure judgment.  
 Before moving forward to various comparative studies on development, particularly on 
industrial catch-up, we need to discuss one of the most contributive approaches to understand 
the origins of developmental state’s emergence. These three reviews, including Johnson (1982) 
himself, point out that the emergence of developmental states were provoked by specific 
conditions. The political coalition is the keyword to developmental state arrangement 
(industrial catch-up pursuit). Following Haggard (2018), who highlights the strength of Doner 
et. al., (2005), I break down the systemic vulnerability concept in the next subsection. 
 
2.I.b.1. The Systemic Vulnerability: The Interplay between Resource Constraints, External 
Threat, and Broad Political Coalition 
The concept of the developmental state makes the government the central actor in 
speeding up a country’s industrial catch-up process. In this regard, industrial catch-up is an 
expensive, long-term investment that requires a broad coalition within the government, which 
is the starting premise of systemic vulnerability. Doner et. al., (2005) argue that while the 
conventional wisdom perceives that developmental states are a result of state autonomy, they 
argue that state’s huge capacities to prioritize industrial catch-up to support rapid growth 
emerged from the systemic vulnerability that force the political elites to uphold political 
coalitions and retain power. The willingness of actors to neglect their narrow interest to pursue 
a long-term costly strategy such as industrial catch-up was provoked by a constrained 
environment (see Fig. 2.1.).  
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Fig. 2.1 Systemic Vulnerability as Interpreted by Author 
Source: Author 
Doner et. al., (2005) investigate the success of Park Chung-Hee in South Korea, Chiang 
Kai Shek in Taiwan, and Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore16. They argue that a systemic 
vulnerability refers to a “simultaneous interplay” between three constraints17. First, there is a 
heightened need for foreign exchange and war materiel induced by national insecurity or a 
severe security threat. Second, this insecurity comes from a credible threat that any 
deterioration in the living standards of popular sectors could trigger unmanageable mass unrest, 
which provokes broad coalitional commitments; 3) the hard budget constraints imposed by a 
scarcity of easy revenue sources such as natural resource endowments scarcity (p. 328). In sum, 
external threats coupled with resource scarcity provide a strong incentive for the political elite 
(i.e., political survival) and bureaucrats to coordinate with multiple actors (e.g., bureaucrats, 
 
16 In addition, Doner et. al., (2005) also test their hypothesis on five Southeast Asian countries (Singapore, 
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. They argue that systemic vulnerability only exists in 
Singapore. In this regard, this Ph.D. dissertation does not simply want to argue on the absence of systemic 
vulnerability for three Southeast Asian countries (Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia), and also Latin American 
countries, it rather seeks to argue that an equal comparison how different circumstances leads to different 
prioritization on technology-driven industrial catch-up strategy (instead of systemic vulnerability and the 
emergence or non-emergence of developmental states). As exhibited in Chapter 3, the purpose of comparative 
study is to understand how countries developed differently instead of evaluating how far a latecomer country 
deviates or diverges from the developmental state ideal.    
17 According to them, this systemic vulnerability conditions are made in a deterministic term, instead of 
probabilistic, to facilitate falsification. It is not because they deny the agency of state leaders (Doner, et al., 2005, 
p. 330). This means, that the emergence of a developmental state depends on all three conditions. On this Ph.D. 
Dissertation, I developed the systemic vulnerability concept to incorporate national unity and socio-economic 
structure as factors that also enabled the political elites to pursue costly long-term industrial catch-up strategy 
(more on Chapter 3).  
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research institutions, firms) under an efficient institutional arrangement that support a long-
term industrial catch-up strategy. 
Doner et. al., (2005) seek to show causal relations between systemic vulnerability and 
broad coalition in developmental state arrangement. At normal conditions, ruling political elites 
prefer narrow coalitions to maintain their political survival. They would expand their coalition 
when they are threatened by credible mass mobilization, which can be solved by side payments 
to the popular sectors (i.e., popular interest or the “lower economic class”). But in the 
occurrence of security threat and pressing need for defense budget allocation, ruling political 
elites are pressed to marginalize the popular sector politically without completely ignoring 
them economically (e.g., labor control). With a lack of easy revenue, the ruling political elites 
are pressed “to abandon low-wage-based export for a higher-skill quality-based export 
trajectories” in their future economic strategy without undermining the popular sector18 (p. 
331). Doner et. al., also argue that they supported Johnson’s (1982) emphasis on security threat 
that provokes patriotism19 in Northeast Asia, which are channeled through the construction of 
stronger economic institutions because they are pressed by the resource constraints (Doner, et 
al., 2005, p. 332). Therefore, when the state seeks to maximize revenue under these systemic 
vulnerability constraints20, they would avoid relying only on costly foreign technology to 
support growth and instead promotes growth by continuously upgrading their local resources 
(Doner, et al., 2005, p. 340).   
On his other works, Doner (2011) repeats his argumentation of vulnerability and argues 
that this contributes to weaker institutional capacities in the four middle-income ASEAN 
countries (Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines) in comparison with the New 
 
18 Here, I would like to make a note that Doner et al., do not explore much on the domestic dynamics as their 
focus is more on the presence of external threat. Thus, they ignore how a particular domestic structure plays role 
in shaping the selection of industrial strategy. I seek to incorporate this aspect on my method of comparison (see 
Fig 3.2. on Chapter 3). 
19 Doner et al., use the term patriotism. Scholars tend to differentiate patriotism with nationalism, in which the 
latter is often perceived as a sentiment imbued with a desire for power and superiority. Orwell’s Notes on 
Nationalism (1945), which was written in the post-World War II Europe, place the term patriotism in a defensive 
nature while nationalism in an aggressive nature. However, the term nationalism is commonly used by scholars 
in Southeast Asia because it is often associated with the independence movement from the colonial power and 
nation-building in post-World War II, see for example Tarling (2004). 
20 With regards to resource endowments, they differentiate between two characteristics of state: state as revenue 
satisfices and as revenue maximizer. The state’s tendency to maximize revenue depends on coalitional and 
geographical context (Doner, et al., 2005, p. 340).  
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Industrializing Countries21 (NICs). Doner evaluates various institutional capacities in these 
countries by focusing on the pressures and opportunities faced by the political elites. There are 
three important points noted by Doner on this paper concerning the technology policy or the 
national innovation system. First, he argues there is sufficient level of awareness among the 
policymakers in Malaysia and Thailand to promote the importance of local technology 
development, particularly with regards to its linkage to industrial deepening with export 
promotion. Second, nonetheless, this has not produced any prominent results as the ASEAN 
countries’ economics has yet to transform into higher value-added activities. Third, thus, he 
argues that the policy and policy objective variations within the national innovation system 
alone cannot explain the development performance outcomes (p. 156).  
It is important to note that Doner (2011) does not explore much on the national 
innovation system itself. He mostly argues that the failure to move-up to higher-value-added 
activities is due to the result of weak institutions instead of STI policy selection and 
institutional arrangement. His discussions on ASEAN countries cases mostly revolving only 
around Malaysia and Thailand. He argues that globalization, natural resource endowment, and 
access to abundant migrant labor reduce the pressure for these two countries to nurture the 
growth coalitions (i.e., the lack of political will). In sum, while Doner makes an important note 
on the coalition, he does not connect it specifically to the national innovation system or STI 
policy in ASEAN countries. He also does not incorporate Indonesia as the largest economic 
power in ASEAN (e.g., labor size, resource endowments). This Ph.D. dissertation places 
indigenous technology as the main element to a sustained manufacturing sector growth. 
Therefore, I perceive that it is important to build up a clearer causal relation between the broad 
coalition and national innovation system (i.e., indigenous technological development to pursue 
indigenous manufacturing upgrading).  
 
2.I.b.2. External Threat, Political Competition, Technological Change, and States’ Support on 
Innovation Activities  
On a rather similar note with Doner (2011), Acemoglu and Robison (2006) and Taylor 
(2016) also discuss how the dynamics between domestic political competition and external 
 
21 New Industrializing Countries refer to the countries that experienced fast industrial growth since the 1960s. In 
the 1970s, the term was first used to describe the rise of Four Asian Tigers: Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and 
South Korea.  
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threat influences the innovation policy22. Both Acemoglu and Robinson and Taylor point out 
that, at the very core, innovation or creation of new technology creates a political loser and can 
reduce the political and economic power of the incumbent. Thus, political elites are reluctant 
to promote change (or costly economic strategy) due to the fear of losing political power despite 
it might benefit society as a whole. When the domestic dynamics fail to provoke innovation, 
only external threats can push the incumbents to support it. 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) argue that external threats will provoke political elites 
to conduct innovation because their weak technological capabilities make countries vulnerable 
to foreign invasion (p. 117). They provide five cases of industrialization in the 19th century 
with Britain, Germany, Japan, Russia, and the Habsburg Empire. They conduct a simple model 
on political replacement effect, in which political elites may block technological and 
institutional development because it disturbs incumbency advantage. Political blocking23 is 
likely to occur in the event of high political stakes and the absence of external threats (p. 129). 
Here, what they seek to measure are the degree of political competition and elites’ attitude 
toward technology change and to investigate its relations with “the likelihood of blocking” (p. 
129).   
It is important to note that, Acemoglu and Robison (2006) goes so far to use the 
expression “fail to encourage industrialization” and “blocking the introduction of new 
technologies and economic institutions necessary for industrialization” (e.g., production of 
well-functioning factor markets, property rights, and legal system). However, I find that this 
sentiment is too simplistic. With the current extensive promotion of national innovation system 
in developing countries, latecomer governments have been emphasizing the importance of 
technology and manufacturing growth, as pointed out by Doner (2011). I would like to point 
out two issues here. First, scholars need to also evaluate what kind of technology development 
and what the government sought to do with it? Because, in most cases, technology 
development, promoted by latecomer governments, is focused on low-technology development 
or resource-centric technology such as agriculture technology. In this regard, the promotion of 
 
22 One of the earlier works that seek to build a connection between the technological creativity and political 
competition is Mokyr (1994) and the Cardwell’s Law, which is based on Donald S. L. Cardwell’s “Turning Points 
in Western Technology” in 1972. Mokyr develops Cardwell’s Law, which is a statement in the economic history 
about the importance of pluralism and competition, to argue that technological progress can be opposed by the 
political losers (i.e., pressure groups). On another note, Taylor (2016) also incorporate Cardwell’s Law in his 
book.  
23 Doner et. al., (2009) refers this as effective veto players. 
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technology development within the national innovation system is not intended for the 
indigenous manufacturing upgrading mechanism. The second issue is that does the government 
actively seek to improve indigenous manufacturing upgrading or simply relying on MNCs-
driven manufacturing sector growth24, which is enabled by the globalization process? Again, 
in this research, the matter of innovation is not simply innovation for the sake of innovating 
but innovation for the pursuit of indigenous manufacturing upgrading. 
Taylor (2016) presents his creative insecurity25 as a direct contrast to Joseph 
Schumpeter’s creative destruction. He adds external forces into Schumpeter’s domestic-centric 
innovation approach to explain the national innovation rates. He further argues that “countries 
for which external threats are relatively greater than domestic rivalries should have higher 
innovation rates than countries for which domestic rivalries outweigh external threat” (p. 216). 
Therefore, Taylor defines creative insecurity as “the condition of perceiving more threats from 
external hazard than from domestic rival” (p. 216). Taylor’s creative insecurity seeks to answer 
“what” are the politics behind innovation pursuit instead of “which institutions or policies” a 
country should use to pursue innovation (p. 225). There are two elements of creative insecurity: 
the distributional politics and the security politics (or the economic dimension of national 
security). Taylor treats national domestic rivalries as a force that reduces support for 
innovation, due to the potential political resistance on innovation. Meanwhile, the national 
threats to a country’s military security act as a force that increases support for innovation in the 
strategic-defense sector. 
In sum, if Doner et. al., (2005) argue that the systemic vulnerability provokes a broad 
coalition, then Taylor (2016) sees it is as creative insecurity. However, in contrast with Doner 
et. al., Taylor’s takes on innovation policy and national innovation system is detached to 
national economic strategy (i.e., rapid economic growth through upgrading as a means to gain 
high revenues to fund defense sector). Instead, Taylor’s focus is on the state’s objective to 
 
24 The expansion of global production networks by MNCs from developed countries to the developing countries, 
especially in the late 1900s, benefited the home countries who have an abundance of resources and labors. Labor 
abundance provides the political elite with an alternative strategy to boost manufacturing growth without 
developing indigenous manufacturing technologies. 
25 In addition to Schumpeter and Taylor, Christensen also coined out the theory of disruptive innovation in 1995 
that is more popular among the small entrepreneurial companies instead of large companies. The concept of 
disruptive innovation targets the low-end of the market and the less profitable but new market. It promotes 
accessibility and affordability as it seeks to find the overlooked market segment (i.e., by the industry leaders). 
Christensen differentiate disruptive innovations with sustaining innovations, which is an innovation to create a 
better product (e.g., television with higher picture quality, cars with higher fuel-efficiency) (Christensen, et al., 
2015). Thus, this concept moves away from the idea of technological catch-up or competing with the technological 
leaders.  
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increase strategic-defense technology capabilities to reduce the nation’s reliance on foreign 
weaponry. According to Taylor, competitive Science and Technology or S&T-based industries 
started with a government effort to develop indigenous S&T capabilities to produce strategic-
defense goods that are too expensive to be purchased from abroad (p. 229). In other words, this 
refers to an import-substitution policy in the strategic defense sector under the framework of a 
balance of power instead of industrial catch-up or development pursuit.  
Concerning the purpose of this Ph.D. dissertation, Taylor’s (2016) understanding of 
innovation is detached from the notion of industrial upgrading and structural change. Despite 
his statement that “framing S&T in security term is foolish” (p. 291), Taylor’s creative 
insecurity implies that the state’s active involvement in S&T development is provoked by the 
need to increase their strategic-defense technological capabilities. Thus, it ignores other factors 
that might influence national development paths such as resource endowment. Resource 
endowment is one of the important factors that influence specific technology development 
pursuit within a national innovation system, such as resource-based technology development. 
Overall, Taylor’s conception of innovation and S&T advancement is a very broad one. He also 
does not differentiate between the lead countries and the latecomer countries.  
As I have stated in Chapter 1, historically of STI policy is not always related to 
economic growth pursuits. According to Lundvall and Borrás (2005), science policy as a 
concept was born in post-World War II era. The increasing government’s support for science 
and technology development in the developed countries intertwined with national security and 
also war interest, for example, arms and space races between the U.S. and Soviet Union (the 
launch of Sputnik in 1957). The innovation policy is gradually being used more often along 
with economic stagnancy in the 1970s. This provoked a growing interest in a national 
innovation system that can boost up national economic growth. Therefore, to quote Lundvall 
and Borrás, “technology policy means different things for catching-up countries than it does 
for high-income countries” (p. 8). They argue that for large high-income countries, the purpose 
of technology policy is to establish higher capacities to produce the latest science-based 
technologies, which is often triggered when their national interests were threatened such as in 
the event of the Cold War. Meanwhile, the objective of catching-up countries (e.g., Japan, 
South Korea, and Taiwan) is to imitate and to catch-up with the lead technology.  
In sum, the STI policy and national innovation system can be interpreted and function 
differently by the government in different countries. Time horizon, local conditions, and 
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economic development level are several factors that influence the national government’s 
perception of their national innovation system. What kind of technology did they seek to 
prioritize, for what purpose, under what kind of economic strategy? The industrial policy in 
developmental states was built upon indigenous technological development to support 
indigenous manufacturing firms’ upgrading to pursue rapid economic growth. Their successes 
dominate the discourse of national innovation system (STI policy) promotion for other 
latecomers. However, STI policy itself can actually be discussed through different lenses. In 
this regard, the usage of same STI indicators in a cross-countries comparison neglects other 
latecomers’ local conditions and historical-political context. Thus, it would not be sufficient to 
evaluate their different industrial development trajectories. This brings me to the second 
section on the existing comparative works of literature.  
 
2.II. Comparative Approaches on Industrial Path Trajectories 
The notion of good governance is quite ambiguous, and is often used rather 
tautologically. When things are going well, there must be good governance; 
otherwise, presumably, things would not be going well. So one does not really 
have much of an explanation of good economic performance by simply evoking 
good governance, although it is widely touted these days, sometimes ad 
nauseum. (Jomo, 2003, p. 4) 
 
In the first section, I already summarize key works of literature to understand the 
connection between industrial catch-up studies, developmental states, and the national 
innovation system. Good governance or efficient institutional arrangement is perceived as the 
foundation for successful industrial catch-up in developmental states. But then how do we 
explain the countries which failed or have yet to achieve catch-up? Most of comparative study 
literatures, which compare the high-growth Northeast Asian developmental states and other 
countries that have weaker growth performance or weaker industrial development trajectories, 
tend to come up with two types of argument: 1) non-developmental states have less efficient 
institutional arrangement (e.g., clientelism problem, populism, or regime difference) that leads 
to short-term interest pursuit by government26; 2) the difference in historical process such as 
colonialism gave birth to inefficient state formation such as an extractive-predatory state. The 
main idea is the same, is to place a judgment on an ideal versus a less ideal institutional 
 
26 Gereffi and Wyman (1990) argue that populism in Latin American countries is the source of ineffective 
economic policy selection. 
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arrangement based on how it produces high-growth or industrial catch-up. I summarize several 
prominent works on comparative studies Table 2.2. below.   
 Method & cases Point of comparison 
(causality) 
1. Kohli (2004) Qualitative cases study on 
Brazil, South Korea, 
Nigeria, and India 
Colonial rule & Social coalitions → State forms 
 
Three state forms: 
1. neo-patrimonial states (e.g., African countries such as Nigeria)  
2. cohesive-capitalist states or developmental states (e.g., South 
Korea under Park Chung-Hee and Brazil under Estado Novo-
Military government) 
3. fragmented-multiclass states (e.g., India and Brazil) 
 
2. Centeno et. al., 
(2017) 
Case study in a series of 
collective essays 
Latin American countries, 
South Korea, the 
Philippines, Thailand, 
Brazil, African countries, 
India, China, and Taiwan 
 
(Historical) Origins → Organizational (State) Capacity → 
Political Deployment → Performance (growth) 
 
Historical origins: 
Pattern of colonialism, types of political economies, 
socioeconomic inequalities, wars, struggles of national liberation 
and ethic relations 
 
Organizational (state) Capacity: 
1. Resource (state revenues) 
2. Presence of the state (legitimacy) 
3. Mandarins (bureaucratic professionalism) 
4. Coherence of mandates across and within institutions (broad 
consensus). This component “may be the least analyzed and yet 
most important” (Centeno, et al., 2017, p. 10). 
 
3. Acemoglu et. al., 
(2001) 
Quantitative-empirical 
approach on European 
Colonialism 
European Colonialism → State Capacity → Long-run effects 
on Growth 
 
 
4. Vu (2010) Qualitative cases study on 
South Korea, Vietnam, 
China, and Indonesia 
 
State Formation → State (Development) Structure ⇄ State 
Development Capacity → Development Outcomes 
 
Colonialism → Structural Cohesion (Intra-Elite and Elite-Mass 
Interaction) 
 
5. Gereffi and Wyman 
(1990) 
Qualitative cross-regional 
historical study on Latin 
American countries 
(Argentina, Brazil, and 
Mexico) and East Asia 
“Four Tigers” (South 
Korea, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, and Singapore) 
(complementing on the existing approaches such as world system 
theory, dependency theory, modernization theory, neoclassical 
trade and investment) 
 
Policy and Institutional Differences → Industrial 
Development 
 
Three categories of comparative development outcomes: 
1. The similarities that characterized all of the NICs (high level 
of economic growth, industrial diversification, manufacture 
goods exporters) 
2. The cross-regional differences between the NICs in Latin 
America and in East Asia (inward-oriented versus export 
promoting model) 
3. The sources of intraregional or national variation among the 
NICs (variation in timing and trajectories of industrialization and 
linkages to the world-system; geopolitical alliance, foreign aid, 
FDI, international debt, foreign trade; national industrial 
structure). 
 
Five phases of Industrial Development: 
Outward-looking phases 
1. Commodity export phase 
2. Primary export-oriented industrialization (EOI) 
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3. Secondary export-oriented industrialization 
Inward-looking phases 
4. Primary import-substituting industrialization (IOI) 
5. Secondary import-substituting industrialization 
 
6. Haggard and 
Kaufman (2008) 
Cross-national statistical 
analysis with regional-
level comparative 
historical analysis on 
middle-income countries 
from Latin America, East 
Asia, and Eastern Europe 
 
Government capacity → Government choice to redistribute 
income (Social-Welfare Policy) → Growth 
 
Three Determinant Factors to Social-Welfare Policy: 
1. Distributive coalitions and economic interest 
2. Performance of the economy and its organization (varieties of 
capitalism) 
3. Political institutions (regime type) 
 
Tab. 2.2 Summary Points of Selected Comparative Study Literatures 
Source: Author 
 
There are two methods that can be used to conduct a comparative study in 
understanding why countries have different development performances. The first one is by 
building up a causality between different institutional (organizational) arrangement and 
development outcomes. Gereffi and Wyman (1990) and Haggard and Kaufman (2008), for 
example, place their focus on the varieties of institutional structure and industrial policy 
selection that leads to different growth and industrial performances. As pointed out by Haggard 
and Kaufman (2008), the problem, however, the focus on an institution is limiting. Initially, 
they seek to evaluate the effect of democracy and its variation on policy selection27. Haggard 
and Kaufman further states that the contemporary trend in the political economy view, which 
use “representative institutions as mechanism for aggregating preferences without an 
understanding of those interest”, is misleading (Haggard & Kaufman, 2008, p. xviii).  
This brings us to the second method, which is to incorporate the historical origins of 
institutional variations in state capacity. State formation is the natural starting point to 
understand why some state transforms into what they are; hence the popularity of colonialism 
as a point of discussion.  Kohli (2004) is one of the earliest scholars who incorporate colonial 
legacy to analyze state institutional forms. In his initial works he merely proposes three 
categorizations of state form (see Tab. 2.2.). Later on, his focus shifts into how colonialism 
produces a different level of state capacity (Centeno, et al., 2017). Coherence or coalition is 
the most important element of state capacity (see Tab. 2.2.). Political coalitions and the balance 
of social forces are two key inputs that determine potential growth outcomes (Centeno, et al., 
2017, p. 11). The logic presented here is as follows: 
 
27 In their case, it is welfare-policy or the government’s choice on income redistribution mechanism. 
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ORIGINS → ORGANIZATIONAL (STATE) CAPACITY → POLITICAL DEPLOYMENT 
→ PERFORMANCE (Centeno, et al., 2017, p. 8) 
 
 Acemoglu et. al., (2001) conduct an empirical analysis on how different European 
colonial experiences resulted in different levels of extractive states28 (i.e., predatory state 
behavior). On his later work with Robinson on “Why Nations Fail”, Acemoglu again argues 
that extractive economic institutions reduce the incentives for political elites to pursue a more 
efficient economic growth strategy because they are “just too happy to extract resources or 
quash any type of independent economic activity that threatens themselves and the economic 
elites”29 (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 372). The linkage between colonial experiences, 
extractive economic institution, and predatory behaviors is tightly connected with the studies 
on natural-resource oligarchs, which often found in various works of literature on the political-
economic history of Latin American and Southeast Asian countries30. The deep involvement 
of oligarchs in these countries’ politics has a strong influence on the national economic policy. 
Vu (2010) conducts a qualitative approach to analyze the impact of state formation 
dynamics on developmental outcomes. Complementing the works of Kohli (2004), he 
incorporates “historical origins of developmental structure as opposed to the policy causes” to 
explain developmental success (2010, p. 8). Instead of linking it to the predatory behavior of 
states, Vu connects colonialism with the degree of political cohesiveness during the state 
formation31. Elite unity, instead of fragmentation, and a controlled mass mobilization are his 
conditions for on a growth-conducive relationship32.  
 Overall, most of these cross-country comparative studies evaluate how developmental 
state occurs or does not occur in other countries. While some focus on the difference in 
 
28 They used mortality rates of European settlers to determine the likeliness of extractive state. They use the 
mortality rates as a source of exogenous variation to estimate the impact of institutions on economic performance. 
Their result shows a high correlation between mortality rates and early institutions and between early institutions 
and institutions today (Acemoglu, et al., 2001, p. 1395).  
29 They use Argentina, Colombia, and Egypt as the example for this.  
30 Studies on natural-resource oligarchs and oligarchy in Latin America can be read from works of literature such 
as Keen and Haynes (2000), Hutchinson (1909), Thorp (1998). Some of the works of literature on oligarchs and 
oligarchy in Southeast Asia include Robinson and Hadiz (2005) and Winters (2011). More discussion on this topic 
can be found in the three main chapters of this Ph.D. dissertation (Chapter 4 to 6).  
31 Here, his focus is the pattern of interaction, both among elites and between elite and mass. 
32 It is important to note that, socialist country and centralized government; hence his emphasis on ideological 
congruence that often neglected as one contributive component of  a developmental structure (2010). Here, I 
would like to argue that basically, ideological congruence works as a legitimacy tool. What is needed is public 
support on the government’s policy choice.  
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institutional arrangement and policy selection, some compares the historical journey. Earlier 
literatures on historical origins focus on how colonialism provoked the emergence of extractive 
states which do fail to prioritize long-term economic plans. This also includes the works that 
discuss political rents and clientelism as the cause for negative development outcomes. 
However, as presented by the case of the developmental states, a close relationship between 
politicians-big businesses and politicians-interest groups exist in almost every country. Thus, 
colonialism and differences in institutional structure alone are not sufficient to explain different 
development trajectories. We need a more comprehensive method of comparison to explain 
different industrial development trajectories. 
 
2.III. Mapping the Existing Literatures: The Foundation of Industrial Catch-Up 
In this Ph.D. dissertation, I do not simply compare various institutional (organizational) 
structures that produce a different level of performance. I seek to emphasize the importance of 
historical origins to understand actors’ behavior that provoked them to choose different policy 
decisions; hence different performance outcomes. In this regard, I construct a method of 
comparison by incorporating systemic vulnerability concept and various key determinant 
factors from the existing works of literature I have reviewed in this chapter. These determinant 
factors influence the political elites’ decision to prioritize industrial catch-up pursuit since the 
initial stage of their national economic planning (more in Chapter 3). Table 2.3. below 
summarized all important elements from the two groups of literature I have discussed earlier. 
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Determinant Factors 
Developmental States 
Origin of 
Developmental States 
Politics of Innovation 
Comparative Studies 
Early Literatures 
Extension 
Literatures: 
Middle-
income trap & 
Industrial 
Upgrading 
Systemic Vulnerability 
Institutional 
Capacity 
Differences 
Historical 
Origins (State 
Formation) 
(Johnson, 
1982) 
(Amsden, 
1989) 
(Wade, 
1990) 
(Gill & 
Kharas, 2015; 
United Nations 
Industrial 
Development 
Organization, 
2015) 
(Doner, et 
al., 2005) 
(Doner, 
2011) 
(Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 
2006) 
(Taylor, 
2016) 
(Gereffi & 
Wyman, 1990; 
Haggard & 
Kaufman, 
2008) 
(Kohli, 2004; 
Centeno, et al., 
2017; Vu, 
2010; 
Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 
2012) 
G
lo
b
al
 –
 
E
x
te
rn
al
 
C
o
n
te
x
t 
External Threat • •   • • • •   
Global Economic 
System • •  •  •   •  
D
o
m
es
ti
c 
C
o
n
te
x
t 
Natural Resource 
Endowment     •   *) • • 
Elite Politic 
Coalition (Rivalries) •  •  • • • • • • 
State Formation 
(Colonialism) – 
National Unity 
       *) *) • 
Socio-Economic 
Structure (e.g., Labor 
& Mass 
mobilization) 
 • • •     • • 
P
o
in
t 
o
f 
D
is
cu
ss
io
n
 Developmental 
State • • • • • •   • • 
Industrial Catch-
Up (Indigenous 
Technology 
Development) 
• •  • • • •  •  
Innovation 
Activities (broad)  •  •  *) • •   
Tab. 2.3 Summary of Key Elements 
Notes: I left out some of the literatures whose conclusion already represented on the literature mentioned above. *) means that the particular element is mentioned on the 
literature not elaborated further as a key element. 
Source: Author  
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In table 2.3., I divide various determinant factors from the existing works into two 
categories: 1) global-external context; and 2) domestic context. For this Ph.D. dissertation, I 
also include the information about their points of discussion. I do this because some, for 
example Taylor (2016), only discuss innovation activity without exploring on the industrial 
upgrading. Overall, as we can see from the table, the earlier works of literature on 
developmental states and its expansions, with an exception to Johnson, do not pay much 
attention to the political-historical aspect behind developmental state arrangements that support 
industrial catch-up. They tend to neglect other countries’ specific historical journey as they 
seek to promote duplication of good governance and efficient policies. Meanwhile, the works 
of literature that do conduct historical approach often stop at how colonialism provoked the 
emergence of extractive-predatory state or the inequality within the society. 
Developmental state scholars, both the earlier works of literature and its extensions 
(i.e., middle-income trap and industrial upgrading studies), tend to center their discussion on 
the policy instruments that support industrial catch-up experiences. Their arguments have been 
extended from industrialization into the national innovation system study. This is manifested 
in the construction of STI policy to support an indigenous technology-driven industrial catch-
up strategy. However, these policy instruments are still built upon a developmental ‘plan 
rational state,’ which do seek to pursue industrial catch-up. The critiques already point out 
these scholars neglect that a developmental state was a product of history. Therefore, analysis 
over historically sensitive cases needs be accompanied by the incorporation of political-
historical contexts that provoked its emergence.   
With regards to “the emergence”, the works of Doner et. al., (2005), Doner (2011), 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), Taylor (2016), and Vu (2010), I want to highlight that: 1) the 
developmental state arrangement and industrial catch-up pursuit requires a broad coalition 
among elites (i.e., political elites-big business-bureaucrats); 2) a broad coalition only takes 
place when these elites perceive that they are facing a significant external threat that disturbs 
national survival, while at the same time are constrained domestically due to the lack of easy 
revenue (i.e., resource scarcity). Thus, this enables a political cohesion to establish institutional 
capacity and efficient policy selection, which is also supported by the national unity and socio-
economic structure (e.g., educational spending prioritization, controlled labor, conducive trade 
and industry policy); 3) accounting industrial development, these vulnerability, which occurs 
in their early stage of national economic planning (state formation), provoked the elites in the 
 37 
latecomer countries to prioritize domestic industrial development through foreign 
technological learning.  
In sum, institutions are constructed by political actors and their interests. The 
developmental state arrangement was born out of a conscious choice upon a specific condition; 
a broad coalition to pursue rapid and sustained growth in a certain period of time. As stressed 
by Haggard (2018), systemic vulnerability offers the most comprehensive explanation of 
developmental state emergence. It answers why and how this broad coalition was born (i.e., 
domestic structure meets external threats). The question then, how do we explain the other 
trajectories? Do we simply argue that these latecomers choose the wrong policy? Southeast 
Asian countries have been following the policy prescription (e.g., export-oriented 
industrialization), yet their technological capabilities remain weak. Do we simply argue that 
their institutional arrangement is inefficient due to problems such as political rents, corruption, 
inefficient bureaucracy, or blaming the lack of democratic institutions? But, how do we explain 
the fact that these exist in most countries, including developed countries? Do we simply argue 
that different colonial structures and abundant natural resources provoke the elite to be more 
predatory than others?   
If we take into account the idea that developmental states emerged as a conscious choice 
by the political elites, then the same logic can be applied to explain the other trajectories. In 
the next chapter, I would like to propose that perhaps the answer is simply to try to understand 
a country’s current industrial trajectories by evaluating their specific period of historical 
journey (i.e., the formation period that has been emphasized by the majority of comparative 
studies). By employing a historical approach, therefore, the underlying logic is to understand 
how the present institutional arrangement was born in a certain period in the past. Different 
contexts, domestic and international, gave birth to various ruling political elites’ priorities, such 
as reliance over short-term natural resource-oriented strategy to gain faster revenues. This then 
extended to their STI policy that is framed far from the indigenous technology-driven industrial 
catch-up. Therefore, it is essential to incorporate three important elements: 1) elites’ behavior 
(who they were and what were their collective interest); 2) international – regional 
circumstances and how the elites perceive it; 3) domestic circumstances (the socio-economic 
structure). In the next chapter, I propose the idea that latecomer countries’ government simply 
has different levels of urgency to prioritize a technology-driven industrial catch-up strategy.   
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CHAPTER 3 METHOD OF COMPARISON 
Incorporating Time Horizon into Systemic Vulnerability 
 
Induction has become a dirty word, and particularly when cases are selected on 
the dependent variable of success. But note how we simultaneously think that 
“best practice” is something that successful companies – and countries – should 
emulate. If we don’t know what the “best practice” was – the range of 
possibilities – it’s hard to draw lessons from it. Local knowledge matters not 
only for those in the policy fray but for those in the academy trying to understand 
it. (Haggard, 2018, p. 95) 
The discussions in the existing works of literature highlight that a historical method is 
essential to find the pieces missing from economic development studies, and therefore, I have 
chosen to use a comparative historical approach in this Ph.D. dissertation. In this regard, path-
dependence logic, or the idea of contingency in past events, becomes the main foundation of 
the method of comparison. Revisiting the emergence period of developmental states can better 
explain their efficient institutional arrangements. If we accept the idea that the institution is 
resistant to change, then present political coalitions that supported a particular economic 
development strategy are also rooted in the past and emerged at a specific time. This is the 
reasoning behind my choice to emphasize the critical juncture period (which I discuss in greater 
depth in the next section). 
 As reviewed in the previous chapter, systemic vulnerability (Doner, et al., 2005) 
provides the most comprehensive analysis on the determinant factors that heavily influence 
political elites’ decision to prioritize industrial catch-up pursuits. Although we can see 
developmental states’ successful industrial catch-up as the best possible trajectory for the 
latecomer countries, I seek to avoid using systemic vulnerability as the “idealistic 
measurement” to evaluate other trajectories. Instead, I use historical context as my foundation 
to construct a method of comparison that includes both the global (external) context and the 
domestic context as initial conditions during and prior to critical juncture periods under the 
path-dependence frame. From this foundation, I assemble and analyze the political and 
historical context that influences different development trajectories. 
A specific context at a specific point in one latecomer country’s journey led to an 
“industrial catch-up” trajectory, while another context that occurred in another country at a 
different time led to a “stagnated” trajectory for the latter country. Different contexts can 
provoke political elites to choose alternative economic growth strategies, which might not be 
 39 
as sustainable as industrial catch-up. The main purpose of this method of comparison is to 
construct an alternative explanation to understand latecomer governments’ choices on growth 
strategy. At the end of this chapter, I propose an idea of different “level of urgency” for an 
industrial catch-up pursuit. 
 As I stated in the opening of the first chapter, “industrial catch-up pursuit” on this Ph.D. 
dissertation refers to the effort to increase indigenous technological capabilities through foreign 
technological learning and development to support upgrading of indigenous manufacturing 
firms. Thus, the manifestation of this industrial catch-up pursuit within national policy takes 
different forms based on different time horizons. Before the globalization and the increasing 
number of free trade regimes of the late 1990s (e.g., the GATT and WTO regimes), under the 
developmental states paradigm, it was manifested in industrial policy (which include the 
political elites’ decision to pursue modernization). In the current global economic regime, it is 
manifested in the STI policy under the notion of a national innovation system33. 
I have divided this chapter into three main sections. In the first section, I explore the 
idea of path-dependence logic, specifically the importance of the critical juncture period. In the 
second section, I then construct my method of comparison for the seven country cases, in which 
I propose a different level of urgency as the main contribution for this Ph.D. dissertation. I also 
include an overview of the seven country cases. In the third section, I elaborate upon a selected 
sub-case to demonstrate further the “self-reproducing sequence” in post-critical juncture 
periods (which I discuss in greater depth in the next section). It is important to note that the 
selection of one country as a sub-case in this dissertation acts as the initial step for the next 
stage of this dissertation. Therefore, the selection of one country does not equal neglect of the 
other six cases because the same method can be applied, and will be applied in the future, to 
the other cases.   
 
3.I. Historical Method: Path-Dependence Logic 
Historian like to look back, not ahead. They try to understand and explain the 
record. Economist also want to know the past, but believe what they know about 
it only insofar as it accords with theory and logic; and since they have the 
assurance of basic principles, they are less averse to telling a future shaped by 
rationality. (Landes, 1998, p. 514)  
 
33 Prior to the current popularity of “Science, Technology, and Innovation” term or the innovation policy, the 
more common term was “Science and Technology” term or the technology policy.  
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Doner et. al., (2005) highlight that a broad coalition among elites to prioritize industrial 
catch-up pursuits occurred as a result of interaction between two elements: external threats and 
lack of easy revenues (resource scarcity). If we are to adopt this into a method of comparison, 
we need to evaluate how the interaction between a global circumstance and a domestic factor 
endowment dictates the political elites’ decisions on national economic strategy. Before we 
further address the causality and its measurements, I will briefly discuss the time horizon within 
a historical analysis. Countries develop at different times and in different contexts, and for this 
reason, differences in environment prompt political elites in different countries to make 
different choices. We can only make sense of a policy choice if we place it under its time 
horizon (or in the context in which it was created).  
The basic idea of this Ph.D. dissertation is simple: scholars have long recognized that 
institutions tend to be resistant to change (Campbell, 2010, p. 90)and thus, we must analyze 
history and understand an institution’s raison d’être if we want to explain its current dynamics. 
If we seek to compare present differences in institutional arrangements, then it is essential to 
provide the context34 that influences the emergence of a society and how its institutions develop 
(Morgan et al. 2010, 3-4). We must incorporate what happened during the initial stages of a 
society’s national economic planning to understand the present economic development 
strategy. Instead of proposing a universal theory as a recipe to produce rapid growth, the main 
purpose of this research is to draft a better explanation of different industrial development 
trajectories by focusing on a government’s behavior, elites’ consensus on national economic 
strategy, and industrial development. In this regard, I emphasize the importance of critical 
juncture periods within the path-dependence logic that have provoked an emergence of political 
coalitions behind a particular economic development strategy. 
“History matters,” also known as the “historical institutionalism approach,” among 
political science, economics, and sociology scholars mostly involves the discussion over path-
dependence. Tilly (2006) argues that path-dependency emphasizes on the idea that the 
sequencing of events to understand state transformation, where “events occurring at one stage 
in a sequence constrain the range of events that is possible at later stages” (2006, p. 421). In 
other words, the present institutional arrangement is built upon particular events in the past. 
 
34 Following Collier and Mazzuca (2006), time in politics has four notions: 1) History as period, where a political 
phenomenon occurred within some world-historical time (e.g., the Cold War, the period of import substitution); 
2) History as conjuncture, which refers to a “temporal coincidence” involving limitless number of forces, actors, 
structures, and events; 3) The notion of “timing”, where a political phenomenon occur in different sequences with 
different temporal spreads; and 4) the notions of “change over time” (pp. 473-474).  
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History matters thus illustrates the importance of identifying the initial events that preceded or 
precipitated the establishment of a specific institutional arrangement, specifically when major 
political coalitions were created. 
Mahoney and Schensul (2006) summarized various prominent scholarly works on it35. 
Economic historians pioneered path-dependence logic, which plays a significant role in 
political science research. Scholars from different fields, such as in economy, sociology, and 
political science, disagree on how one should define how history matters, but they generally 
agree that “early events are more important than later events” , which then contribute to some 
degree of a lock-in embedded in path-dependence (Mahoney & Schensul, 2006, p. 464). Initial 
conditions, also called antecedent conditions, in the period before a critical juncture “plays 
some causal role in defining a broad range of historically possible outcomes” but “do not limit 
the range of future possibilities” (Mahoney & Schensul, 2006, p. 460). 
Based on Mahoney and Schensul (2006), I can summarize that the use of path-
dependence logic must incorporate several defining features. The first and most important 
feature is the notion of the present that is rooted in the past; second, there are initial conditions, 
or the historically specific configuration variables before the critical juncture, that are causally 
important; and third, the presence of contingency in the post-critical juncture period might lead 
to historical lock-in. Historical lock-in refers to a notion of “causal determinism” in which 
random events lead to specific outcomes that are reproduced over time (e.g., party patronage 
and how they appeal to the masses). 
In addition to the scholarly consensus above, Mahoney and Schensul (2006) state that 
there is still a debate36 among scholars on self-reproducing sequences. The first debate is 
whether path-dependence needs to incorporate an evaluation of self-reproducing sequences 
(i.e., increasing returns), and the second debate centers on the mechanism that sustains self-
reproducing sequences, which include economic approach (i.e., utilitarian considerations of 
rational actors) and sociological approach (i.e., the functionality of outcome, enhancing power 
of elites, or expansion of legitimacy). In this regard, the discussion over self-reproducing 
 
35 Mahoney and Schensul (2006) summarize Paul David, Brian Arthur, Giovanni Dosi, and Douglas North for the 
economic historians; Paul Pierson, Kathleen Thelen, Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier for the political 
scientist; and several historical sociologist such as Jack Goldstone, Margaret Somers, William Sewell, and Charles 
Tilly (pp. 456-457). 
36 Aside than the debate over self-reproducing system, Mahoney and Schensul mentioned another scholarly 
discussion on the “reactive sequences”. However, the notion of “reactive sequences” take the discussion away 
from path-dependence logic because reactive sequences incorporate the “non-reinforcing sequences” (p. 468). 
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sequences is based on an evaluation of the post-critical juncture period once a system is 
established.  
 Based on both the description above and the existing works of literature on 
development studies, as I have explored in the second chapter, I place heavy emphasis on the 
critical juncture period in this Ph.D. dissertation. I find that the logic of systemic vulnerability 
and, to some extent, the logic of existing comparative works of literature on state formation, 
place similar emphasis on the critical juncture period. The key here is, first and foremost, to 
compare the emergence of the political coalitions that supported the present economic 
development strategies in different country cases. If systemic vulnerability was the initial 
condition that gave rise to developmental states, what were the initial conditions that gave rise 
to other strategies? This is what Doner, et al., (2005) and other scholars (Gereffi & Wyman, 
1990; Kohli, 2004; Haggard & Kaufman, 2008; Vu, 2010; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; 
Centeno, et al., 2017) have sought to find, but all failed to devise conclusions better than the 
non-existence of systemic vulnerability and high level of predatory behavior (i.e., non-
existence of an efficient developmental state). In addition, Doner, et al., only trace systemic 
vulnerability back to Post-World War II Japan, whereas I followed Johnson (1982) to evaluate 
how the systemic vulnerability have existed since the Meiji era.   
In this Ph.D. dissertation, I would like to emphasize “choice,” which is the defining 
feature of the critical juncture period: “when a particular option is selected from a range of 
alternatives”  (Mahoney & Schensul, 2006, p. 460). Choice then becomes the departure point 
for the future movement in a specific dynamic. Contemporary political coalitions in each 
country, including the country’s choice of economic development strategy, are rooted in the 
critical juncture period, which is the period of “a random happening, an accident, a small 
occurrence, or an event that cannot be explained or predicted on the basis of a particular 
theoretical framework” and that provoked contingency of events, or how one event leads to 
other events  (Mahoney & Schensul, 2006, p. 461). This is the basis for my primary method of 
comparison in seven country cases. Evaluation of initial conditions before and during the 
critical juncture period inspires my proposal on a different level of urgency (Section 3.II). I 
employ the method of comparison for the seven cases in Chapters 4 to 6. In these chapters, I 
also incorporate a brief evaluation over a post-critical juncture period to show the presence of 
replication of development strategy (i.e., historical lock-in).  
 In addition, I select one sub-case study from the seven country cases to contribute to 
the ongoing debate over the self-reproducing mechanism. I use Indonesia as a sub-case study 
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examine more deeply the mechanism that enabled the replication of strategy. Mahoney and 
Schensul (2006) summarize that the self-reproducing system can be sustained by either the 
practicality of policy (i.e., rational actors) or the means by which the political elites enhanced 
their power and gained public legitimacy over their strategy. Within this Ph.D. dissertation, the 
notion of policy practicality is already incorporated into the idea of the level of urgency, 
namely, that political elites tend to avoid a shift into costly development strategy such as an 
indigenous technology-driven industrial catch-up. Therefore, my purpose for the sub-case is to 
explain how political elites, whom the same political coalitions have supported, find public 
legitimation for their economic development strategy.   
To discuss public legitimacy over policy choice, I evaluate the existing policy discourse 
in the sub-case country, specifically on the manifestation of economic nationalism discourse 
into economic development strategy and STI policy. Here, I borrow a discursive 
institutionalism approach by Schmidt (2008), who proposes discursive institutionalism to 
complement older institutionalism approaches, including historical institutionalism (i.e., path-
dependence). The approach focuses on the actors and what the actors say; in other words, an 
evaluation over policy discourse or idea does not mean that it is the sole determinant factor for 
actor behavior nor that other factors, such as patron–client relationships and environments, do 
not matter. Discursive institutionalism approach is a continuation of the previous historical 
approach that offers a closer look into what the political actors say in various policy discussion 
mediums (more in Section 3.III). Therefore, the flow of this Ph.D. dissertation is as follows: 
 
Fig. 3.1 Seven Country Cases and One Sub-case Study 
Source: Author 
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3. II. The Seven Country Cases: Constructing Method of Comparison 
3.II.a. Understanding the Causality within a Method of Comparison: Broad Coalition and 
Industrial Catch-Up Pursuit in the Critical Juncture Period 
As stated above, systemic vulnerability works in a similar logic with the notion of a 
critical juncture period. The external threat from the U.S.’s gunboat diplomacy in Meiji Japan 
and North Korea’s threat in post-war South Korea, adding to their resource scarcity, were 
random incidents beyond the control of the domestic political elites. These events compelled 
the political elites to construct their national economic strategy to prioritize indigenous 
industrial upgrading through foreign technological learning and development to pursue rapid 
growth. Other growth options were not available. Once the high-growth institutions were 
established, its dynamic persisted and strengthened over time. 
If I seek to find the critical juncture that influences elites’ behavior in other latecomer 
countries, such as those in Latin America and Southeast Asia, I must also analyze these 
countries’ initial stages as modern states or as independent countries and then determine the 
initial conditions, which include prominent global-external and domestic circumstances. The 
focus is on the events that occurred beyond the control of the domestic political elites but that 
nevertheless determined the choice of national economic strategy. In this manner, I evaluate 
how these events gave birth to political coalitions on a particular economic development 
strategy (i.e., the strategy to gain revenue). Resource endowments, global trade regimes, high 
commodity demand, and domestic instability due to colonial legacies are several examples of 
initial conditions, which occurred or existed beyond the control of political elites in their 
critical juncture period. These are the key elements that I seek to incorporate into the method 
of comparison (Fig. 3.2).  
The selection of critical juncture periods encompasses different time horizons for 
different countries because the political coalitions arose during unique circumstances and at 
various points from country to country. However, the selected critical juncture periods mostly 
relate to the initial stage of national development planning (i.e., the initial phase of the present 
economic development strategy), which is mainly when political coalitions started to take 
shape. The critical point here is to understand the current political alliances and trace their 
origins to determine their reasons for existence (e.g., the close relations between the political 
elites and the large businesses). For some countries, the end of colonialism and the early years 
of independence served as the starting point for these political coalitions, but investigating this 
period is irrelevant to countries that were never colonized.  
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The main purpose of this method of comparison is to reintroduce contextualization into 
the analysis of elites’ behavior to expound more clearly upon different industrial development 
trajectories instead of only measuring “the level of external threat,” “the level of resource 
scarcity,” or “the level of domestic political elite coalitions.” In Figure 3.2 below, I reconstruct 
the systemic vulnerability into a method of comparison by incorporating a historical approach 
(or time horizon), and I also include other determinant factors that can be regarded as global 
circumstances and domestic circumstances (i.e., initial conditions prior to the critical juncture 
periods), such as global economic system, state formation or national unity, and socio-
economic structure (see Table 2.3 in Chapter 2). In this figure, the original systemic 
vulnerability causal relations are represented with straight lines (see Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2). 
The dashed lines represent other possibilities or scenarios that might occur in other cases. 
Through this method of comparison, the main causality entails how different combination of 
interaction between global circumstances and domestic circumstances produces different 
behavior or perceptions among political elites with regard to national economic strategy, 
industrial development, and technology development.  
 
Fig. 3.2 Method of Comparison 
Source: Author 
 
Based on systemic vulnerability, efficient developmental state arrangement emerges 
when the ruling political elites establish a broad political coalition to pursue industrial catch-
up (i.e., broad consensus to prioritize technology-driven indigenous manufacturing upgrading). 
However, the broad coalition to pursue industrial catch-up only occurs when the ruling political 
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elites face strong pressure to neglect their narrow, short-term political interests due to the 
presence of an external threat and lack of easy revenues, which together threaten their national 
survival. If we adapt systemic vulnerability logic into a method of comparison, we must also 
incorporate two other possibilities: 
1. That instead of a broad coalition to pursue a costly, long-term industrial catch-up 
strategy for rapid growth, the coalition is narrow. This refers to a situation in which 
political elites prioritize political survival through short-term, less costly economic 
strategy (e.g., natural resource-centric strategy) instead of indigenous technological 
development to support industrial upgrading; hence, the “inefficient institutional 
arrangement,” such as resource-oriented technology development; costly, high-
technology military projects; or MNC-driven manufacturing growth. 
2. That the combination of global-regional circumstances and domestic circumstances 
provides the ruling political elites with economic growth strategy alternatives that are 
politically less costly (i.e., less threatening to the popular sector) and provide faster 
revenue, even if the revenue is less sustained, to support structural change. We must 
keep in mind that political elites need to receive public support or legitimation, and 
therefore, especially under an electoral democratic system, the incumbents need to 
justify the national economic strategy to the public to avoid public retaliation that can 
cost the incumbents their political survival. In this regard, Chapter 7 uses Indonesia as 
a sub-case study to illustrate this mechanism in contemporary politics. 
 
With regard to the two possibilities above, I choose to put aside variations in 
government capabilities, which are often measured by the education level of the bureaucrats or 
the degree of corruption. Governments or policymakers with different capabilities would still 
make the same choices when they face similar circumstances (e.g., the case of Japan and South 
Korea), but governments with similar capabilities would make different choices when they 
faced different circumstances (e.g., the two Northeast Asian cases and the two Latin American 
cases). The decision to pursue an industrial catch-up strategy or rely on other economic growth 
strategies is made based on the interplay between global-regional circumstances and domestic 
circumstances that produce different levels of urgency. 
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3.II.b. Operationalization of Key Elements ithin Method of Comparison for Seven Country 
Cases 
 In this section, I provide a detailed explanation of each element within the method of 
comparison (Fig. 3.2) and how it is measured. First, I begin with a description of the 
institutional arrangements for industrial catch-up based on developmental state literatures. 
Second, I define the elite and their coalitions, particularly with regard to national growth 
strategy. Third, I specify the prominent historical events, both at the global level and domestic 
level, for later evaluation in each country at different time horizons. Finally, I propose an idea 
of “urgency to pursue industrial catch-up” in the last subsection. 
3.II.b.1 Institutional Arrangements: Indigenous Technology-Driven Industrial Catch-Up 
 If we are to accept that a strong government intervention in industrial policy, which 
prioritizes foreign technology learning to support indigenous manufacturing upgrading, 
enabled developmental states’ industrial catch-up trajectories, then we can conclude that weak 
indigenous technology capabilities and indigenous manufacturing firms’ performance in other 
latecomer countries might be a result of different priorities in policymaking and different 
economic development strategies. There are at least two categories of national development 
strategy: 1) industrial catch-up, with a focus on indigenous technology development and 
upgrading, as exhibited by Northeast Asian developmental states, and 2) another strategy, one 
yet to be identified, as demonstrated by other latecomer countries. Throughout this Ph.D. 
dissertation, another strategy would be revealed; referring to a natural resource-oriented 
development strategy. In these countries, indigenous technology development mostly 
intertwines with natural resources or the low technology sector, and therefore, the key 
difference is the objectives embedded within industrial policy and/or national innovation 
systems (STI policy). In this Ph.D. dissertation, I treat the developmental states’ industrial 
policies and contemporary, post-globalization STI policies in the same manner; government 
policy, championed by both political elites and bureaucrats, focuses on the indigenous 
industry’s development and indigenous technology development. 
To evaluate this matter, I first summarize the latest statistical trend of each country’s 
manufacturing sector performance (i.e., share of MVA to GDP, the composition of 
manufacturing value-added and manufacturing export, list of large enterprises) and their STI 
capabilities from secondary data (i.e., innovation index, STI reports, technological 
characteristics of patent data). The main purpose is to show different industrial development 
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trajectories. Second, I summarize each country’s current industrial policy and STI policy, 
including its key agents, from various prominent reports such as the OECD’s STI Outlook, 
European Commissions, and the OECD’s STIP Compass. I seek to highlight the sectoral 
priorities within the national policy and, as a consequence, the difference between technology-
oriented strategy and natural resource-oriented strategy.  
 
3.II.b.2. Elite Coalitions on National Growth Strategy 
 As stated above, the key here is to understand what happened during the initial stage of 
national economic planning in each country or during the country’s critical juncture period. 
Present political coalitions are rooted in the past, and therefore, I have selected a different 
critical juncture period for each country, focusing on the country’s early years as a modern 
nation-state or an independent nation-state. I first identify the groups of interest, such as 
political elites (including bureaucrats), large business groups, the military, and civil society 
movements. I evaluate their interests and their interactions, particularly patron–client relations, 
during this critical juncture period to show their consensus on growth strategy in the critical 
juncture period and how this strategy is developed. I then seek to explain why and how, in 
some latecomer countries, the political elites were able to build a broad coalition to support a 
long-term, costly, indigenous, technology-driven industrial catch-up while other countries 
featured narrow coalitions. The term “narrow coalition” refers to how each interest group 
behaves in pursuing its narrow interest (i.e., its survival), hence the preference on a less costly 
economic development strategy such as over-reliance on commodity exports or an MNCs-
driven manufacturing sector. 
 
3.II.b.3. Global-External Circumstances and Domestic Circumstances 
 I incorporate several determinant factors, other than external threats and resource 
endowment, within the global and domestic circumstances (see Table 2.3 in Chapter 2). As 
shown in Figure 3.2., global-external circumstances refer to the dynamic of international 
political economic in a given time horizon; this includes events such as global economic 
regimes (e.g., high commodity price, oil shocks, crisis, globalization, and free trade regimes); 
global politics (e.g., Cold War interests and threats of colonialization); and also, to some 
degree, global economic development discourse or economic development trends. While it is 
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difficult to show how this directly influences the political elites, an acknowledgement of the 
difference in “development trend” adds more nuance to the political elites’ strategic choices. 
The domestic circumstances include three main points: resource endowment, national unity, 
and socio-economic structure. Resource endowment (e.g., arable land and oil rents) determines 
the source of easy revenue for government, while national unity and socio-economic structure 
both determine the domestic stability needed for the government to pursue a long-term, costly 
strategy, especially one that potentially hampers a popular sector (e.g., agriculture). Colonial 
legacy is an important factor that influences national unity and socio-economic structure, 
particularly in the Latin America and Southeast Asia, and therefore, I position colonialism as 
a collection of global-external circumstances that influence domestic circumstances. 
 
3.II.b.4. Proposing “Urgency to Pursue an Indigenous Technology-Driven Industrial Catch-
Up” 
 Based on different interactions between global-external circumstances and domestic 
circumstances, I categorize the seven cases into three categories. By evaluating historical 
events faced by the political elites in each country, I create three types of circumstances: 
conducive, unconducive, and mixed. Here, “conducive” refers to whether the historical events 
provoked the pursuit of an indigenous, technology-driven industrial catch-up strategy, and 
“unconducive” means that the events provoked a different strategy to gain revenue. From here, 
I propose three levels of urgency to pursue an indigenous, technology-driven industrial catch-
up among the seven cases, as seen in Table 3.1 below. 
Level of Urgency Global-External 
Circumstances 
Domestic 
Circumstances 
High  conducive conducive 
Low unconducive unconducive 
Medium mixed mixed 
Tab. 3.1 Three Categories of Level of Urgency 
Source: Author 
 
1. The first category is for countries whose political elites face a high level of urgency. 
This occurs when the interaction between conducive global-external circumstances and 
conducive domestic circumstances produced a consensus among elites to pursue an 
indigenous technology-driven industrial catch-up strategy during critical juncture 
period. Conducive global-external circumstances refer to the presence of external threat 
and/or regional security instability that threatens national survival. Meanwhile, 
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conducive domestic circumstances refer to a constrained easy revenue source, but with 
a stable political system or a presence of national unity, and the large support of large 
businesses and civilian movement to support the indigenous manufacturing sector. The 
interaction between these two dynamics resulted in the political elites’ consensus to 
pursue industrial catch-up as a mean of national survival. 
2. The second category refers to countries whose elites face a weak level of urgency. It 
happens when the interaction between unconducive global-external circumstances and 
unconducive domestic circumstances produced a consensus to rely on the natural-
resource-based low-technology sectors (i.e., commodity exports) to gain revenue 
during critical juncture period. Unconducive global-external circumstances refer to the 
domination of international trade system that leads to a high demand for commodity 
exports. Whereas unconducive domestic circumstances refer to a large presence of easy 
revenue source (i.e., the export of agriculture sector products and minerals), but with 
an unstable political system or a lack of national unity and the preference of large 
businesses and the dominance of agricultural sector in labor. The interaction between 
these two dynamics resulted in the political elites’ consensus to pursue industrial catch-
up and a stronger urgency to prioritize short-term economic development strategy (e.g., 
extractive sector, agricultural sector) that would not risk any resistance from the masses 
and large businesses.    
3. The third category describes countries whose elites face a medium level of urgency. it 
occurs when there are mixed circumstances which produce some degree of consensus 
on the manufacturing sector development. Here, the political elites initially had faced a 
weak level of urgency to pursue indigenous technology-driven industrial catch-up 
strategy during critical juncture period as the result of an interaction between 
unconducive global-external circumstances and unconducive domestic circumstances. 
However, due to the development in global-external and domestic circumstances, these 
elites started to see the need to support manufacturing sector growth. Yet, the change 
in these circumstances also had hindered them from pursuing a technology-driven 
industrial catch-up strategy as the political elites had been exposed to an alternative 
strategy on industrial growth (i.e., MNCs-driven manufacturing sector). Thus, as they 
rely on this alternative strategy, these political elites continue to rely on the natural-
resource sector in order to accommodate interests of large businesses and to gain 
popular support. 
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Overall, the term “conducive” is associated with the initial conditions during the critical 
juncture period that provoked an urgency among the political elites to pursue a long-term 
strategy to gain higher and sustained revenues (i.e., an industrial catch-up strategy), and a 
coalition between political elites and large industrial groups supported the pursuit of industrial 
catch-up. The term “unconducive” is associated with the initial conditions during a critical 
period that provides an alternative strategy to gain more revenue faster even if the rate of 
revenue is less sustainable (i.e., commodity exports). The term “mixed” is associated with some 
degree of change in conditions after the establishment of the political coalitions that requires 
these coalitions’ members to pay attention to industrial growth. However, at the same time, 
these political elites were presented with an alternative strategy to pursue industrialization (i.e., 
MNC-driven manufacturing sector growth). Thus, the same political coalitions, comprising 
political elites and natural resource oligarchs, were able to survive while the manufacturing 
sector grew without indigenous technological upgrading (i.e., weak indigenous patent 
capabilities). Once the political coalitions were established and the strategy was chosen in the 
critical juncture period, this dynamic of the system strengthened, and the strategy continues to 
be reproduced to the present day. 
 
3.II.c. The Seven Country Cases 
As I have stated in section 3.I., I apply the method of comparison for seven country 
cases. The method of comparison explores the critical juncture period while at the same time 
also incorporates the replication of economic development strategy in the post-critical juncture 
period. The seven country cases are selected based on the literature review chapter. The works 
of literature that I have reviewed in Chapter 2 show that these seven cases often come up either 
as success cases or failed cases. Scholars often refer to two Northeast Asian countries to 
construct policy ideals for either the two Latin American cases or the three Southeast Asian 
cases. Latin American countries and Southeast Asian countries often come up as the “failed 
cases” in comparison to the Northeast Asian counterparts. This is supported by the 
development of trajectories data, such as income level (see Tab. 3.2). Therefore, I would like 
to choose the country cases that are often referred by prominent scholars while trying to provide 
new interpretations using a historical approach. These countries are Japan and South Korea 
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from Northeast Asia; Argentina and Brazil from Latin America37; as well as Malaysia, 
Thailand, and Indonesia from Southeast Asia.  
I combine both secondary (prominent scholarly works) and primary data (statistical 
databases) to revisit the historical process of these seven countries from three different regions. 
I selected a different time horizon for each country based on their critical juncture period, which 
coincides with their turning points either as a modern nation-state or independent nation-state. 
This is the period when we can find the origin of the political coalitions that support the present 
development strategy. In addition, the term “independent” is not suitable for Japan and 
Thailand since they did not experience colonialism. Thus, to determine their critical juncture 
period, I take the 1868 Meiji Japan and the 1932 Siamese Revolution (Monarchy 
Constitutional) as the starting year of the modern state respectively, based on the existing 
historical literatures. Based on prominent historical literature, these were essential periods that 
gave birth to present political coalition in Japan (i.e., political elites, military government, and 
industry groups) and Thailand (i.e., monarchy, military, and natural-resource oligarchs). 
Meanwhile, the other cases show that independence years were a crucial period of state 
formation as the political coalitions started to take shape (i.e., political elites and natural 
resource or commodity exports oligarchs). 
 
Fig. 3.3 Relative Income Trap 1950 to 2016 (Three Regions) 
Notes: author’s calculation based on (Agénor, et al., 2012) 
Source: Maddison Project Database version 2018 (Bolt, et al., 2018) 
 
37 This Ph.D. dissertation uses the term Latin America because it represents a shared colonial experience under 
Spain and Portugal. In this regard, there are twenty Latin American countries in total: ten republics of South 
America (excluding the three Guianas), the six republics of Central America (including Panama but excluding 
Belize), Mexico, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti (Bulmer-Thomas, 2003, p. 2). 
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It is understood that there are no complete similarities between cases. However, among 
variations in the interaction processes between these countries, there is some degree of 
consensus that can be constructed from the experiences of countries within the same region 
(Tab. 3.2.). In addition to their overall economic performances, these seven countries also have 
different levels of resource endowments. Figure 3.4. and figure 3.5. show that countries that 
are located in closer geographical proximity to each other share similar natural resource 
endowments.  
 
Fig. 3.4 Arable Land (1961-2013) 
Source: (The World Bank, 2018a) 
 
Fig. 3.5 Oil Rents (1970-2015) 
Source: (The World Bank, 2018b) 
 
Japan and South Korea, the two representative Northeast Asian countries, achieved 
high per capita income statuses despite starting their industrial development in different periods 
(late 1800’s and mid-1900’s, respectively). Argentina and Brazil, representing the Latin 
American countries, which experienced rapid economic growth earlier than their Northeast 
Asian counterparts but have been struggling with low economic growth for decades. They are 
the largest countries in the group concerning the geographical area and population size. 
Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia are three middle-income Southeast Asian countries with 
similar (but not completely the same) characteristics, which have had a relatively similar 
economic development period thus far. These seven countries also show different technological 
levels in terms of their manufacturing sectors. Japan and South Korea are at the top 
technological level, in contrast with Argentina and Brazil. Among the three Southeast Asian 
countries, Malaysia has exhibited the best performance in both per capita income growth and 
the technological level of their manufacturing sectors. 
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 Northeast Asia Southeast Asia Latin America 
 Japan South Korea Malaysia Thailand Indonesia Argentina Brazil 
Economic growth stage 
 Relative income per capita 
quadrant 1950-2016 as 
seen on Fig.1.1. (see Ch.1) 
(Absolute income per 
capita in 2017 – World 
Bank) 
 
middle-income to high-
income 
 
(high-income) 
 
middle-income to 
high-income 
 
(high-income) 
 
middle-income trap 
 
 
(upper middle-
income) 
 
middle-income trap 
 
 
(upper middle-income) 
 
middle-income trap 
 
 
(lower middle-income) 
 
economic basket 
case 
 
(upper middle-
income) 
 
middle-income trap 
 
 
(upper middle-
income) 
Time Period (turning point) 
 Modern nation state or 
Independence Day 
 
 
1868 
(Meiji Restoration) 
 
1948 
(First Republic) 
 
1957 
(Declaration of 
independence) 
 
1932 
(Constitutional Monarchy) 
 
 
 
 
1945 
(Declaration of 
independence) 
 
 
1816 
(Declaration of 
independence) 
 
1822 
(Declaration of 
independence) 
 National economic 
planning - industrial 
development 
1868 
(Meiji Industrialization) 
1961-1979 
(Park Chung-Hee) 
1970 
(New Economic 
Policy - Mahathir) 
1957 
(Economic reconstruction – 
Sarit) 
2001-2006 
(First industrial policy – 
Thaksin) 
1966 
(New Order 
Industrialization – 
Suharto) 
1870-1930 
(Rapid growth) 
1950’s 
(ISI Policy – 
Peron) 
1870-1930 
(Rapid growth) 
1950’s 
(ISI Policy – Vargas) 
 Important regional 
circumstances 
1854; 1858 (Gunboat 
Diplomacy; Unequal 
Treaties) 
1953-1961 (Korean 
Armistice) 
1980’s – 1997/1998 (Global economic slowdown – Asian Financial Crisis) 
Late 1980’s (Plaza Accord – Expansion of global production network and EOI 
policy trend) 
2007 (ASEAN Economic Community) 
1930 (Great Depression) 
1948 (UNECLAC / CEPAL and ISI policy 
trend) 
Manufacturing sector in 2016 
(CIP Index) 
 Share of MVA to GDP 
(Share of medium-high 
tech activities in total 
MVA) 
 Composition of 
manufacturing export: 
1. Resource based  
2. Low Technology 
3. Medium Technology 
4. High Technology 
 
 
 
18.9% 
(56.2%) 
 
 
 
9% 
9% 
64% 
17% 
 
 
 
28.6% 
(63.7%) 
 
 
 
13% 
11% 
48% 
28% 
 
 
 
22.9% 
(44.1%) 
 
 
 
25% 
12% 
24% 
38% 
 
 
 
28.2% 
(40.7%) 
 
 
 
23% 
13% 
44% 
20% 
 
 
 
21.3% 
(25.1%) 
 
 
 
44% 
26% 
25% 
5% 
 
 
 
15.0% 
(26.0%) 
 
 
 
49% 
7% 
38% 
6% 
 
 
 
11.9% 
(35.4%) 
 
 
 
47% 
10% 
35% 
6% 
Innovation Index 
 Global Innovation Index 
2018 (rank out of 126) 
 GERD intensity and 
growth as % of GDP – 
OECD Report 
 
 
13th 
 
3.59% (2014) 
 
 
12th 
 
4.29% (2014) 
 
 
35th 
 
1.13% (2012) 
 
 
44th 
 
0.63% (2015) 
 
 
85th 
 
0.08% (2012) 
 
 
80th 
 
0.61% (2014) 
 
 
64th 
 
1.24% (2013) 
Tab. 3.2 Seven Countries’ Characteristics Comparison 
Source: Author’s compilation from various sources  
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 In the next following three chapters (i.e., Chapters 4 to 6), I apply the method of 
comparison to the seven-country cases, which are grouped based on their respective regions. 
In the first section of each chapter, I also provide the overall performance of the manufacturing 
sector as well as STI capabilities. I compiled the information based on the latest prominent 
reports such as the Science Technology and Innovation Outlook released by the OECD, the 
Science Technology Innovation Policy Compass released by the European Commission, and 
the Global Innovation Index released by the Cornell University, Institut Européen 
d’Administration des Affaires (INSEAD), and the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO). Additionally, I utilize several other databases such as: OECD Statistics (patent data), 
ASEAN Statistics (indigenous small-medium enterprises data), and the Competitive Industrial 
Performance Index released by the UNIDO. I also incorporate additional supplementary 
information such as a list of large companies from the Forbes and Nikkei Asia Review.  
The purpose of this first section is to show the present development trajectory in each 
case. Here I focus on several critical trajectories: 1) who are the large enterprises; 2) their 
indigenous manufacturing capabilities; 3) their indigenous technological capabilities; and 4) 
their present STI policy overview. After providing an overview of the current trajectories and 
government strategy, I went back to the critical juncture period to explore how this strategy 
was originated from the political coalition construction in the past. This led to the reproduction 
of the same strategy in the post-critical juncture period, which exhibits the same strong or weak 
tendency to promote indigenous technology-driven industrial catch-up strategy. 
 
3.III. Indonesia as a Single Sub-Case Study 
Through an equal comparison of seven country cases, I explore how present 
development trajectories are rooted in critical juncture periods in which a random event 
provoked political elites to select particular policy options. It then continues to be reproduced 
in the post-critical juncture period. In addition to the seven country cases-comparison, I select 
one sub-case, the purpose of which is to provide deeper analysis over the reproduction of 
strategy in the post-critical juncture period by evaluating how political elites continue to gain 
In this regard, it is crucial to select one among seven country cases with a short gap in time 
between the critical juncture period and the post-critical juncture period due to data availability. 
The three Southeast Asian cases are relatively younger in terms of the starting point of their 
development. As we focus on public legitimation, the selection of the sub-case must 
incorporate better local language comprehension to reflect the various communication media 
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between the government and the public with accuracy. In Chapter 7, I select Indonesia as a 
sub-case study among the three Southeast Asian countries to show the specific mechanism by 
which the political coalitions continued to amass political legitimization of their development 
strategy: highlighting the manifestation of economic nationalism discourse. The case of 
Indonesia demonstrates that economic nationalism discourse is manifested in anti-colonial 
sentiment and a natural resource protection narrative that act as a legitimization of natural 
resource-oriented STI policy choices38.  
As stated earlier in this chapter, the selection of Indonesia as a sub-case study in this 
Ph.D. dissertation neither indicates that I have neglected the other six cases nor implies that the 
same method cannot be applied to another country in the future. Rather, I selected Indonesia 
as the first country to be explored further because of two reasons in addition to the local 
language proficiency: first, as a middle-income country, Indonesia has the largest economic 
potential in Southeast Asia, and second, the country is also one of the world’s largest 
democracies. In that regard, an observation of economic nationalism manifestation in Indonesia 
also engenders a discussion over the present lack of rational programmatic economic discourse 
under a democratic political system.  
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate how the surviving political coalitions (i.e., 
patron-client relations) continue to gain public legitimacy, especially under a democratic 
system that is equipped with a mechanism for the public to criticize government policy. In this 
vein, I focus on the development of discourse that exists in various media of communication. 
I adopt Schmidt’s (2008) discursive institutionalism approach to evaluate how the economic 
nationalism discourse is manifested into STI policy prioritization. Schmidt proposes the 
discursive institutionalism approach to complement the three older New Institutionalisms, 
which are rational choice institutionalism (fixed rationalist preferences), sociological 
institutionalism (norms and rules), and historical institutionalism (path-dependence). 
According to Schmidt, the three older versions of new institutionalism discuss how external 
factors (e.g., economic incentives, organizational culture, and systems) influence or constrain 
policymakers’ behavior. Instead of examining external factors that, this dissertation aims to 
discuss policymakers as sentient agents (who think and speak) to understand what discourse 
exists and how this discourse influences policy outcomes. Discursive institutionalism 
 
38 In addition to the other elements such as political rents from the resource oligarchs. This is important because 
this also explains how economic nationalism discourse provides a policy legitimacy from the public to the political 
elites; hence less mass resistance.  
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comprises two main elements: ideas and discourse. Agents think and carry out ideas through 
discourse (interaction) (Schmidt, 2008, p. 305). Discursive institutionalism utilizes a top-down 
approach, i.e., “policy elites generate ideas, which political elites then communicate to the 
public” (Schmidt, 2008, p. 311), and this type of institutionalism works through two channels: 
coordinative discourse (interaction among policymakers) and communicative discourse (public 
persuasion by government). 
The primary purpose of this Ph.D. dissertation is to understand what happened in the 
critical juncture period. The goal is to offer new interpretations for “emergence” that are not 
trapped in a dichotomy between good government and predatory government or good versus 
evil. I seek to diverge from policy pragmatism, which has been the main criticism of economic 
development and developmental state study. Indonesia, as a sub-case in Chapter 7, therefore 
only acts as the first case into future study extension. I use Indonesia as a starting point of the 
possible second stage of evaluating the self-reproducing mechanism, which remains debatable 
within the path-dependence study. 
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CHAPTER 4 NORTHEAST ASIA 
Japan and South Korea: High Level of Urgency 
 
 In this chapter, I discuss Japan and South Korea as the representation of Northeast 
Asian countries with a high level of urgency to pursue industrial catch-up. Both cases exhibit 
a high level of urgency to pursue an indigenous technology-driven industrial catch-up in their 
critical juncture period because the mentioned action is their national survival strategy in the 
face of a systemic vulnerability (i.e. the presence of external threat and a constrained easy 
revenue). In addition to this, the domestic dynamic (i.e. stable political system and cooperative 
socio-economic structure) also acted as conducive circumstances to this strategy. As shown in 
figure 4.1., I selected the Meiji Restoration period in 1868 and the Park Chung-Hee’s Yushin 
Restoration, as the critical juncture period for both Japan and South Korea respectively. These 
were the early periods in their state formation when the political elites in Japan and South 
Korea made a decision to embark on an industrial catch-up strategy through indigenous 
technology development. The consensus on economic development strategy remains the same 
from these critical juncture points onwards. Since then, the national government have 
continued to favor indigenous technology-driven manufacturing sector development within the 
national innovation system (section 4.I.b). 
I divide this chapter into four main sections. First, I start by providing an overview of 
the current manufacturing sector development in Japan and South Korea. This section shows 
that both Japan and South Korea currently have a strong manufacturing sector with high 
technological capabilities, both in terms of their share of manufacturing value-added, their 
manufacturing exports, and the performances of their indigenous manufacturing firms. Their 
performances provide a contrasting trend against the two Latin America cases and the three 
Southeast Asia cases39. I discuss the cases of Japan and South Korea in the second and third 
sections respectively. Through these two sections, I highlight what was the context that 
provoked the political elites’ consensus on national development strategy and how it has 
remained lasting in the post-critical juncture period. 
 
39 The critical juncture period of the two Latin American cases, Argentina and Brazil, were within the same decade 
with Meiji Japan. Meanwhile, the critical juncture period of the three Southeast Asian cases, Malaysia, Thailand, 
and Indonesia, were within the same decade with South Korea. 
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Fig. 4.1 Timeframe of Influential Historical Key Events for Japan and South Korea 
Notes: The events above the line are external circumstances and those below the line are domestic-related events. The straight lines represent the 
important global-external circumstances that occurs in particular period of time, some events directly and indirectly influence the political elites’ 
behavior in both critical juncture period and post-critical juncture period. The dotted lines represent influential key events related to Japan and the 
dashed lines are related to South Korea. 
Source: Author
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4.I. Recent Statistical Trends: Japan and South Korea 
4.I.a. Manufacturing Performances 
  
Fig. 4.2 Change in Japan’s Manufacturing 
Value Added (1990, 2000, 2017) 
Source: Competitive Industrial 
Performance Index 2019 (UNIDO, 2019) 
Fig. 4.3 Change in Japan’s Manufacturing 
Exports (1990, 2000, 2017) 
Source: Competitive Industrial Performance 
Index 2019 (UNIDO, 2019)  
 
I provide an overview of recent manufacturing sector performances of Japan and South 
Korea on this first sub-section. The manufacturing sector plays an important part in their GDP, 
particularly for South Korea (28.6 percent in 2017) which developed latter than Japan (21.1 
percent in 2017). While Japan’s share of manufacturing export in total export shows a declining 
trend (Fig. 4.3.), Japan is an industrialized country which already entered the high-income 
stage. Furthermore, by 2017 its share of manufacturing export in total exports is still at 90 
percent with a share of medium and high-technologies in total exports remains high at 81 
percent. Often dubbed as the successful industrial catch-up cases, South Korean manufacturing 
export has been growing to be more technologically sophisticated (Fig. 4.4.; 4.5.).   
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Fig. 4.4 Change in South Korea’s 
Manufacturing Value Added (1990, 2000, 
2017) 
Source: Competitive Industrial 
Performance Index 2019 (UNIDO, 2019) 
Fig. 4.5 Change in South Korea’s 
Manufacturing Exports (1990, 2000, 2017) 
Source: Competitive Industrial Performance 
Index 2019 (UNIDO, 2019)  
 
JPN KOR 
Manufacturing Composition by 2017: Manufacturing Composition by 2017: 
1. Motor vehicles, trailers, semi-
trailers 
18.4% 1. Office, accounting, and computing 
machinery 
24.4% 
2. Office, accounting and computing 
machinery 
16.7% 2. Motor vehicles, trailers, semi-
trailers 
10.9% 
3. Food and beverages 12.9% 3. Chemicals and chemical products 10.8% 
4. Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 10.9% 4. Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 8.1% 
5. Chemicals and chemical products 10.8% 5. Food and beverages 6.4% 
Tab. 4.1 Manufacturing Composition of Japan and South Korea 
Source: Compiled by author from UNIDO Manufacturing Profile pages (UNIDO, 2019)  
 The table above shows another similarity between Japanese and South Korean 
manufacturing sector. Medium-high technology manufacturing sectors have composed a large 
portion of the manufacturing sector in Japan and South Korea. Furthermore, if we look into a 
total of 228 Japanese companies and a total of 67 South Korean companies listed on the Forbes 
Global 200040 in 2018 (Tab. 4.2.), we can see that these companies are mostly involved or 
related to manufacturing industries. Toyota Motor, Honda Motor, Sony, Nissan Motor, and 
Hitachi are some of the largest public companies from Japan which ranked in the top 150. 
These companies’ origins can be traced back to World War II-era. The majority of the largest 
companies from South Korea are also involved in the manufacturing sector or related to the 
manufacturing sector (e.g., Samsung, LG, Hyundai, and KIA). These companies were mostly 
 
40 The Forbes Global 2000 provides a list of top 2000 largest public companies in the world. It is a useful indicator 
to evaluate leading public companies globally.  
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established in post-World War II (the Cold War period), which are between the 1950s to 1970s. 
This is an important element to understand the foundation of Japanese and South Korean 
industrialization, which I would explore more in the third and fourth section of this chapter. 
The domination of the manufacturing sector also provides an important contrast to Latin 
America and Southeast Asian cases. Banks, extractive sectors, and low-technology 
manufacturing sectors dominated the company list in Latin America and Southeast Asia (see 
Chapters 5 and 6). 
 
Rank Company Founded 
Year 
Sector (P/S)* 
JPN #12  Toyota Motor 1937 Auto & Truck Manufacturers (P) 
  #37  Mitsubishi UFJ Financial 2001 Major Banks (P) 
  #39  Softbank 1981 Telecommunications services (P) 
  #46  Nippon Telegraph & Tel 1985 Telecommunications services (S) 
  #58  Honda Motor 1948 Auto & Truck Manufacturers (P) 
  #59  Sumitomo Mitsui 
Financial 
2002 Major Banks (P) 
  #86  Sony 1946 Consumer Electronics (P) 
  #97  Nissan Motor 1933 Auto & Truck Manufacturers (P) 
  #112  Mitsubishi 1950 Trading Companies (P) 
  #114  Mizuho Financial 2003 Major Banks (P) 
  #144  KDDI 1984 Telecommunications services (P) 
  #149  Hitachi 1910 Electronics (P) 
  #183  Mitsui 1947 Trading Companies (P) 
  #190  Tokio Marine Holdings 2001 Property & Casualty Insurance (P) 
  #194  Dai-ichi Life Insurance 1902 Life & Health Insurance (P) 
  #206  Itochu 1958 Trading Companies (P) 
  #222  Denso 1949 Auto & Truck Parts (P) 
  #223  JXTG Holdings 2010 Oil & Gas Operations (P) 
  #231  Panasonic 1918 Consumer Electronics (P) 
  #235  East Japan Railway 1987 Railroads (S) 
  #250  Central Japan Railway 1987 Railroads (S) 
  #252  Canon 1937 Business Products & Supplies (P) 
  #253  Sumitomo 1919 Trading Companies (P) 
  #254  Orix 1964 Consumer Financial Services (P) 
  #257  Japan Tobacco 1985 Tobacco (S) 
  
KOR #14  Samsung Electronics 1969 Semiconductors (P) 
  #147  Hyundai Motor 1967 Auto & Truck Manufacturers (P) 
  #200  SK Hynix 1949 Semiconductors (P) 
  #219  KB Financial Group 1963 Regional Banks (S) 
  #228  Posco 1968 Iron & Steel (S) 
  #273  Shinhan Financial Group 2001 Investment Services (P) 
  #281  SK Holdings 1962 Oil & Gas Operations (P) 
  #295  Korea Electric Power 1915 Electric Utilities (S) 
  #338  Samsung Life Insurance 1957 Life & Health Insurance (P) 
  #411  LG Electronics 2002 Consumer Electronics (P) 
  #417  SK Innovation 1962 Oil & Gas Operations (P) 
  #436  Hana Financial Group 2005 Regional Banks (P) 
  #443  Hyundai Mobis 1977 Auto & Truck Parts (P) 
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  #474  LG Chem 1947 Specialized Chemicals (P) 
  #476  SK Telecom 1984 Telecommunications services (S) 
  #485  Samsung C&T 1938 Trading Companies (P) 
  #550  Woori Bank 1899 Regional Banks (S) 
  #568  Samsung Fire & Marine 1952 Property & Casualty Insurance (P) 
  #584  KIA Motors 1944 Auto & Truck Manufacturers (P) 
  #588  Industrial Bank of Korea 1961 Regional Banks (S) 
  #700  Lotte Chemical 1976 Specialized Chemicals (P) 
  #748  LG Corp 1947 Household Appliances (P) 
  #778  LG Display 1985 Electronics (P) 
  #825  S-Oil 1976 Oil & Gas Operations (P) 
  #851  Hanwha 1952 Trading Companies (P) 
  #923  Hyundai Steel 1953 Iron & Steel (P) 
Tab. 4.2 Large Companies from Japan and South Korea as Listed on the Forbes Global 2000 
(2018) 
Notes: *) “P” refer to private companies (including publicly listed company) and “S” refer to 
state-owned companies or used to be state-owned. This table only includes the top 25 
companies from a total of 228 Japanese companies and 67 South Korean companies. For some 
companies, the founded year refers to merger year. 
Source: Compiled by Author based on the Forbes Global 2000 (Forbes, 2018)  
4.I.b. Science, Technology, and Innovation Capabilities (Including Patent) 
 
Fig. 4.6 Trend in Total R&D Performance of Japan and South Korea in Comparison with the 
US and OECD countries (1995-2015) 
Source: Figure adjusted by author from OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 
(OECD, 2017)  
 
 I provide an overview of the latest trend of STI development in Japan and South Korea 
in this second section. The government of Japan and South Korea both allocate a large amount 
of STI budget into the development of industrial production, technology, energy, and 
infrastructure (Tab. 4.3.). In 2016, the share of GERD in total GDP of Japan is 3.6 percent and 
the share of GERD in total GDP of South Korea is 4.2. percent41 (OECD, 2016) In the past 20 
 
41 The share GERD in GDP for the average OECD countries is 2.4 percent. 
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years, the total R&D performance in Japan and South Korea have been relatively higher than 
the average OECD countries (Fig. 4.6.). South Korea’s total R&D performance has been rising 
up since the 2000s. Additionally, the OECD STI Scoreboard (2017) shows that the top five 
R&D companies with IP5 patent families between 2012-2014 are: Samsung, Canon, Toshiba, 
Fujitsu, and Hitachi, with Samsung, hold a 6.2 percent share of IP5 patent families.  
  
Total 
GBARD 
(USD 
billion 
PPP) 
Total 
GBARD 
(USD 
billion 
PPP, 
2010 
prices) 
Defense 
and 
space 
Health 
Agriculture, 
environment 
and earth 
exploration 
Industrial 
production, 
technology, 
energy and 
infrastructure 
Social 
structures 
and 
relationships 
General 
advancement 
of 
knowledge 
Economic 
objective 
not known 
  
% % % % % % % 
USA 149.0 135.3 60.0 24.0 3.3 3.8 1.2 7.7 #N/A 
DEU 35.4 31.1 7.9 5.2 7.9 18.5 4.2 57.3 #N/A 
JPN 33.9 30.6 9.3 4.2 6.7 21.9 0.5 57.3 #N/A 
KOR 21.2 21.1 16.2 8.4 9.5 38.3 6.8 20.9 #N/A 
Tab. 4.3 Japanese and South Korean Government R&D budgets by socio-economic objective 
in Comparison with the U.S. and Germany (2016) 
Source: OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard (OECD, 2017) 
 The OECD STI Outlook (2016) reports that Japan was the world’s third most R&D-
intensive country in 2016. The major corporate groups, which are among the world’s largest 
corporate R&D investors, dominate the Japanese STI system. Their business investments are 
in high-technology and medium-high-technology sectors, such as pharmaceuticals, 
communication equipment, and motor vehicles. The main public instrument for R&D 
development is an R&D tax credit. Japanese large firms’ innovation activities rely more on 
cooperation within corporate groups along with high mobility of researchers in the private 
business sector instead of public research institutes (PRIs). However, Japanese universities and 
PRIs are also active in patenting process.  
 Meanwhile, the government of South Korea continues to take an active role in 
developing the country’s national R&D system under the Ministry of Science, ICT, and Future 
Planning. The South Korean PRIs, with a strong linkage with industry, are the main agents for 
public research. The PRIs also required to support small medium enterprises (SMEs) in 
technology transfer and the commercialization of SMEs. By 2017, the government requires the 
PRIs to allocate 15 percent of their institutional funding to support SMEs. In addition, the 
government have also established the Korean Science and Technology holdings and Mirae 
Holdings, Ltd to support the commercialization of technology developed by PRIs. Similar to 
Japan, the universities and PRIs in South Korea are also very active in patenting.  
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Fig. 4.7 Japanese and South Korean Total Patents Granted at the USPTO in comparison to 
other selected countries (1999-2014) 
Source: OECD Stats (OECD, 2019) 
 A patent is still the best proxy to measure national technological capabilities, 
particularly to measure the technological capabilities of a country’s indigenous manufacturing 
firms. There are two sources of patent data that I use on this Ph.D. dissertation. The first source 
is the US Patent Office (USPTO). The second source are the domestic patent offices (i.e., the 
Japan Patent Office / JPO and the Korean Intellectual Property Office / KIPO). Figure 4.7., 
figure 4.8., and table 4.4. provide an overview of the total growth and technological 
characteristics of Japanese and South Korean42, filed and granted at the USPTO. Figure 4.9. 
and figure 4.10. show the technological characteristics of domestic patents filed at the JPO and 
KIPO.   
JPN 1 H01L SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES; ELECTRIC SOLID STATE DEVICES NOT 
OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR 
  2 G06F ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING 
  3 H04N PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION 
  4 G03G ELECTROGRAPHY; ELECTROPHOTOGRAPHY; MAGNETOGRAPHY 
  5 G11B INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN 
RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER 
  6 B41J TYPEWRITERS; SELECTIVE PRINTING MECHANISMS, i.e. MECHANISMS 
PRINTING OTHERWISE THAN FROM A FORME; CORRECTION OF 
TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS 
  7 G02B OPTICAL ELEMENTS, SYSTEMS, OR APPARATUS 
 
42 The patent data retrieved from the OECD stats are sorted based on inventor(s)’s country(ies) of residence.  
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  8 G06K RECOGNITION OF DATA; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD 
CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS 
  9 H04L TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC 
COMMUNICATION 
  10 H01M PROCESSES OR MEANS, e.g. BATTERIES, FOR THE DIRECT 
CONVERSION OF CHEMICAL ENERGY INTO ELECTRICAL ENERGY 
  
KOR 1 H01L SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES; ELECTRIC SOLID STATE DEVICES NOT 
OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR 
  2 G06F ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING 
  3 H04N PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION 
  4 G11C STATIC STORES 
  5 G02F DEVICES OR ARRANGEMENTS, THE OPTICAL OPERATION OF WHICH 
IS MODIFIED BY CHANGING THE OPTICAL PROPERTIES OF THE 
MEDIUM OF THE DEVICES OR ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONTROL 
OF THE INTENSITY, COLOUR, PHASE, POLARISATION OR DIRECTION 
OF LIGHT, e.g. SWITCHING, GATING, MODULATING OR 
DEMODULATING; TECHNIQUES OR PROCEDURES FOR THE 
OPERATION THEREOF; FREQUENCY-CHANGING; NON-LINEAR OPTICS; 
OPTICAL LOGIC ELEMENTS; OPTICAL ANALOGUE/DIGITAL 
CONVERTERS 
  6 H04L TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC 
COMMUNICATION 
  7 G09G ARRANGEMENTS OR CIRCUITS FOR CONTROL OF INDICATING 
DEVICES USING STATIC MEANS TO PRESENT VARIABLE 
INFORMATION 
  8 H01M PROCESSES OR MEANS, e.g. BATTERIES, FOR THE DIRECT 
CONVERSION OF CHEMICAL ENERGY INTO ELECTRICAL ENERGY 
  9 H04B TRANSMISSION 
  10 G11B INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN 
RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER 
Tab. 4.4 Top 10 IPC Code (Three Digits) used by Majority of Granted Patents from Japan and 
South Korea at the USPTO (1999-2014) 
Source: OECD Stats (OECD, 2019) 
 Figure 4.5. shows that while the total number of South Korean patents granted at the 
USPTO between 1999 to 2014 had been growing, the total number of Japanese patents were 
declining especially since 2011. Based on the three digits International Patent Classification 
(IPC) code, the majority of granted patents from Japan and South Korea at the USPTO are 
related to the electronics sector (Tab. 4.4.). Figure 4.7. shows that granted patents from South 
Korea in the electronics sector have been increasing as the granted patents from Japan have 
been declining. South Korean patents have also been increasing in textile and paper sector.  
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Fig. 4.8 Total Patent grants at the USPTO by Technology (1999-2014): Japan and South Korea in Comparison to Selected Latin American and Southeast Asian 
Countries 
Source: OECD Stats (OECD, 2019)
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Fig. 4.9 Japanese Domestic Patent Grants at the JPO by IPC Code (Two Digits) (2003-2017) 
Notes: This figure only includes the top 15 IPC code used by majority of patent grants. 
Source: Figure by Author based on data from IP Five Office (IP5) (IP5, 2019) 
 
Fig. 4.10 South Korean Domestic Patent Grants at the KIPO by IPC Code (Two Digits) (2003-
2017) 
Notes: This figure only includes the top 15 IPC code used by majority of patent grants. 
Source: Figure by Author based on data from IP Five Office (IP5) (IP5, 2019) 
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Based on the data from the domestic patent offices (i.e., JPO and KIPO), the majority 
of the domestic patents granted at JPO and KIPO have also been electronics-related patents 
(Fig. 4.8.; Fig. 4.9). The top three IPC code with the largest number of granted domestic patents 
in JPO and KIPO are the same: H01, H04, and G06. On Chapters 5 and 6, for example, we can 
see that the top IPC codes in Argentina, Brazil, and Indonesia shows a large presence of 
extractive-industry related patents. The patent data from the respective national patent office 
of each countries shows that the chemistry-related patents dominates the patent in Malaysia, 
Thailand, and Indonesia. In this regard, I would like to stress more on the importance of looking 
into the technological characteristic of patents, instead of the total number of patents, to have 
a better picture on a country’s technology development. 
Overall, the first section presents that Japan and South Korea are currently exhibiting 
strong manufacturing sector performances, which are supported by strong indigenous 
technological capabilities. Their large indigenous enterprises are manufacturing firms. These 
firms are actively involved in R&D development, with strong support from the government 
through their STI policy. I trace back the origin of government support to industrial sector 
development back to the critical juncture periods for each country. Prominent historical 
scholars mostly refer to the 1868 Meiji Restoration and 1961 Park Chung-Hee regime as two 
crucial periods where the political elites in Japan and South Korea started to pursue an 
indigenous technology-driven industrial catch-up strategy. In the next two sections, I will focus 
on how the initial conditions, which occur or exist beyond the control of political elites, 
provoke political coalitions to choose this strategy. 
 
4.II. The Case of Japan 
 The first section shows that both Japan and South Korea are two countries that currently 
shows high indigenous technological capabilities within their manufacturing sector. Through 
the second and third section, I seek to show how these outcomes are related to the political 
elites’ consensus to pursue an indigenous technology-driven industrial catch-up strategy in the 
critical juncture period. Therefore, it is important to highlight that the key point here is not 
about the type of industrialization strategy (e.g., import-substitution, export-oriented) but 
rather the intention of the strategy. In the case of Japan, and later South Korea, we can see a 
strong intention of the political elites to support indigenous technological learning to boost up 
industrial catch-up (i.e. manufacturing upgrading). Foreign direct investment (FDIs), including 
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joint ventures with foreign firms, was done to facilitate indigenous technological learning. 
There were conscious efforts made by the political elites to avoid being dependent on the 
foreign firm and foreign technology. In the case of Japan and South Korea, their critical 
juncture marked the beginning of indigenous technology-driven industrial catch-up strategy 
because the political elites had no other option but to choose this strategy as a means of national 
survival.  
The key period to understand Japan's rapid economic growth and industrial catch-up 
can be traced back to the late 1800s (see Fig. 4.1). This is roughly the same period with the 
economic development starting point of Argentina and Brazil (see fig. 5.1. in Chapter 5). Meiji 
Restoration (1868), instead of the Postwar Japan (1945), is the key point to explain Japan’s 
industrial catch-up experiences. Following the literatures such as Johnson (1982) and Ohno 
(2006) (2018), the Postwar Japan system is a replication of the strategy in Meiji era. Therefore, 
the transitioning period from Edo to Meiji in the late 1800s was the critical juncture period for 
Japan. I divided this section into two subsections: the critical juncture period and the post-
critical juncture period. In the first subsection, I discuss three main elements from the method 
of comparison: global-external circumstances, domestic circumstances, and the political elites’ 
consensus on economic strategy. In the post-critical juncture period, I discuss briefly how the 
consensus on economic strategy continues. 
  
4.II.a. Critical Juncture Period: Meiji Restoration 1868 
4.II.a.1. Global-External Circumstances 
Japan embarked its industrialization in 1868 during the Meiji Era. As pointed out by 
Johnson (1982) and Ohno (2006) (2018), before the Meiji period, Japan endured a long period 
of isolationism with no evidence of pre-modern manufacturing43. Overall, the global-external 
circumstances surrounded the political elites in the Meiji period can be separated into two 
categories: 1) direct circumstances; 2) indirect circumstances (Tab. 4.5.). These global-external 
circumstances occurred beyond the control of the political elites, but they contributed to the 
Meiji political elites’ decision to pursue an indigenous technology-driven industrial catch-up. 
 
43 Despite of this, Ohno (2006) points out that Edo society did possess key pre-conditions for industrialization 
such as high literacy. According to Ohno, bakufu education system is often cited by scholars as the main factor 
that supported Japanese industrialization (p. 33). In addition, Edo period also saw the development of handicraft 
and food processing activities such as tea, silk, pottery, sake, etc (p. 32). 
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Critical Juncture Periods Post-Critical Juncture Periods 
direct circumstances indirect circumstances 
• Gunboat Diplomacy (1854) 
• Unequal Treaties (1858) 
• Industrial Revolution (1820-
1840) 
• Opium War (1839-1858) 
• First Globalization (1870-1914) 
• World War I (1914-1918) 
Tab. 4.5 Global-External Circumstances of Japan 
Source: Author 
 
The 1854 Gunboat Diplomacy and the 1858 Unequal Treaties were two important 
global-external circumstances that directly influences the political elites’ behavior during the 
Meiji Period. Meanwhile, the Industrial Revolution (1820-1840) and the loss of China in the 
Opium War (1839-1858) were the indirect circumstances. Before the Meiji government, Edo 
Japan was a long period of isolationism under bakufu government with no access to Western 
technological knowledge, nor even its advancement. By the end of the 1800s, Western ships 
began to head toward Japan. In 1853, the U.S. ships conducted a gunboat diplomacy toward 
Japan. This was the same strategy used by Britain Empire to defeat China. The U.S. threatened 
the bakufu government by showing off their powerful canon. Contact with Western 
imperialism and their military power provoked the Meiji government to start planning for 
industrial and technological catch-up (Ohno, 2018). When the Meiji government took power, 
their main objective was to pursue rapid Westernization (modernization) to avoid 
colonialization by the West. They set three catch-up priorities: industrialization, political 
reform, and external expansion (military capabilities). Their ultimate goal was to reverse 
unequal treaties, which they finally achieved in 1911 (Ohno, 2018, p. 38). 
If we trace it back, therefore, it is crucial to first acknowledge that this is the period 
where the industrial revolution (i.e. transitioning to new manufacturing process) in Europe and 
the U.S. (the American) highly influence the flow of global economic development. This first 
industrial revolution then led to the new phase of European colonial expansion and American 
imperialism. The supremacy of Western society (i.e. Britain and the U.S.) in that period seemed 
apparent for the political elites in the Northeast Asian region, especially with Britain’s victory 
over China in the Opium Wars (1839-1842; 1856–60). The important technological 
advancements from the first industrial revolution were iron and steam, which have contributed 
to the development of naval power. The first Opium War resulted in the Treaty of Nanking 
which obliged China not only to open their five ports, but also handed over Hong Kong island. 
There have been other global global-external dynamics in the post-critical juncture 
period that provided a conducive environment to the political elites’ decision to pursue an 
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indigenous technology-driven industrial catch-up strategy as a mean of national survival. 
World War I (1914), in the middle of the first wave of globalization (i.e. the expansion of 
international trade), benefitted the Japanese economy due to the sudden increase of global 
demand on Japanese products to substitute any unavailability of European products. 
Domestically, there was also an expansion of Japanese products which benefit the mediocre 
and inefficient domestic producers. This boosted up the domestic price level and annual 
growth. In addition, marine transportation and the shipbuilding sector grew rapidly (Ohno, 
2006, pp. 104-105).  
When World War I ended, the Japanese economy fell due to the postwar recession. In 
this period, the Japanese government chose to rescue the industries and banks with bad debt44. 
In 1920, the Bank of Japan granted special loans to stabilize the financial market by relieving 
specific key industries (Nanto & Takagi, 1985; Shizume, 2009). The period between the 1920s 
to 1930s saw rapid development of Heavy and Chemical Industries (HCI). During this period 
Japan built up its capability to produce machines domestically. This period gave birth to a new 
type of zaibatsu such as Nissan, Nichitsu, and Mori, which did not rely on textile and commerce 
and banks like the old zaibatsu such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi. Japanese companies (e.g., NEC, 
Shibaura, Mitsubishi Electric, Furukawa, and Nissan) absorbed foreign technology and built 
industrial linkages through FDIs provided by foreign enterprises in electrical machinery, 
automobiles, rubber tires, and others. These enterprises came from the U.S. and Europe (e.g., 
General Electric, Westinghouse, Siemens, Ford, GM, Dunlop, and Goodrich) (Ohno, 2006, pp. 
104-105).  
Overall, due to their lack of easy revenue (more on the next section) the political elites 
in Japan had only two options: to catch-up or to be colonialized. When the Meiji political elites 
decided to embark on industrial catch-up strategy, this was the period where most of developed 
countries in Europe gained their economic power through colonialism or expansionism. 
Between the 1500s and 1800s, the European empires have gained their economic power from 
 
44 The Great Depression brought economic stagnation in Japan. However, before 1930, Japan had already been 
experiencing a sluggish economic growth throughout the 1920s, especially after the World War I boom. Japan 
was able to escape from more damages from the Great Depression in 1932 after the Takahashi Economic Policies, 
which mainly included: 1) gold standard abandonment and export-oriented promotion; 2) low-interest rates; and 
3) Bank of Japan’s bond sales to finance the deficit spending. It is important to note here that Takahashi Korekiyo, 
who was Minister of Finance (1913; 1927-1936), Prime Minister (1921), and Minister of Agriculture and 
Commerce (1924), heavily promoted low-interest rate to promote industrial expansion. As Minister of 
Agriculture, he separated the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
(Nanto & Takagi, 1985; Shizume, 2009). 
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their colonies across the world (e.g., the Americas, Africa, and Asia). Development of military 
technology, which supported by the practice of colonialism, was the most prominent discourse 
for nation survival in this period45. The success of European countries and the defeat of China, 
which has weaker technological capabilities, were the only examples for the political elites in 
Japan. However, these global-external dynamics were not the only factors that provoked the 
Meiji government’s decision to pursue industrial catch-up. These factors were then met with 
the domestic dynamics (see section 4.II.b).  
 
4.II.a.2. Domestic Circumstances 
There are three important elements of domestic circumstances in which I would like to 
discuss here (see fig. 3.2. on Chapter 3). Those are being the natural resource endowment, 
national unity, and socio-economic structure before the Meiji industrialization. A combination 
between the global-external circumstances and the three elements of domestic circumstances 
created a high urgency level that provoked a broad coalition among the political elites to 
prioritize indigenous technology-driven industrial catch-up. The natural resource endowment 
is related to access to easy revenue. National unity is related to domestic political stability. A 
socio-economic structure is related to the ownership of capital. Overall, I seek to highlight the 
interest of different stakeholders within the society in question, which mostly includes the 
political elites, the large businesses, the bureaucrats, the military, and the interest groups. 
The lack of natural resource endowment constrained the political elites in Meiji Japan 
from easy revenue (e.g., oil revenue) when they were faced with external military threats such 
as Gunboat Diplomacy. In terms of economic development, resource scarcity can refer to two 
elements: agricultural land and mineral (energy) extraction. Japan and South Korea both have 
relatively scarce arable land (for cultivation) and mineral shortages, as opposed to their Latin 
American and Southeast Asian counterparts. Yasuba (1996) presents an overview of Japan’s 
natural resource problem in relation to industrialization since the 1800s. He argues that the 
available resources in Japan could not keep up with the industrialization process, while their 
land endowment was less favorable in comparison to Europe and the U.S. He also states that 
during the early 1930’s, Japan faced a shortage in domestic raw materials and fuels, thus 
 
45 Post Meiji Restoration, the Japanese political elites sought to expand their rules outside Japan. They won the 
war with China in 1895 and with Russia in 1905. In 1910, they annexed Korea. During World War I, Japan sided 
with the Allied Power.   
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imported them for their heavy industries from their colonies in Northeast and Southeast Asia 
(Yasuba, 1996, pp. 552-553). 
Other than the lack of easy revenue, national unity was an important element that 
provided a conducive environment for the political elites in Meiji to pursue indigenous 
technology-driven industrial catch-up. Initially, the domestic politics before Edo Japan was 
unstable with a frequent occurrence of internal wars. In 1603, after the Battle of Sekigahara, 
Ieyasu Tokugawa established a new bakufu government in Edo. During this period of isolation, 
the Tokugawa family ruled the country for 264 years. The political system was centralized 
under bakufu, but the economic system was decentralized under the daimyos who ruled the 
lands, farmers, and samurais. Overall, the Edo period was a period of political unity and 
stability where the agricultural sector, the commerce sector, and the education sector (i.e. 
literacy level) developed well (Ohno, 2006, pp. 23-24).  
The bakufu government banned foreign contact and monopolized foreign trade in a 
limited area such as in Nagasaki. After the gunboat diplomacy by the U.S., the bakufu 
government signed the commercial treaties (i.e. the unequal treaties) in 1858 unilaterally, 
which angered the political oppositions and the samurais. Under the treaties, Japan did not have 
the right to decide tariff nor to judge foreign criminals. Domestically, it also provoked political 
unrest for the next fifteen years, which mostly about an anti-foreigner nationalism sentiment. 
This ended with the removal of bafuku and the establishment of the Meiji government in 1868 
by the young samurais in Western Japan (Ohno, 2006, p. 42).  
In sum, unlike the case of newly independent states in Latin America and Southeast 
Asia (i.e. Malaysia and Thailand), the Meiji politics were already stable. The existence of a 
flexible structure in politics, which had been in place since the late Edo period, enabled the 
Meiji government to reorganize its politics regularly, redefine national goals, and build 
concrete economic plans (Ohno, 2018, p. 37). There has been a constant regrouping of leaders 
from different political groups. After the opening of the port to modern trade in 1858, the 
political unrest continued for years, but the structure of domestic politics remained flexible. 
Different political groups shared the same stance on open trade.  
Another important element is the socio-economic structure, particularly the Edo legacy 
of merchant culture. Meiji Japan benefited from the legacy, which resulted in a unified market, 
a strong merchant culture, and developed financial services. Western diplomats and merchants 
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began to settle in a designated area within Yokohama as this traditional village slowly turned 
into a modern port city. The Yokohama merchants played a key role as mediators between the 
foreign traders and local producers (Ohno, 2018). 
Okubo Toshimichi, one of the most important figures in Japanese industrialization. He 
visited British factories and started to greatly encourage industrialization when he returned to 
Japan as the Minister of Finance. Technological advancement in Meiji Japan started in the 
cotton industry, with Japan eventually becoming a major exporter of cotton clothes. Initially, 
Japan started to import British cotton clothes due to an increasing rural demand following the 
opening of its ports after the Treaty of Amity and Commerce 1858 between the U.S. and Japan 
(Ohno, 2018). 
Through the textile sector, Japan started the development of its machinery industry, 
which was intertwined to the second goal of the Meiji government, which was to strengthen 
the country’s military capabilities (external expansion to avoid being colonialized). In the 
second half of the Meiji period, the Japanese government started to train Japanese engineers to 
replace foreign advisors46. This was the turning point for technological skills development in 
Japan. Initially, state-owned military mills dominated the machinery industry initially while 
the private sector grew gradually. Its construction imitated the Western model and they also 
hired western managers. Other industrial sectors, which developed later due to military needs, 
were the steel, railroad carriage and locomotive, shipbuilding and ocean transport, as well as 
electrical machinery industries (Ohno, 2018). It should be noted that while Japan later lost 
World War II, the legacy of Meiji Restoration contributed to how Japan built its post-war 
economy. 
 
4.II.a.3. Political Elites’ Consensus on Economic Strategy & Indigenous Technology-Driven 
Industrial Catch-up 
The main goal of the Meiji government was clear: modernization to avoid 
colonialization by the West. The national slogan was “rich country, strong army”, which wish 
to be achieved through industrialization (economic modernization), political modernization, 
 
46 Since the 1870s, the method of technology transfer was by hiring foreign advisors to construct and operate new 
factories and infrastructures. These foreign advisors were, for example, the unemployed British railroad engineers 
which traveled abroad to find jobs. 
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and external expansion (military modernization) (Ohno, 2006, p. 43). Overall, the general 
public, media, and academicians shared the same goals with the Meiji government. The 
problematic group during that period was the conservative samurai class. However, the Meiji 
government managed to reduce their power gradually (Ohno, 2018, p. 39). 
To fund the industrialization process, the Meiji government started to reform the Land 
Tax since 1873. The Land Tax reform strengthened the financial basis for the Meiji 
government, which was used part of it to promote capitalist industrialization. The Reserve Fund 
and Industrial Promotion funds were several key channels for the Meiji government to facilitate 
the industries. Between 1873-1881, the Meiji government allocated capital loans for the 
encouragement of industry in a total of JPY 53 million or more than 1.2 times the average 
annual revenue from the Land Tax for that period. This was met with some rejections, but it 
never grew more extensive than the presence of foreign threats (Takeda, 1965, p. 432). 
In sum, since the 1800s, the key element of Meiji industrialization was Western 
technological learning (i.e., Western technology import and internalization), which was done 
by from hiring foreign advisors, the training of Japanese engineers, and the critical role of 
industrial high school. They established the Institute of Technology in 1887. By the end of the 
Meiji period, the number of Japanese engineers increased significantly as the expertise 
produced from the Institute of Technology played an important role in selecting and developing 
new technologies. There was a limited FDI during the Meiji Japan and the government were 
mostly hostile towards foreign investment. When several automobiles and electrical machinery 
companies signed a various licensing agreement and technical cooperation with the Western 
firm in the 1900s, the Japanese firms conducted a relatively quick technology absorption 
(Ohno, 2018, pp. 52-54).  
By the 1930s, Japan experienced an economic recession following the 1930 Great 
Depression. In this period there was a shift in the political and intellectual thinking from liberal 
economics into state control economics. Between 1931 to 1937, the ultra-nationalist group 
within the military gradually took over the government. Then, the Japan-China war erupted in 
1937 as the Japanese economy transformed for war-purpose. The Japanese firms started to 
produce war goods such as ships and warplanes. Japan also invaded the Southeast Asian region. 
Later Japan was defeated by the allied power in 1945, followed by the collapse of its war 
economy (Ohno, 2006, pp. 136-139). 
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 During the World War II period, the Japanese political elites gave birth to the “Greater 
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” vision. It was started with a radio speech by Foreign Minister 
Hachiro Arita on 29 June 1940. He stated that countries in East Asia, which includes Northeast 
and Southeast Asia, “are geographically close, historically, racially and economically very 
closely related to each other” therefore they “are destined to cooperate and minister to one 
another's needs for their common well- being and prosperity” (Duus, 1996, p. 59). In the 1930s, 
Kaname Akamatsu’s Flying Geese theory gained popularity in Japan. The original idea 
released in 1932 did not have any war-intention as it was proposed to explain the pattern of 
development. The idea was as the old industries began to lose their comparative advantages, 
the state needs to withdraw their support and these industries should move to less developed 
countries. In the 1940s, the flying geese theory became part of the Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere propaganda for the Japanese government to occupy Asia47 (Korhonen, 1994, 
pp. 93-94).  
 
4.II.b. Post-Critical Juncture Period: The Post World War II and Replication of Strategy  
 Throughout the 1900s, the Japanese government has been mostly consistent with their 
prioritization over economic development. As Johnson (1982) points out, from the World War 
II era to the 1970s, “the high-growth system cannot be reduced to any particular device or 
institution, to the rate of saving, or the employment system, or the banking system” because it 
was a continuous learning and adaptation process in the middle of various constraints (p. 306). 
The existence of broad consensus to support economic development throughout the 1950s and 
1960s occurred when the country had experienced war and postwar inflation which caused a 
nationwide poverty48. The post-World War II industrial rationalization in the 1950s and 1960s 
was a replication of the 1920s policy when the political elite seek to overcome recession49 
(Johnson, 1982, pp. 307-308). As we can see from Johnson’s book (1982), during the Japanese 
high-growth system the attitude of the policymakers, especially the prioritization over domestic 
industrial upgrading, is a continuation from the Meiji Restoration. Shigeru Sahashi, who served 
as vice-minister of the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MITI) between 1964 and 1966, was an 
 
47 In 1943, the Japanese military government sent Kaname Akamatsu to Singapore to research the Southeast Asian 
economy under Japanese rule. 
48 This is similar to the situation in South Korea. 
49 Johnson differentiates Japanese developmental state arrangements with the political system in Argentina and 
Brazil where the political elites chose to collaborate with the multinational companies (Johnson, 1982, p. 317). 
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industrial nationalist whose policies were created to support indigenous industries against 
foreign enterprises (Johnson, 1982, pp. 243-246). 
 The MITI’s high-growth system in Japan was created in the Post-World War II era 
when Japan was under the U.S. Occupation period (i.e., the Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers or SCAP). Government, through their economic bureaucrats, select certain industries 
to nurture them through a set of policies (e.g. foreign exchange, technology import, tax breaks, 
and protection from competition). Rationality became the key to produce efficient industrial 
policy. While initially, the SCAP had broken up the old zaibatsu, MITI rebuilt them after the 
Occupation period was ended. They recombined Mitsubishi in 1952 and Mitsui in 1955. MITI 
provided various funding and assigning enterprises to trading companies. Bank groups from 
the old zaibatsu were rebuilt. One of the most important instruments of MITI’s industrial policy 
in this time was the Japan Development Bank in 1951, which granted MITI had the authority 
to fund and invest in the selected industry such as the steel firms (Johnson, 1982, pp. 204-209).  
 In sum, the idea here is that after the turning point in the Meiji Period, the Japanese 
government consensus over indigenous manufacturing sector prioritization within a national 
development strategy remains to exist. The Meiji system then became the foundation for Japan 
to rebuild its economy in the Post-World War II period. As we can see from section 4.I.b., the 
Japanese government continues to allocate a large amount of national STI budget into the 
industrial technology sector. Patent-producing performances of Japanese manufacturing firms 
continue to be strong as they also invest largely in the R&D sector, especially in the high and 
medium-high technology sectors. The Japanese manufacturing firms continue to expand their 
production network, including to Southeast Asian countries, particularly in the aftermath of the 
1985 Plaza Accord.  
In the post-critical juncture period, there is a continuation of political coalitions 
between the government and the large industrial firms. The old zaibatsu survived and 
transformed into new forms. The nationalistic idea within the Japanese economy in post-World 
War II was manifested in support of indigenous industries against foreign enterprises. Overall, 
the close relations between government and indigenous industrial firms started way back in the 
Meiji period. Once it was established, we only see the reproduction of strategy supported by a 
similar political coalition. The case of Japan shows the same pattern with South Korea, in which 
we can find a critical juncture period that marked the emergence of an alliance between political 
elites and indigenous large industrial firms to pursue industrial catch-up. 
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4.III. The Case of South Korea  
The key period to understand South Korea's rapid economic growth and industrial 
catch-up can be traced back to the post-World War II period, particularly in the aftermath of 
the Korean War (see fig. 4.1). This is roughly the same period with the independent of 
Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia (see fig. 6.1. in Chapter 6). The transitioning period from 
the Syngman Rhee (1948) to Park Chung-Hee regime (1961-1979) and the Yushin Restoration 
(1972) were important events in its the critical juncture, which can explain the South Korean 
rapid industrial catch-up experiences. Post-World War II South Korea were left with the 
majority of its population working in the agricultural sectors as the majority of the heavy 
industrial establishment was located in North Korea. Prior to Park Chung-Hee’s era, there was 
no evidence of any advanced industrial development in South Korea. The political coalition 
before Park Chung-Hee was crony capitalism seeking short-term revenue. 
As we can see from section 4.I., the indigenous manufacturing sector in South Korea 
has developed into a technologically sophisticated sector. This is shown by the performances 
of their manufacturing value-added and the patenting activities of their indigenous 
manufacturing firms. Currently, there are a total of 67 South Korean companies listed on the 
Forbes Global 2000 with manufacturing firms on the top of the list (e.g., Samsung Electronics, 
Hyundai Motor). The founding of these manufacturing firms can be traced back to the critical 
juncture period. 
The case of South Korea also exhibits another example of a high level of urgency. 
Similar to Japan, in South Korea, the political elites’ consensus to support indigenous 
technology-driven industrial catch-up was initially provoked by the need for national survival. 
The presence of hostile global-external dynamics met with a lack of easy revenue, as well as 
nationwide poverty due to the war damages resulted in a broad political coalition among the 
political elites to prioritize the indigenous technology-driven industrial catch-up. The 
nationalist sentiment within the Park Chung-Hee’s military regime was manifested into a 
pursuit of independent industrial capabilities and to avoid foreign technology dependence50. 
The same strategy, including the political coalition that support it (i.e., government and 
indigenous industrial firms), is replicated throughout the post-critical juncture period.  
 
50 This provides an interesting contrast with the Suharto’s regime in Indonesia, which decided to be open to foreign 
technology and FDIs (more on Chapter 6). 
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4.III.a. Critical Juncture Period: Park Chung-Hee and the 1972 Yushin Restoration 
4.III.a.1. Global-External Circumstances 
Similar to the case of Japan, overall, I divide the global-external circumstances into two 
categories: 1) direct circumstances; 2) indirect circumstances. There were also global-external 
dynamics, occurred close to the critical juncture period, which provided a conducive 
environment to support an indigenous technology-driven industrial catch-up. I categorized the 
key global-external circumstances from figure 4.1. into table 4.6. below. Likewise, these 
global-external circumstances occurred beyond the control of the political elites.  
Critical Juncture Periods Post-Critical Juncture Periods 
direct circumstances indirect circumstances 
• Japan’s Rule over Korea 
Peninsula (1910-1945) 
• Korean War (1950-1953) 
• Korean Armistice 
Agreement – the U.S. in 
South Korea (1953) 
• World War II (1939- 1945) 
• Nixon’s Visit to China (1972) 
• Vietnam War (The U.S. Cold 
War policy) (1955-1975) 
• Treaty on Basic Relations 
between Japan and the Republic 
of Korea (1965) 
Tab. 4.6 Global-External Circumstances of South Korea 
Source: Author 
 
Post-war South Korea faced a hostile regional environment as much as Meiji Japan had.  
In the second half of the 1950s, South Korea found itself in the middle of hostile regional 
instability (i.e., the North Korean threat and legacy of the Japanese Occupation) while dealing 
with a chaotic domestic economic situation (i.e., poverty). First, it is important to note that 
South Korea, as a part of Korea, had been under the control of the Japanese Empire since 1910. 
After Japan’s defeat in World War II in 1945, the U.S. and Soviet Union had divided Korea in 
two, with the South Korea was established in 1948. Subsequently, the domestic ruling elite in 
South Korea continued to face instability from North Korea, in addition to strong anti-Japanese 
sentiments as the legacy of the Japanese occupation.  
We must take [the lesson] to our hearts and minds that inter- national society 
from now on will not spare either sympathy or support to any nation which does 
not have a strong spirit of chaju (independence) and charip (economic self-
reliance) . . . And we must also renew our determination and will to maintain the 
spirit of self-reliant national defense by uniting the government and the people. 
[Presidential Secretariat vol. 8 1971: 102 as cited on Kim (2003, p. 110)] 
What is the best way to fight [against North Korean Communists]? Is it possible 
to compromise with them? There is absolutely no possibility. If there were, 
would we be prepared to concede and retreat? That would be as good as a death 
sentence for all of us. In this case, there is only one solution: to fight with [our 
own] strength! That is the only way for us to survive. The enemy will hesitate to 
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invade [us] only when they realize that we are equipped with strength and 
determined to fight to the end. [Presidential Secretariat vol. 5 1969: 117 as cited 
on Kim (2003, p. 112)] 
The U.S. presence in South Korean was helping with post-war economic 
reconstruction, as it strengthened the motivation among the ruling political elites to pursue 
industrial catch-up and smoothened the path to industrialization. When Park Chung-Hee’s 
military government took power via coup d’état in 1961, their main objectives were similar to 
those of Meiji Japan: 1) to end the country’s poverty; 2) to free the nation from economic 
dependency on the U.S.; and 3) to compete with the rapid industrialization taking place in 
North Korea (Seth, 2017, p. 5). Akin to the Meiji government’s strategy of developing 
indigenous technological skills, the major feature of Park Chung-Hee’s strategy was to acquire 
technical skills and conduct technological dissemination to business enterprises (e.g., the 
Korean Institute of Science and Technology, which was established in 1966). In this regard, 
the U.S. and Japan played an important role. 
The Vietnam War51 and the normalization of relations in 1965 with Tokyo benefited 
both Japan and South Korea in terms of indigenous manufacturing firm development. After 
that, Japan had become the major source of technology for South Korea while was benefiting 
from the cheap labor in South Korea (Lee, 2001). This normalization was a part of the U.S. 
Cold War’s containment strategy. Park Chung-Hee visited Japan in 1961 to seek economic 
benefits. In 1962, the Japanese government agreed “to provide $300 million in grants payable 
over ten years; $200 million in government loans; and $100 million in commercial credits, 
which amount was later increased to $300 million” (Kim, 2003, p. 98). 
Meanwhile, in return for the 300,000 troops, which they sent to support the U.S. during 
the Vietnam War, South Korean firms gained contracts to supply goods and services in the area 
and to the allied military forces. One of the examples was Hyundai. Its close relationship with 
the U.S. military started during the Korean war when its founder, Chung Ju-Yung received a 
contract to deliver goods. Hyundai then received further contracts to build army barracks and 
national airports. Their involvement in various projects in Vietnam provided Hyundai with 
direct training with U.S. Military engineers. Hyundai experienced rapid engineering and 
technology upgrading through these opportunities (Glassman & Choi, 2014, pp. 1170-1171). 
 
51 The Vietnam War provided economic grain for South Korea. By the end of 1968, the total economic gain was 
more than USD 380 million, which represents 2.8 percent of their GNP (Kim, 2003, p. 101). 
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Another important indirect global-external circumstances that provoked the pursuit of 
indigenous technology-driven industrial catch-up in the Park Chung-Hee’s regime was 
President Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, which was had been preceded by U.S. military 
withdrawal from South Korea a year before. In 1971, Park Chung-Hee started the Five-Year 
Military Modernization Plan after the U.S. had withdrawn one-third of its military troops from 
South Korea. Several months after President Nixon announced that he had planned to visit 
China, Park Chung-Hee started to campaign for South Korea’s independence in economic and 
military matters. He then started to prioritize defense and industrial development through 
various radical changes in bureaucracy. This was the initial stage of the Yushin era, which was 
mainly promoted as the strategy to face North Korea (Kim, 2003).  
The U.S. Cold War policy contributes to Park Chung-Hee’s successful 
industrialization. The focus of the U.S., under Kennedy’s administration, was to promote the 
anti-Communist regime without going further to intervene in South Korea’s domestic politics. 
The U.S. also supported Park Chung-Hee’s military junta in their effort to prevent the 
expansion of the USSR’s periphery area. Park Chung-Hee used this as their bargaining power 
(e.g., continuously promoting the U.S. anti-communist agenda domestically) to negotiate for 
more economic aid. Yet, at the same time, he sought to free South Korea from their economic 
dependence to the U.S.  This ensured the survival of Park Chung-Hee’s military dictatorship 
in the middle of the Cold War context (Kim, 2003, p. 93).    
In sum, a hostile global-external circumstance, characterized by regional instability, 
provoked Park Chung-Hee's military regime to pursue an indigenous technology-driven catch-
up strategy. However, regional instability alone is not sufficient to explain the high level of 
urgency and to explain how the indigenous technology-driven catch-up strategy works as a 
mean of national survival. If a conducive domestic circumstance in Japan was a combination 
of natural resource scarcity and a 200 years old legacy of Edo isolationism, a conducive 
domestic circumstance in South Korea mostly was a combination of natural resource scarcity 
and the result of war devastation. 
 
4.III.a.2. Domestic Circumstances 
 First, similar to Japan, South Korea have relatively scarce arable land (for cultivation) 
and mineral shortages, as opposed to their Latin American and Southeast Asian counterparts. 
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In addition, the South Korean agricultural sector was destroyed by the Korean war when South 
Korean was under a military alliance with the U.S.52. The Land Reform bill in 1949, initially 
aimed to end the feudal system from the Japanese occupation period, was also disturbed by the 
mentioned conflict. The government imposed a high tax burden on the farmers. The 
government also imposed landowners to a compulsory sale of goods to the government at a 
low price (Lee, 2001; Mitchell, 1949). 
 When the two Koreas were separated in 1948, South Korea was faced with extreme 
poverty, with the majority of its people mostly involved in agricultural activities, which could 
not feed the population adequately. The war destroyed both North and South Korea, including 
the pre-World War II industrial production built by Imperial Japan. Japan annexed Korea in 
1910 and they built various modern factories, schools, and transport systems. Japanese imperial 
power invested in the development of industries and infrastructure. In 1945, Korea has built at 
least 3,000 km of railroad and 50,000 km of motor roads. The literacy rates increased to almost 
50 percent. In 1937, there were 2,300 factories ran by Koreans. However, the majority of heavy 
industries were located in North Korea (Vu, 2010, pp. 31-32). By the early 1950s, the war has 
destroyed 51 percent of the total industry. In the first four months, 70 percent of the textile 
industry, 70 percent of the chemical industry, 40 percent of agricultural machinery, and 10 
percent of the rubber industry were destroyed. The total estimation of war damages was around 
USD 6.9 billion, which reached 86 percent of their GNP in 1953 (Lee, 2001, p. 98). 
Post-war South Korea benefitted from the people’s desperation to escape from poverty. 
While Meiji Japan inherited national unity (political and market unity) from 200 years of Edo’s 
isolationism, the sense of national unity53 in the early days of modern nation state South Korea 
was strengthened by the nationwide high poverty that was prevalent after the Korean War. 
Before the 1960s, South Korean exports mostly consisted of low-technology agriculture 
products, such as rice and seaweed, as well as a small amount of tungsten, iron, and graphite 
(Seth, 2017, p. 8). The Syngman Rhee’s regime (1948-1960) was the foundation for Park 
Chung-Hee’s growth-oriented strategy. The Syngman Rhee period was a period of crony 
 
52 Initially, the war was a civil war between North and South Korea. However, it soon turned into a larger scale-
war involving the UN forces’ support on South Korea, mainly the U.S., and the USSR and China’s support on 
North Korea. 
53 Prior to the division of Korean Peninsula, they were unified under the Goryeo (918–1392) and Joseon (1392–
1897) dynasties and also under the Korean Empire (1897–1910). For further information, Rausch (2016) discusses 
the nationalism in Korea prior to the World War II, particularly on the development of pre-modern Korean 
identity.   
 84 
capitalism. The business community benefited from their close ties with the president as they 
received favorable policies such as import licenses. These import license became the means to 
transfer the foreign aid into government’s coffers. However, during this period, there was a 
flow of South Korean migrants to the U.S. to study and came back as young technocrats. They 
then contributed in arranging South Korean long-term economic development plan. Syngman 
Rhee’s administration also marked the period of South Korea's rapid expansion of education. 
Between 1945 to 1960, the primary school enrollment increased three times, the secondary 
school increased eight times, and higher education increased ten times (Seth, 2017, p. 8).    
In the 1960s, it was a student movement that ended the Syngman Rhee regime. The 
protest was mostly about corruption issues, election rigging, and police brutality instead of 
economic issues such as inequality or anti-capitalistic sentiment. The student demonstrations 
continued every year throughout the decade. These demonstrations remained to be mostly 
noneconomic issues, such as the relations between South Korea and the U.S. and also the 
normalization of relations with Japan. There was a lack of protest against economic policy (Vu, 
2010, pp. 46-47).  
 
4.III.a.3. Political Elites’ Consensus on Economic Strategy & Indigenous Technology-Driven 
Industrial Catch-up 
Initially, when Park Chung-hee took over the government, the military regime did not 
have a clear economic plan other than the need to end the nationwide poverty. Along with it, 
Park Chung-Hee’s military government had a reformist agenda, which was similar to that of 
the student revolution in 1960; putting an end to the patronage politics of the Syngman Rhee’s 
period. Most of the present influential figures in South Korea originated from the Park Chung-
Hee’s period. The dictatorial leadership of Park Chung-Hee gave birth to the modern industrial 
state of South Korea under the support of the technocrats in the Ministries of Commerce & 
Industry. The rapid economic growth policy in this period was pursued under an anti-
communist economic nationalism agenda, seeking to achieve political, economic, and security 
independence, mostly from the U.S. (Kim, 2003, pp. 205-206). 
Park Chung-Hee’s growth-oriented strategy relied on two basic ideas: land reform and 
the development of education. Land reform led to the replacement of the South Korean 
agricultural sector with a consumer goods-oriented industrial structure, starting with the textile 
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industry (Lee, 2001). Between 1945 and 1960, the primary school enrolment in South Korea 
increased threefold, the secondary school enrolment increased more than eightfold, and higher 
education enrolment increased tenfold. Therefore, by 1961 South Korea possessed the ‘best-
educated workforce’ in comparison with other countries at comparable income levels (Seth, 
2017, p. 4). 
Park Chung-Hee’s government launched the Economic Planning Board in 1962, which 
promoted the development of export-oriented light industries. In the 1950s to 1960s, the textile 
industry sector benefited from government aid and low-paid labor due to the high level of 
unemployment. This system gave birth to the establishment of the ten biggest Korean chaebols 
during this period. The Board consisted of technocrats who directed economic growth. From 
1962 to 1966, the economy grew by 8.9 percent, on average, exceeding their 7.1 percent target, 
while exports grew by 29 percent, on average (Lee, 2001). 
Under Park Chung-Hee’s government, South Korea’s efficient institutional 
arrangements benefited from a stable political cycle (i.e., Park’s relatively secure political 
position after the 1963 election) and the close access to the government that the private sector 
enjoyed without being able to dominate the policy process (i.e., a mechanism was in place to 
suppress rent-seeking opportunities) (Haggard, et al., 1991, p. 869). As the economy grew, the 
South Korean government began to professionalize the state bureaucracy. In the 1970s, Park 
Chung-Hee’s government54 redirected the development strategy towards the heavy and 
chemical industries. 
The Yushin Restoration (1973-1979) became the foundation of Park Chung-Hee’s 
Korean Way or Korea-first strategy. Park Chung-Hee and his team of technocrats implement 
state-guided industrialization. The Yushin reform was a system of dedication for heavy 
chemical industry development seeking a minimal opposition within a tight centralization of 
power. The Cold War, particularly the Vietnam War, became the channel for Park Chung-
Hee’s government to maximize opportunities to expand their market. He also took advantage 
of the Korea-Japan normalization in 1965 to boost their rapid industrialization. The chaebol55-
oriented economic system supported the heavy chemical industry development during this 
Yushin era. There is a combination of roles between the technocrats and the chaebols (e.g., 
 
54 Although the government went back to civilian rule in 1963, Park Chung-Hee was elected president three times 
afterward (i.e., in 1963, 1967, and 1971). In 1972, he declared martial law. 
55 A large family-owned industrial conglomerates. 
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Pohang Iron and Steel Co., Samsung Electronics Co., and Hyundai Heavy Industry Co.) in 
South Korean industrialization. The economic nationalism56 plays a large part in the Park 
Chung-Hee regime (Kim, 2003, pp. 206-207). 
 
4.III.b. Post-Critical Juncture Period: The Continuation of Strategy  
As a result of the Yushin era, South Korea slowly experienced social and economic 
transformation. Despite the assassination of Park Chung-Hee in 1979, his successor, Chin Doo 
Hwan, continued his development policies into the 1980s (Seth, 2017). The 1980s saw an 
increasing number of the middle class and white-collar workers. It was started with the rapid 
growth in manufacture workforces, which increased six times in twenty years. As the society 
modernized, the grassroots movement for democracy also grew. The series of student protests 
in the 1960s continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s, manifested in the series of Minjung 
Culture and Democracy Movement. The developmentalism, the promotion of economic 
growth and democracy were not challenged (Vu, 2010, pp. 47-48). By 1995, the movement 
resulted in the establishment of “New Korea” under President Kim Young Sam, seeking to 
move away from the authoritarian regime (Kim, 2003, pp. 210-211). He implemented a series 
of bureaucratic reforms, such as social welfare, economic revitalization, and political reform. 
His main focus particularly placed upon the eradication of corruption in the military forces 
(Yoon, 1996; Cha, 1993).  
Overall, as we can see from the section 4.I.b., contemporary South Korean government 
continue to take an active role in developing the national innovation system. The role of public 
research institutes (PRIs) remains strong in facilitating technology development. The industrial 
technology development sector receives a large portion of government R&D budget. The South 
Korean manufacturing companies, which were rooted in the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., Hyundai, 
Samsung), have grown to be the some of the largest companies in South Korea (see Tab. 4.2.).   
  
 
56 This provides a contrast with the case of Southeast Asia and Latin America. 
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4.IV. Japan and Korea: High Level of Urgency to Pursue Industrial Catch-Up Strategy 
 Critical Juncture Period Post-Critical 
Juncture 
Period 
Global-External 
Circumstances 
Domestic Circumstances Political Elites 
Consensus 
J
A
P
A
N
 
C
O
N
D
U
C
IV
E
 
Threat against national 
survival from larger 
power 
(Gunboat Diplomacy; 
Unequal Treaty) C
O
N
D
U
C
IV
E
 
▪ Scarcity of natural resource 
▪ Edo Unity on political 
system 
▪ Edo legacy on merchant 
culture (support on 
technology learning) 
Patron-Client: 
Government & 
Zaibatsu 
(Manufacturing 
industries) 
 
Industrial 
Catch-Up 
Repetition of 
high level of 
urgency 
system in the 
Post-World 
War II 
S
O
U
T
H
 K
O
R
E
A
 
C
O
N
D
U
C
IV
E
 
Instability of regional 
security 
(North Korea threat; 
U.S. Armistice 
Agreement; Japan 
Occupation legacy)  C
O
N
D
U
C
IV
E
 ▪ Scarcity of natural resource 
▪ Unity post-Rhee government 
(Revolutionary movements) 
▪ Korean War impact: 
nationwide poverty and 
agricultural sector 
destruction 
Patron-Client: 
Government & 
Chaebol 
(Manufacturing 
industries) 
 
Industrial 
Catch-Up 
Repetition of 
high level of 
urgency 
system in the 
Post-Park 
Chung-Hee 
regime 
Tab. 4.7. High Level of Urgency 
Source: Author 
In the first section, we can see that there is strong support of national government and 
indigenous manufacturing firms in the present Japan and South Korea. The two governments 
particularly pay close attention to indigenous technological upgrading to support 
manufacturing sector growth. Through the second and third sections, I present how this 
decision can be traced back to each country’s critical juncture periods. These are the periods 
where the political coalition between government and manufacturing industries were 
constructed upon the presence of initial conditions that provoked it. These initial conditions 
(i.e., global-external circumstances and domestic circumstances) are conducive to stimulate a 
high urgency to choose of indigenous technology-driven industrial catch-up strategy in Japan 
and Korea.    
I summarize the two Northeast Asian cases in table 4.7. to show how the high level of 
urgency occurred when the political elites faced both conducive global-external circumstances 
and domestic circumstances in the critical juncture period. The political elites experienced a 
presence of external threat and/or regional security instability against national survival from a 
larger military power. In the case of South Korea, the political elites were in the constant 
shadow of the North Korean threat. North Korea inherited most of the infrastructures and 
advancement from the Japanese occupation period, which was perceived as a threat to South 
Korea. Thus, Nixon’s visit to China, followed by the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from South 
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Korea, provoked Park Chung-Hee’s regime to prioritize heavy chemical industries build-up. 
This became the foundation of South Korea industrialization. 
The conducive domestic circumstances refer to several dynamics. First, aside from 
presence of external threats against national survival, these political elites also faced by a 
constrained easy revenue needed to build up their defense capabilities (e.g., raw materials 
exports, oil revenue). Second, both the Meiji military government and the Park Chung-Hee’s 
regime benefited from domestic unity or stability. The Meiji government benefited from the 
Edo legacy on national unity and supportive socio-economic structure (e.g., a well-functioning 
market and merchant culture). Whereas, Park Chung-Hee’s regime benefited from the 
nationwide poverty due to the war, including a destroyed agricultural base. Furthermore, the 
regime also gained momentum from the student revolutionary movement. These movements 
showed that the general public had been supportive of the government’s prioritization over 
industrialization.  
In sum, the two cases of Northeast Asian countries showed how systemic vulnerability, 
which provoked the pursuit of an indigenous technology-driven industrial catch-up strategy, 
occurred due to a series of uncontrollable yet conducive events. Facing a systemic 
vulnerability, the political elites in Japan and South Korea opted to pursue industrial catch-up 
by building up their indigenous technological capabilities by borrowing from foreign 
technology. As a consequence, the patron-client relations were constructed between the 
political elites (i.e., military government) and the indigenous large business in industrial 
sectors. There was a lack of opposition against this strategy due to the presence of systemic 
vulnerability that affected the whole country. Because they had no other options.  
Once this high level of the urgency-based system was established, there has been no 
alteration in the government prioritization on indigenous manufacturing upgrading. The 
political coalitions between government and large manufacturing firms survived in the post-
critical juncture period. Regardless of the change of policy in the post-critical juncture period 
(i.e., from import-substitution, export-oriented), they were created to support indigenous 
manufacturing sector upgrading. As we can observe in the first section, the same prioritization 
over indigenous manufacturing technology development remains to exist within their national 
innovation system, which then also resulted in its manufacturing sector performances. In the 
next two chapters, we can see that different kinds of political coalitions survived in two Latin 
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American cases and three Southeast Asian cases (i.e., government-natural resource oligarchs-
foreign capital). 
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CHAPTER 5 LATIN AMERICA 
Argentina and Brazil: Low Level of Urgency 
 
 In this chapter, I select Argentina and Brazil as the representation of Latin American 
countries with a low level of urgency to pursue industrial catch-up. The history of Argentina 
and Brazil, along with the Latin American countries as a whole have been intertwined with the 
dynamics in Europe (e.g., the Industrial Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars, the First 
Globalization). The global-external circumstances led to the expansion of the natural resource-
based export-oriented sector in Argentina and Brazil. It provided the political elites with a 
relatively easy revenue (i.e., relying on commodity exports instead of pursuing industrial catch-
up such as Meiji Japan). The colonial period gave birth to the political actors, including the 
military power, and the socio-economic structure. All of this contributed to the lack of unity 
and unstable domestic circumstances. Thus, in sum, the low level of urgency to pursue 
indigenous technology-driven industrial catch-up occurred due to a combination between 
unfavorable domestic dynamics and unconducive global-external circumstances, which then 
provoked them to prioritize short-term economic development strategy (e.g., extractive 
economic sector, agricultural sector). Reasoning behind the selection of this strategy was to 
reduce the risk of hampering popular-political sector or risking an occurrence of mass 
resistance (see fig. 5.1.). 
I divide this chapter into four main sections. First, I start by providing an overview of 
the current manufacturing sector development in Argentina and Brazil. This section shows that 
despite their similar critical juncture period with Meiji Japan, the manufacturing sector 
performances in the two countries show a premature de-industrialization period. In addition, 
their patent capabilities and national innovation system show their weak technological 
capabilities and high dependency on foreign technology (i.e., a high number of patents filed by 
a non-resident). I discuss the cases of Argentina and Brazil in the second and third section 
respectively. Here, I seek to highlight what was the context that provoked the political elites’ 
consensus on national development strategy and how it has been continuing in the post-critical 
juncture period. I sum up the two cases in the last section of this chapter.   
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Fig. 5.1 Timeframe of Influential Key Events for Argentina and Brazil  
Notes: The events above the line are external circumstances and those below the line are domestic-related events. The straight lines represent the 
important global-external circumstances that occurs in particular period of time, some events directly and indirectly influence the political elites’ 
behavior in both critical juncture period and post-critical juncture period. The dotted lines represent influential key events related to Argentina and 
the dashed lines are related to Brazil. 
Source: Author 
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5.I. Recent Statistical Trends: Argentina and Brazil 
5.I.a. Manufacturing Performances 
  
Fig. 5.2 Change in Argentina’s 
Manufacturing Value Added (1990, 2000, 
2017) 
Source: Competitive Industrial Performance 
Index 2019 (UNIDO, 2019) 
Fig. 5.3 Change in Argentina’s 
Manufacturing Exports (1990, 2000, 2017) 
 
Source: Competitive Industrial Performance 
Index 2019 (UNIDO, 2019)  
 
 In this first section, I provide an overview of the recent manufacturing sector 
performances of Argentina and Brazil. In contrast to the Japanese and South Korean 
manufacturing sector which shows increasing technological sophistication, Brazil and 
Argentina show a declining trend in manufacturing sector performances (Fig. 5.2.; Fig. 5.4.). 
If both Japan and South Korean share of medium and high-technology activities in total 
manufacturing value-added have been growing above 50 percent, Brazil’s and Argentina’s 
have been shrinking in around 20 to 40 percent with a small share of manufacturing value-
added in their total GDP (below 16 percent). This contrasting trend is an important element 
considering that Brazil and Argentina started their economic development in the beginning of 
1800s, which was earlier than Japan’s Meiji industrialization.  
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Fig. 5.4 Change in Brazil’s Manufacturing 
Value Added (1990, 2000, 2017) 
Source: Competitive Industrial Performance 
Index 2019 (UNIDO, 2019) 
Fig. 5.5 Change in Brazil’s Manufacturing 
Exports (1990, 2000, 2017) 
Source: Competitive Industrial Performance 
Index 2019 (UNIDO, 2019)  
 
While Japan currently has transitioned into an industrialized high-income economy, 
both Argentina and Brazil have been stuck with weaker manufacturing technological 
capabilities. This is also apparent from the latest data on their manufacturing composition. 
Low-technology and natural resource-based sectors dominate their manufacturing sector (Tab. 
5.1.). Natural resource-based companies, especially oil and gas, as well as banks also 
overlooking large public companies in Argentina and Brazil (Tab. 5.2.). On one hand, these 
data display how contrast both Argentina and Brazil to Japan and South Korea. However, they 
also show similarities with the three Southeast Asian countries (see Chapter 6). 
ARG BRA 
Manufacturing Composition by 2002: Manufacturing Composition by 2017: 
1. Food and beverages 30.2% 1. Food and beverages 22.6% 
2. Chemicals and chemical products 16.1% 2. Chemicals and chemical products 14.0% 
3. Basic metals 10.0% 3. Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 7.8% 
4. Coke, refined petroleum products, 
nuclear fuel 
6.3% 4. Motor vehicles, trailers, semi-
trailers 
6.2% 
5. Motor vehicles, trailers, semi-trailers 4.9% 5. Basic metals 6.2% 
Tab. 5.1 Manufacturing Composition of Argentina and Brazil 
Source: Compiled by author from UNIDO Manufacturing Profile pages 
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 Rank Company 
Founded 
Year 
Sector (P/S)* 
ARG #794  YPF 1977 Oil & Gas Operations (S) 
  #1785  Grupo Galicia 1999 Regional Banks (P) 
  #1985  Telecom Argentina N/A Telecommunications services (S) 
  
BRA #45  Itaú Unibanco Holding 1944 Regional Banks (S) 
  #65  Banco Bradesco 1943 Regional Banks (P) 
  #132  Vale 1942 Iron and Steels (S) 
  #140  Banco do Brasil 1808 Regional Banks (S) 
  #243  Petrobras 1953 Oil & Gas Operations (S) 
  #818  Itaúsa 1965 Conglomerates (P) 
  #834  Braskem 1972 Specialized Chemicals (P)** 
  #968  Cielo S.A. 1995 Business & Personal Services (S) 
  #1037  JBS S.A. 1953 Food Processing (P) 
  #1120  Eletrobrás 1962 Electric Utilities (S) 
  #1312  Ultrapar Participacoes 1953 Oil & Gas Operations (P) 
  #1498  Suzano Papel e Celulose 1924 Paper & Paper Products (P) 
  #1614  Metalurgica Gerdau 1901 Iron and Steels (P) 
  
#1616  Companhia Brasileira de 
Distribuicao 
1948 Food Retail (P) 
  #1718  Oi 1963 Telecommunications services (S) 
  #1773  BRF 1934 Food Processing (P) 
  #1776  B3 1890 Investment Services (S) 
  #1902  Sabesp 1973 Diversified Utilities (S) 
  #1935  Fibria Celulose 2009 Paper & Paper Products (S) 
Tab. 5.2 Large Companies from Argentina and Brazil as Listed on the Forbes Global 2000 
(2018) 
Notes: *) “P” refer to private companies (including publicly listed company) and “S” refer to 
state-owned companies or used to be state-owned. **) By March 2019, Petrobras owned 36.1 
percent share and 47.0% voting rights. For some companies, the founded year refers to merger 
year. 
Source: Compiled by Author based on the Forbes Global 2000 (Forbes, 2018) 
 
5.I.b. Science, Technology, and Innovation Capabilities (Including Patent) 
 In comparison to Japan and South Korea, who have higher total R&D performances, 
Argentina’s and Brazil’s share of GERD in total GDP are lower. According to the OECD STI 
Outlook (2016), the share of GERD in total Argentina's GDP was 0.61 percent in 2014 while 
Brazil’s was 1.24 percent in 2013. However, since 2016 Brazil’s government has made more 
effort to boost up their GERD by 2019 as they introduced various changes in their national 
innovation system. In 2016, they launched a new National Strategy for Science, Technology, 
and Innovation (ENCTI) 2016-2019. The new plan states that Brazil seeks to close the 
technological gap with developed economies and promotes priority sectors (i.e., defense, water, 
food, biomes and bio-economy, sciences and social technologies, climate change, ICT, energy, 
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health and converging and enabling technologies). Through the NCTI, Brazil also seeks to 
strengthen its comparative advantage, which involves the “green economy”. Brazil’s 
government also develop a Technology System (SIBRATEC) to support Brazilian companies 
through STI activities (OECD, 2016).  
 There are many government bodies within Argentina’s national innovation system. 
However, the government mostly rely on sectoral funds to support the national STI policy. The 
government sought to develop a comparative advantage in ICT and other targeted technologies 
and priority sectors (e.g., biotechnology, nanotechnology, energy, health, and agro-industry). 
A low share of Business enterprise expenditure on R&D or BERD in Argentina's GDP (0.12 
percent in 2014) shows that the private sector in Argentina also lacks in innovation 
performances. In addition to the weak national innovation system, both Brazil and Argentina 
also have a weak level of international scientific cooperation, as reflected in their low share of 
co-authored scientific articles and international co-patenting (OECD, 2016).  
ARG 1 A61K PREPARATIONS FOR MEDICAL, DENTAL, OR TOILET PURPOSES 
  2 G06F ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING 
  3 A61B DIAGNOSIS; SURGERY; IDENTIFICATION 
  4 E21B*) EARTH OR ROCK DRILLING; OBTAINING OIL, GAS, WATER, SOLUBLE OR 
MELTABLE MATERIALS OR A SLURRY OF MINERALS FROM WELLS 
  5 A61N ELECTROTHERAPY; MAGNETOTHERAPY; RADIATION THERAPY; ULTRASOUND 
THERAPY 
  6 A61F FILTERS IMPLANTABLE INTO BLOOD VESSELS; PROSTHESES; DEVICES 
PROVIDING PATENCY TO, OR PREVENTING COLLAPSING OF, TUBULAR 
STRUCTURES OF THE BODY, e.g. STENTS; ORTHOPAEDIC, NURSING OR 
CONTRACEPTIVE DEVICES; FOMENTATION; TREATMENT OR PROTECTION OF 
EYES OR EARS; BANDAGES, DRESSINGS OR ABSORBENT PADS; FIRST-AID KITS 
  7 C12N MICROORGANISMS OR ENZYMES; COMPOSITIONS THEREOF; PROPAGATING, 
PRESERVING, OR MAINTAINING MICROORGANISMS; MUTATION OR GENETIC 
ENGINEERING; CULTURE MEDIA 
  8 F16L PIPES; JOINTS OR FITTINGS FOR PIPES; SUPPORTS FOR PIPES, CABLES OR 
PROTECTIVE TUBING; MEANS FOR THERMAL INSULATION IN GENERAL 
  9 A61M DEVICES FOR INTRODUCING MEDIA INTO, OR ONTO, THE BODY; DEVICES FOR 
TRANSDUCING BODY MEDIA OR FOR TAKING MEDIA FROM THE BODY; 
DEVICES FOR PRODUCING OR ENDING SLEEP OR STUPOR 
  10 H04L TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC 
COMMUNICATION 
  
BRA 1 G06F ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING 
  2 A61K PREPARATIONS FOR MEDICAL, DENTAL, OR TOILET PURPOSES 
  3 E21B*) EARTH OR ROCK DRILLING; OBTAINING OIL, GAS, WATER, SOLUBLE OR 
MELTABLE MATERIALS OR A SLURRY OF MINERALS FROM WELLS 
  4 F04B POSITIVE-DISPLACEMENT MACHINES FOR LIQUIDS; PUMPS 
  5 H04L TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC 
COMMUNICATION 
  6 B65D CONTAINERS FOR STORAGE OR TRANSPORT OF ARTICLES OR MATERIALS, 
BAGS, BARRELS, BOTTLES, BOXES, CANS, CARTONS, CRATES, DRUMS, JARS, 
TANKS, HOPPERS, FORWARDING CONTAINERS; ACCESSORIES, CLOSURES, OR 
FITTINGS THEREFOR; PACKAGING ELEMENTS; PACKAGES 
  7 A61F FILTERS IMPLANTABLE INTO BLOOD VESSELS; PROSTHESES; DEVICES 
PROVIDING PATENCY TO, OR PREVENTING COLLAPSING OF, TUBULAR 
STRUCTURES OF THE BODY, e.g. STENTS; ORTHOPAEDIC, NURSING OR 
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CONTRACEPTIVE DEVICES; FOMENTATION; TREATMENT OR PROTECTION OF 
EYES OR EARS; BANDAGES, DRESSINGS OR ABSORBENT PADS; FIRST-AID KITS 
  8 A61B DIAGNOSIS; SURGERY; IDENTIFICATION 
  9 C12N MICROORGANISMS OR ENZYMES; COMPOSITIONS THEREOF; PROPAGATING, 
PRESERVING, OR MAINTAINING MICROORGANISMS; MUTATION OR GENETIC 
ENGINEERING; CULTURE MEDIA 
  10 G01N INVESTIGATING OR ANALYSING MATERIALS BY DETERMINING THEIR 
CHEMICAL OR PHYSICAL PROPERTIES 
Tab. 5.3 Top 10 IPC Code (Three Digits) used by Majority of Patent Grants from Argentina 
and Brazil at the USPTO (1999-2014) 
Notes: *) refers to extractive-industry related patents (e.g. oil and gas)  
Source: OECD Stats (OECD, 2019) 
 Table 5.3 and figure 5.6. show the technological characteristic of granted patents at the 
U.S. Patent Office (USPTO)57 from Argentina and Brazil58. In comparison to the patents from 
Japan and South Korea, which mostly are electronic sector-related (i.e., IPC code H) and 
physics-related patents (i.e., IPC code G), there is also a noticeable presence of resource-related 
(e.g., C12) and extractive industry-related patents (e.g., E21) of those from Argentina and 
Brazil. Figure 5.6. show that Brazil relatively has better patent performances than Argentina 
and the three Southeast Asian countries. However, among these five countries, Malaysia has 
the highest patent growth in the electronics sector (more on Chapter 6). According to the data 
provided by the World Intellectual Property Rights Organization (WIPO), the majority of 
patents filed and granted between 2008-2017 at the national patent office of Argentina and 
Brazil each year are filed by foreign residents (Tab. 5.4.). However, there is no further 
information on the technology classification of this patent. 
Patent Grants (ARG) Patent Grants (BRA) 
Year Resident Non-Resident 
Abroad 
(foreign office) 
Year Resident Non-Resident 
Filed Abroad 
(foreign office) 
2008 244 970 102 2008 234 2,279 395 
2009 248 1,106 126 2009 341 2,431 390 
2010 211 1,155 105 2010 314 2,937 491 
2011 224 1,067 112 2011 380 3,059 567 
2012 208 724 146 2012 365 2,465 661 
2013 228 1,069 182 2013 385 2,587 855 
2014 265 1,095 142 2014 374 2,375 940 
2015 214 1,345 161 2015 460 2,951 925 
2016 201 1,678 176 2016 533 3,662 931 
2017 176 2,126 178 2017 714 4,736 908 
Tab. 5.4 Patent Grants at the National Patent Office of Argentina and Brazil (2008-2017) 
Source: (WIPO, 2018a; WIPO, 2018b)   
 
57 There is no available database to for the domestic patent data filed and granted by technological sector at the 
national patent office of Argentina and Brazil. 
58 This refers to the inventor(s)’ country(ies) of residence. 
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Fig. 5.6 Total Patent grants at the USPTO by Technology (1999-2014): Argentina and Brazil in Comparison to Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia. 
Source: OECD Stats (OECD, 2019)
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Overall, the first section presents that Argentina and Brazil exhibit weaker 
manufacturing sector performances in comparison to Japan and South Korea. There is a 
domination of banks, ICT, and natural resource-based industries (e.g., oil and gas, paper, and 
food) in their list of large companies. This is accompanied by weak indigenous technological 
capabilities, in which the majority of their patents are owned by non-residents. Meanwhile, the 
national government seems to direct its STI policy into developed natural resource-based low 
technology instead of supporting their indigenous manufacturing sector development. In the 
next two sections, I seek to show that the political coalition to rely on short-term natural 
resource-centric strategy can be traced back since their independence years. Therefore, I use 
the independence years, which includes the initial conditions before independence, as the 
critical juncture period for Argentina and Brazil. 
 
5.II. The Case of Argentina 
 While the critical juncture period in the Northeast Asian cases can easily be associated 
with their industrialization turning point period, the same logic cannot be applied for the two 
Latin American cases and the three Southeast Asian cases. As stated earlier, the objective of 
this Ph.D. dissertation is not to compare the industrialization process but rather to compare 
political elites’ behavior in the initial stage of national economic planning. (i.e., the 
independence year). In the case of Argentina, I seek to find the origin of political coalitions 
between the government and the natural-resource oligarchs. The initial conditions before 
independence matter the most because it provides us with a better look at who these political 
elites were. In this regard, the dynamic in Europe played an influential role in shaping the 
political coalitions in post-independent Argentina. 
While the focus for the Northeast Asian cases is how the political elites came to support 
indigenous technology-driven industrial catch-up, the focus for the other countries is how the 
political elites chose another type of economic strategy during their critical juncture period. 
The case of Argentina is the case of how the political elites in the country continue to rely on 
natural resource sectors. As we can see from the first section of this chapter, the manufacturing 
sector in Argentina shows a weak performance (e.g., share of manufacturing value-added, size 
of BERD). The same can be said about their technological capabilities (e.g., patent numbers). 
There is a lack of sign-on government’s effort to support indigenous manufacturing firms 
upgrading. We can see a high contrast of manufacturing performances between Argentina and 
Japan, which developed a bit later but in the same period. 
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In this regard, I revisit Argentina in the years prior and after their declaration of 
independence in 1816. Consequently, the majority of the discussions in this section are related 
to the colonial years and how the colonial legacy has shaped the national economic strategy of 
the political elites. I would like to point out that due to the close geographical proximity 
between Argentina and Brazil, there are some overlapping historical events shared between the 
two countries. Similar to the previous chapter, I divide the discussion on Argentina into two 
subsections: the critical juncture period and the post-critical juncture period. In first subsection, 
I discuss three main elements from the method of comparison: global-external circumstances, 
domestic circumstances, and the political elites’ consensus on economic strategy. I also discuss 
briefly how the consensus on economic strategy continues in the post-critical juncture period. 
 
5.II.a. Critical Juncture Period: Spanish Colonial Rule, Declaration of Independence, and the 
High Growth Period 
5.II.a.1. Global-External Circumstances 
In the case of Argentina, I divide the global-external circumstances into categories: 1) 
direct circumstances and 2) indirect circumstances (Tab. 5.5.). The coming of European 
colonial power, the industrial revolution, and the first wave of globalization were three 
important global-external circumstances that influenced the political elites’ consensus on 
national economic strategy in Argentina. Their consensus led to the expansion of commodity 
export production in Argentina (more on the next subsection). Meanwhile, the Napoleonic War 
and World War I were the indirect circumstances that also influenced the national economic 
strategy. The Napoleonic War influenced the policy dynamics of the Spanish Crown in their 
American colonies, including Argentina. World War I led to an increasing number of 
immigrants coming to Argentina as labors to escape the conflict in Europe. This is often 
referred to as the “great European immigration wave to Argentina,” when waves of 
immigration contributed to an additional 4.2 million individuals to the overall Argentinian 
population between 1881 and 191459 (SICREMI, 2019). In the post-critical juncture period, the 
political elites continue to have the same natural-resource centric economic strategy under the 
 
59 Between 1854 to 1869, the population in Buenos Aires increased from 90,000 to 177,000 before it increased 
even further into 670,000 by 1895. By 1914, immigrants from made up 30 percent of total Argentina population. 
This was the highest number in the history of immigration in Argentina. Argentina adopted open immigration 
policy since the early 1800s by promising better wages. Most of these immigrants came from Spain and Italy and 
they continued to be the majority of population in Buenos Aires until the 1940s (SICREMI, 2019). 
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changing global economic dynamics such as the Great Depression, UNECLAC (i.e., the 
import-substitution wave), and the Commodities Super Cycle (more on section 5.II.b.).  
Critical Juncture Periods Post-Critical Juncture Periods 
direct circumstances indirect circumstances 
• Spanish Crown’s Rule (1776) 
• Industrial Revolution and (1820-
1840) 
• First Globalization and Export 
Boom (1870-1914) 
• Napoleonic Wars 
(1803-1815) 
• World War I (1914-
1918) 
• Great Depression (1929-1939) 
• UNECLAC (1948) 
• Commodities Super Cycle 
(2000s) 
Tab. 5.5 Global-External Circumstances of Argentina 
Source: Author 
 
The ruling political elites in post-independence Argentina benefitted from high demand 
for their commodity exports. This went adjacent with the technological development after the 
first industrial revolution in the Britain during the 1850s, which led to an increasing demand 
for minerals. Increasing incomes, provoked by European industrialization, also led to an 
increasing demand for food (Thorp, 1998). Capital poured into Latin American countries based 
on these interests, given the abundance of land and resources. The Europeans who had come 
to the region since the 1400s had similar motivations. Regardless of different patterns, the main 
quest of both Spain and Portugal was to accumulate silver and gold through external trade, as 
well as enforcing a trading monopoly and monopsony on Latin America as their colonies, 
including Brazil and Argentina (Bulmer-Thomas, 2003, p. 22). The emergence of the political 
independence movement in the 1820s ended the colonial trade monopoly, but agriculture and 
raw material remained as the main economic activities. By this time, the Latin American 
countries grew closer to Britain as British merchants began to settle in Rio de Janeiro, Buenos 
Aires, Valparaiso, and Lima (Bulmer-Thomas, 2003, p. 28). In the next subsection, I discuss 
the impact of the European colonialism and how the dynamic in Europe influence the national 
unity and socio-economic structure. 
The cases of Japan and South Korea show how the indigenous population faced various 
external threat that provoked industrial catch-up strategy pursuit as a mean for survival. The 
case of Argentina shows how the history of a nation has been heavily influenced by the coming 
of foreigners (i.e. European colonialization and European immigration). The formation of 
political system in Argentina was shaped by the political elites who were originated from 
Europe (i.e. the immigrants). Unlike Malaysia and Indonesia, whose declarations of 
independence were provoked by the indigenous political elites who seek to liberate themselves 
from the colonial power, the declarations of independence in Argentina were provoked by the 
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political elites who had origins from the European elites (i.e. Spanish crown). They sought to 
gain political independence from their European motherland, specifically with regards to 
control over the export commodity sector (see next sub section). 
In addition, the external conflict did not provoke national economic strategy alterations 
in Argentina60, unlike in the case of Japan. These disputes provoked the national governments 
into strengthening their armed forces, but due to the easy revenue gained from commodity 
export and their relations with their colonial government, it did not lead to a massive effort to 
pursue costly industrialization. It left a legacy to the political structure. At the start of World 
War I, most of the political systems in Latin American were anarchic, oligarchic rule, or a 
dictatorship (Bulmer-Thomas, 2003, p. 49). The external threats contributed to domestic 
political instability instead of encouraging broad coalitions to pursue economic growth or 
industrial catch-up.  
 
5.II.a.2. Domestic Circumstances 
In this part, I focus on how colonialism and the dynamics in Europe shaped the national 
unity and socio-economic structure in Argentina, which was deeply related to the natural 
resource endowment. Scholars in Latin American economic history, such as Cardenas et al. 
(2000) and Bulmer-Thomas (2003), often borrow the term commodity lottery from Carlos 
Diaz-Alejandro. This term refers to a development strategy that relies on international prices 
and demand on one hand, and resource endowment-based export specializations on the other 
(Bulmer-Thomas, 2003, pp. 394-393). The abundance of land and natural resources had shaped 
the socio-economic and political structures in Argentina and Brazil since the beginning of 
European colonial era (the 1400s to 1700s)61.  
Before the Great Depression, the economics of these countries had grown rapidly due 
to commodity exports. This enabled the export oligarchs in Latin American countries to expand 
their economic power and dominate the national politics. When the Great Depression occurred, 
 
60 Inter-state conflicts did occur among Latin American countries, as post-independence Latin America (1850-
1914) did engage in minor territorial disputes. There were also disputes with Great Britain, France, and the 
Netherlands when they arrived to protect their colonies in the late 1800s. Some conflicts involved Argentina, and 
Brazil, directly such as the War of the Triple Alliance during the period 1865-1970, which resulted in some 
transfers of territory. 
61 Graham (2013) and Engerman and Solokoff (2002) provide a complete overview of the political-economic 
structure during the colonial period in Latin America. 
 102 
it not only disturbed the domestic economy, but it also provoked domestic political instability 
rooted in economic disparity. The climate and soils of these countries were suitable for the 
cultivation of highly valued commodities, particularly sugar. Post-independence Latin 
American countries’ economic policies centered on integration with the world’s economic 
system through natural resource exploitation rather than incorporating industrial development 
(Rinke, 2017, p. 26). By 1914, the industries in Latin America depended on imported 
machinery and equipment to support commodity exports (Miller, 2000).  
Product 1859-61 1899-1901 1911-13 1927-29 
Meat 
Cereals 
Sugar 
Coffee 
Tobacco 
Leather 
Rubber 
Wool 
Natural fertilizer (guano) 
Mineral fertilizer (nitrates) 
Oil 
Non-ferrous metals (copper & tin) 
Precious metals 
Others 
1.1 
0.9 
26.6 
18.2 
7.8 
6.8 
1.9 
 
8.3 
0.7 
 
0.2 
9.8 
17.6 
4.1 
8.8 
10.1 
18.5 
5.5 
6.5 
6.4 
9.3 
0.0 
6.2 
0.1 
1.1 
8.0 
15.4 
5.0 
13.6 
9.7 
18.6 
3.0 
6.0 
5.8 
5.8 
0.1 
7.6 
2.1 
2.6 
5.3 
15.0 
6.7 
17.0 
10.6 
18.0 
1.7 
4.2 
0.4 
4.0 
0.0 
3.9 
7.6 
6.6 
2.7 
16.6 
Tab. 5.6 Composition of Latin American Commodity Exports in 19th-20th Century (percentage) 
Notes: The data includes British Antilles and it excludes the unclassified product. 
Source: (Cárdenas, et al., 2000, p. 12) 
Following Bethell (1985), the history of Argentina’s independence was tightly 
connected with the political dynamic in the European countries, particularly the Spanish 
monarchy and also Britain. By the 1700s, Spain had weak economic development and have yet 
started the path of modernization. In this period, it faced problems with the agrarian reform 
and also had an inadequate transportation system, which held back its economic growth and 
industrial development. Despite a modest economic recovery, which was supported by a series 
of intensive trades from their Spanish American colonies (including Argentina), Spain 
remained as an agrarian economy. Hence, by the end of the 1700s, “after three centuries of 
imperial rule, Spanish Americans still saw in their mother country an image of themselves” 
(Lynch, 1985, p. 3). Between the 1780s to 1800s, the colonies could no longer rely only on 
Spain as their trading partner. At the same time, the industrial revolution has boosted Britain's 
industrial development, particularly its textile production. Spanish American colonies started 
to trade with Britain, especially in silver as their main commodity, which was a vital product 
for Britain.  
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 The Spanish empire’s structure in America consisted of three groups: the administration 
(i.e., bureaucrats), the Church62, and the local elites. The Spanish crown granted the 
administration with autonomous authority and sovereignty to conduct a bureaucratic function 
with minimum military power. The local elites were the property owners in towns and 
countryside. These local elites consisted of a majority of creoles (i.e. European-origins who 
were born in the colonies) and a minority of peninsulares (i.e. Spanish-born Spaniards). The 
local oligarchs, who had built their economic power from land mining and commerce, were 
well established by the 1700s. These groups started to resist the Spanish crown’s rule63. In the 
midst of this dynamic, the Spanish Crown, who had no sufficient resources to maintain their 
troops, created a new militia in 1796 using the defense budget of the Spanish American 
colonies. The member of this new militia were the creoles and the mixed races (with indigenous 
population) under the new status of fuero military, which gave them privileges and immunities 
similar to the Spanish military (Lynch, 1985, pp. 8-11). 
 Throughout the second half of the 1700s, the Spanish crown, under the Bourbons’ 
leadership, exerted more economic control in Spanish America. They imposed royal 
monopolies in various commodities such as tobacco, gun powder, and salt. The tax revenue 
collected was not spent for the betterment of the colonies, but it was converted to spices and 
shipped to Spain. Spanish America had no involvement nor authority upon Spain’s foreign 
policy, but they had to suffer from the tax increase and wartime shortage. Another sector that 
suffered from the high tax burden was the agriculture sector (Lynch, 1985, pp. 12-23). Overall, 
the Spanish America was used “to consume Spanish exports and to produce minerals and few 
tropical products” (Lynch, 1985, p. 18). This provoked the growing unrest in Spanish America 
with more demand on economic independence, which resulted on the end of the Spanish trade 
monopoly by 1801. In this post-monopoly period, the Spanish American colonies’ trade with 
the U.S. boomed (Lynch, 1985, p. 23). 
 In 1808, there was a crisis in the Spanish monarchy due to the Peninsular War (1807–
1814)64. This left Spanish America with several choices, ranging from accepting the 
 
62 The Roman Catholic Church held an important position in the colonial Spanish America. Under the Royal 
Patronage, the Church controlled various aspects of life. However, there were factions inside the Church itself. 
For more information, Barnadas (1984) discusses the organization of the Catholic Church in the colonial Spanish 
America and how it exercised its power. 
63 In this period, Spain Crown conducted the Bourbon reform, which was intended to modernize Spain. Thus, the 
impact of this reform was also extended to Spanish America.  
64 A military conflict between Napoleon's empire (France) and Bourbon Spain. 
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Bonaparte’s rule, to lean towards the escaped Spanish crown families who took refugees and 
escaped to the Rio de Janeiro; hence establishing their governing juntas in the name of the 
captured King Ferdinand. At the end of the day, this resulted in a series of Spanish American 
revolutions in 1810. The revolutionary government started to emerge in various areas of 
Spanish America, from Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia, and in the Rio de la Plata (i.e. modern-day 
Argentina). The independence of Argentina started with the establishment of the governing 
junta in Buenos Aires (1810), which was led by Cornelio Saavedra, a creole militia leader. The 
independence movement in Buenos Aires was conducted under the rhetoric of egalitarianism 
(Bushnell, 1985, p. 118).  
 The war for independence in Argentina occurred from 1810 to 1818. The political elites 
of Argentina formally declared their independence in the 1816 Congress of Tucumán. Initially, 
General Manuel Belgrano proposed the Congress to create a constitutional monarchy headed 
by European princes in Spanish America. The reasoning behind the establishment of a 
constitutional monarchy was made under the consideration of the political atmosphere in 
Europe (i.e. adoption of monarchy was considered to be politically beneficial). However, after 
1819, the constitutional monarchy adoption started to lose its popularity in Argentina. One of 
the reasons was the difficulty to find an acceptable candidate of European monarch who has 
strong legitimacy power in front of Britain and France (Safford, 1985, pp. 359-361).   
 In the years after the war of independence, the most important issues in Spanish 
America were the establishment of a viable new state system and the legitimacy of its founding. 
This led to various debates among different groups, both civilian and military, hence the 
occurrence of civil wars that contributed to political instabilities Disintegration of colonial 
structures and debates over social-economic ideas and political system followed the end of 
colonial rule (Safford, 1985, pp. 350-351). In this period, however, the militia continues to be 
the key political force with a tight direct control over the established corporate groups, which 
was supported by the Church. The Church was influential to the survival of political leader 
(Safford, 1985, p. 356).   
Economically, post-independence Spanish America already had built close relations 
with the world economy especially between 1808 to 1825. In 1808, Spanish America finally 
freed Spain as the commercial intermediary to the trade with Europe. This enabled a surge of 
British merchants coming to Buenos Aires. Between the 1830s to 1840s, Juan Manuel de Rosas 
in Buenos Aires had the most influential power spread across other provinces (Safford, 1985, 
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p. 364). By the 1840s, Argentina’s exports were mostly meat, meat products, and wool. Export 
in wool was 10.8 percent of total export in 1837. By 1859, it reached 33.7 percent of total 
exports. This expansion occurred due to the growing demand in the U.S. and Europe, 
particularly in France (Donghi, 1985, pp. 328-329). The late 1800s saw the expansion of 
agricultural cultivation in Argentina, particularly with the expansion of the rail network that 
eased the transportation of goods and the wave of the immigrant. This vast wave of immigrants, 
who came in the late 1800s, were mostly Spanish and Italian. Between 1869 to 1895, the annual 
growth rate of the population was 30.4 per a thousand inhabitants with more than half of them 
were immigrants65 (Conde, 1986, pp. 331-335). In sum, the rapid economic growth in 
Argentina between 1880 to 1912 was built upon these foundations. It was supported by staples 
sectors (i.e. agricultural and staple products) that received high foreign demand.  
 
5.II.a.3. Political Elites’ Consensus on Economic Strategy & Short-Term Economic Strategy 
 In Argentina, initially, there was an effort to establish a centralized system as presented 
by the 1826 Constitution. However, this was met with rejections from the provincial caudillos66 
and their local supporters. Juan Manuel de Rosas, the governor of Buenos Aires from 1829 to 
1852, was supported by the economic groups such as the cattle and salt-meat entrepreneurs 
who had close relations to political conservative groups. Thus, the political conflict in this 
period was mostly consist of power struggles between the dominant economic groups behind 
Rosas (Safford, 1985, p. 411). If the 1810s to 1870s were the period of political instability in 
Spanish America, the 1870s to 1910s were the time of political consolidation and centralization 
under a secular, but authoritarian government. In 1870, the politics of Argentina were 
consolidated under an oligarchy. They enjoyed rapid economic growth in the following decade 
due to: 1) the constantly growing demand of raw material from Europe and North America; 2) 
a flow of foreign loan and investment; and 3) a continuous flow of immigrants (Safford, 1985, 
pp. 420-421).  
The earliest national political organization in Argentina, the National Autonomist Party 
(PAN), was established in 1880 by General Roca. They introduced a centralized system with 
 
65 In 1869, the population in Argentina was 3.96 million and it reached 7,89 million in 1914. During this period 
the ratio of people who lived in the urban area increased from 29 percent to 53 percent. In Buenos Aires, the 
population increased from 182 thousand in 1869 to 1,58 million in 1914 (Safford, 1985, pp. 363-364).  
66 Individuals with some kind of military attainment or soldier of independence (Safford, 1985, p. 371).  
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the national army domination over the military forces. Under the constitution, the president 
held supremacy and control over the federal states. Voting was not an obligatory conduct until 
1912 and the majority of the people were politically indifferent. The PAN supported by the 
rural oligarchs as their political clients (Gallo, 1986, pp. 381-382). There were oppositions but 
they did not put many different political platforms. The opposition party, the Radical Civic 
Union, won the 1916 presidential election after the 1912 electoral reform. After 1930, the 
opposition had decided to align themselves with the military, which followed by a series of 
military coup d’état and leader changes. However, the close relations with the oligarchs 
remained intact (Gallo, 1986, pp. 386-391).  
By the end of 1800s, most of the Latin American countries found themselves under 
numerous authoritarian rules without a broad consensus. There was an absence of functioning 
state institutions, accompanied with internal power struggles and the dominance of military-
political leaders (Rinke, 2017, p. 14). There existed minimum public debate on national 
economic strategy and more concerns on political ones, such as liberalism versus conservatism, 
centralism versus federalism, and debates over church-state relation (Bulmer-Thomas, 2003, 
p. 49). In contrast to Meiji Japan, there were no attempts to increase technological skills to 
pursue industrial catch-up. Instead, the domestic ruling political elites decided to promote 
exports as they faced unstable domestic politics. In Argentina, the economic boom (the 1850s 
to 1870s) started with the export of wool. Foreign investment and labors poured into Argentina 
between 1880 and 1930, including waves of immigrants from Europe. During this period, the 
rural elites or the oligarchs dominated Argentinean politics67. These elites consisted of large 
landowners68 and merchants who enjoyed a large share of the benefits coming from export 
expansion (Keen & Haynes, 2000, pp. 312-313). 
Overall, the political actors in Argentina during the critical juncture period, especially 
the military, mostly sought for political survival by securing their economic channel (i.e., 
coalitions with commodity exports oligarchs). This was enabled, again, by the high demand 
from Europe and North America and the high flow of immigrants. Unlike Meiji Japan, the 
 
67 The rural elites in Argentina or the estancieros relied on the military forces to dominate the politics. They 
restricted the votes for the male population who lived in the rural estates. The oligarchies started to lose their 
power as Argentina grew into an urban society and along with the professionalization of the army (Keen & 
Haynes, 2000, p. 311).   
68 In Argentina, the land was very fertile and suitable for agriculture; however, it was monopolized by oligarchies. 
From 1880 to 1912, these oligarchies controlled national politics and received benefits from export policies (Keen 
& Haynes, 2000, p. 313). 
 107 
political elites in Argentina found their sources of high easy revenue. In the period where 
international trade benefiting commodity export, there was no threat against this choice of 
strategy. 
 
5.II.b. Post-Critical Juncture Period: The Continuation of Strategy 
According to Nun (1995), the “generation 1880” in Argentina was highly influenced 
by the free-market ideology (i.e. export-oriented policy). This dictated the national 
development strategy, such as relying on foreign capital to support infrastructures development 
and minimum state involvement in the economic activities69. The agriculture sector has been 
the most prominent sector for Argentina's economics during the commodity export boom, yet 
there was an absence of technological development and minimum investment in machinery 
upgrading. Up until the 1930s, the development of the agricultural sector in Argentina had have 
the tendency to neglect scientific and technological knowledge as a central component (Nun, 
1995, p. 41). Yet, the expansion of this agricultural society becomes a base for political power, 
particularly later during the Peron era in the 1950s.  
The aftermath of World War I and the Great Depression disturbed the overall Latin 
Argentina’s traditional market (i.e., decreasing demand for raw material due to the collapse of 
the world’s economy); hence creating momentum for dependency studies (e.g., Prebisch 
Thesis) and the creation of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America 
(UNECLAC). This was followed by a wave of state-led industrialization or ISI policies in Latin 
American countries (Thorp, 1998, pp. 132-133). The main goal of these policies was to reduce 
foreign dependency (i.e., domestic protection on commodities producers) rather than promote 
industrial catch-up or adopting foreign technological practices. 
 In Latin America, the Great Depression closed down the export markets, a process 
which had already started after World War I. As consequences, there was an increasing tension 
in domestic politics in Argentina. New social and political movements (resulting from the 
growing urban middle class) sought political power and brought about the rise of Peron 
(UCDP, n.d.). Starting in 1946, Peron built a coalition consisting of workers, industrialists, and 
 
69 In Argentina, especially in the Pampas area, agriculture was mostly run by small landowners and benefitted by 
the surge of immigrants who came as labor. The immigration law in the late 1800s allowed a surge of 
naturalization process by foreigners who later permanently worked as farmers (Nun, 1995, p. 39).  
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the middle class. From the 1950s to 1970s, despite there being a consensus that the 
manufacturing sector was important, industrial development policies only targeted agricultural 
development (e.g., the creation of the National Agricultural Technology Institute) and the state-
led defense sector (Santarcángelo, et al., 2018; Katz & Kosacoff, 2000). Peron’s 
administration’s vision was to turn Argentina into a major regional power. He promoted state-
led, high-technology developments (e.g., arms, domestic nuclear power, and aeronautics), 
which was highly supported by the army (Keen & Haynes, 2000, p. 325). 
Beginning in the 1950s, the Peron’s administration abandoned its ultranationalist stand 
(i.e., the self-sufficiency) as it started to seek foreign capital (e.g., an agreement with the 
Standard Oil Company of California in 1953)70 (Keen & Haynes, 2000, p. 327). Entering the 
1960’s, a decline in agricultural prices led to a deficit in Argentina’s balance of payment. It 
prompted the government to promote an inflow of foreign direct investments (FDIs). By the 
mid-1960s, multinational corporations (MNCs) dominated medium-technology manufacturing 
in Argentina (e.g., vehicles, pharmaceuticals, petrochemicals, agricultural equipment), while 
the small and medium enterprises (SMEs) engaged mostly in low-technology manufacturing 
(e.g., textiles, garments, furniture, shoes). Furthermore, indigenous firms were unable to 
compete with MNCs’ subsidiaries in the automotive sector. By the early 1980s, Argentina had 
become mired in resource-based manufacturing (Katz & Kosacoff, 2000, pp. 290-291). 
Between 1975 and 1990, Argentina faced economic stagnation, resulting in the destruction of 
many large corporations and plunging real wages (Keen & Haynes, 2000, p. 330). 
According to Bastos and Cooper (1995), the development of STI policy in the Latin 
American countries was originated in the mid-1960s. They argued that there is a lack of 
variation with regards to STI organizational structure, mainly under the Science and 
Technology Council, which was created in a short period under strong influence of 
international agencies. In the mid-1970s, most of the Latin American countries started to 
introduce the national innovation system to improve efficiency in the STI policymaking. 
 
70 His new policy direction broken the coalition that sustain Peron’s political power, particularly the army, who 
has been heavily involved with the industrial production, and the working class. As consequences, he went into 
exile in 1955 after a successful military coup (Keen & Haynes, 2000, pp. 327-328). Between 1955 to 1983, the 
new military-authoritarian regime ruled Argentina. In 1983, Argentina elected their first president, Raul Alfonsin, 
through democratic election since Peron in 1946. However, the Argentinean economic situation remained 
challenging due to crisis and their technologically backward industrial capabilities. Their exports remained in 
primary low-technology products and the unemployment rate grew (Keen & Haynes, 2000, p. 333).   
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However, these efforts did not produce significant results71. By the end of the 1980s, the role 
of the national innovation system in the Latin American countries remained minor and the 
“S&T policy central agency was an empty shell” (Bastos & Cooper, 1995, p. 14). The patent 
activity statistics of Argentina and Brazil have captured this reality. 
Argentina have carried on its reliance on the natural resource sector, particularly with 
another commodity boom occurred in the 2000s. In the middle of the new millennia, the 
commodity prices increased sharply due to the rise of China and other emerging markets, 
predominantly with the increasing food demand from China and India. The price of energy and 
metals increased by 203 percent between 2003 and 2008, while the crude oil prices by 94 
percent in 2008 from the previous year, and the price of rice in 2008 doubled within just five 
months (Baffess & Haniotis, 2010, p. 42). Therefore, as I pointed out in the first section of this 
chapter, the government of Argentina continues to focus on the natural resource sector within 
its national STI policy (e.g., biotechnology, nanotechnology, energy). Overall, the case of 
Argentina shows that once the political coalitions between government, foreign capital, and 
natural resource oligarchs were established in the critical juncture period, they continue to exist 
in the post-critical juncture period. This then extended into their national STI policy as well. 
Despite various changes in the conditions (i.e., global-external and domestic circumstances) in 
the post-critical juncture period, their choice on natural resource-centric development strategy 
continues to be replicated. 
 
5.III. The Case of Brazil 
The key period to understand Brazil’s current stagnated indigenous manufacturing 
sector upgrading can be traced back to the early 1800s. Similar to Argentina, the history of 
Brazil in their critical juncture period was also intertwined with colonialism and the commodity 
boom. Instead of the Spanish Crown, the political elites’ formation of Brazil was directly 
related to the Portuguese Crown, mainly seeing its historical ascension from a “colony” into a 
 
71 According to Bastos and Cooper (1995), there was lack of clear institutional arrangement and clear 
measurement in the initial stage of S&T policy planning in Latin America. They argue that S&T policy planning 
in Latin America in the mid-1960s was provoked mostly by international circumstances (i.e., as one of the 
conditions to receive finance from the U.S.). In the 1964, the Organization of American States demanded that the 
government in Latin American countries included S&T goals in the national development plan (Bastos & Cooper, 
1995, p. 13). The S&T policy placed focus on a narrow sector-specific technology but without an incorporation 
of a clear global development strategy. The S&T policy did not produce much result in the 1980s due to a lack of 
financial resources (i.e., massive budget reduction). The lack of financial resource was caused by the 1980s debt 
crisis (Bastos & Cooper, 1995, p. 14).  
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“metropolis” of the empire (i.e., the political center). Also similar to Argentina, Brazil’s low 
level of urgency to pursue industrial catch-up in their critical juncture period was due to a 
combination between unfavorable domestic dynamics and unconducive global-external 
circumstances, which provoked them to prioritize short-term economic development strategy.  
As we can see in section 5.I, the manufacturing sector has not much developed in Brazil. 
The largest companies in Brazil were mostly in oil, mining, chemical, and low-technology 
sectors. The majority of those companies are or used to be state-owned companies. In addition 
to this, the natural resource-oriented sector has been the main framework for its national 
innovation system. Therefore, I revisit the critical juncture period of Brazil to highlight that 
there has been a weak level of urgency for the political elites in Brazil to pursue a technology-
driven industrial catch-up since then. The historical legacies, which contributed to the 
expansion of agricultural oligarch and the domestic political instability, have created 
unconducive circumstances for long-term and costly economic planning such as industrial and 
technology catch-up. Furthermore, oil rents started to be an important source of revenue for 
Brazil when the oil fields were found in Brazil between the 1970s to 1980s.  
 
5.III.a. Critical Juncture Period: From Portuguese Colony into the Empire of Brazil 
5.III.a.1. Global-External Circumstances 
In the case of Brazil, I divide the global-external circumstances into categories: 1) direct 
circumstances and 2) indirect circumstances (Tab. 5.7.). The coming of Portuguese colonial 
power in 1808, including the transfer of power from the Portuguese Royal Court to Brazil (i.e., 
the Empire of Brazil) in 1822, along with the wave of First Globalization (i.e., export-
commodity boom in 1870-1914) directly influenced the political elites’ prioritization of natural 
resource-oriented sector in the critical juncture period of Brazil. Similar to Argentina, the 
domestic dynamics of Brazil in the critical juncture period is tightly related to the dynamics in 
Europe. In the post-critical juncture period, the occurrence of the Great Depression, 
UNECLAC and the ISI trend, Commodities Super Cycle, and Oil Shocks I &II showed how 
the political elites have carried on the same priorities (more on the second subsection).  
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Critical Juncture Periods Post-Critical Juncture 
Periods direct circumstances indirect circumstances 
• The Portuguese Colony Brazil 
(1500-1815) 
• Industrial Revolution (1820-1840) 
• First Globalization and Export 
Boom (1870-1914) 
• Napoleonic Wars (1803-
1815) 
• World War I (1914-
1918) 
• Great Depression (1929-1939) 
• UNECLAC (1948) 
• Commodities Super Cycle 
(2000s) 
• Oil Shocks I & II (1973/1974–
1979/1980) 
Tab. 5.7 Global-External Circumstances of Brazil 
Source: Author 
 
For Portugal, which were a small country with a lack of natural resources, Brazil was 
the main revenue source (i.e., international trades with European countries). Unlike Argentina, 
however, the formation of political elites and the political system in Brazil was more directly 
related to the decedents of the Portuguese Crown. The international trade with Europe plays an 
important role in economic development in Brazil. When conflicts occurred in Europe, (e.g., 
the conflict between France and Britain) the Brazilian trade activities under the Portuguese 
Crown rule were disrupted. Due to such deep interconnection between the European dynamics 
and Brazil’s state formation, I directly explore this interaction on the next subsections.  
 
5.III.a.2. Domestic Circumstances 
Brazil gained its independence from Portugal in 1822. Prior to this, Portugal was a 
small country with a backward economy due to limited natural resources by the end of the 
1700s. The country had modest military and naval capabilities. The majority of the Portuguese 
Crown revenues came from their colonies in Asia, Africa, and America, particularly Brazil. 
The Portuguese Crown monopolized trade activities in the colonies and imposed import and 
export duties. The re-exportation of goods from the colonies (e.g. sugar and cotton), 
particularly from Brazil, were essential for Portugal’s balance of trade. While the Spanish 
Crown was involved in various conflicts in Europe, the Portuguese Crown remained neutral 
until 1807; hence their relatively uninterrupted trade with their colonies. Brazil’s agricultural 
export grew dramatically between 1798 to 1807, which also was the starting period for the 
coffee economy. This contributed to the prosperity of Portugal as they continued to depend on 
Brazil’s resources. In Brazil, however, the expansion of the Brazilian market was also provoked 
by the Industrial Revolution (Bethell, 1985, pp. 157-161).  
 While the Portuguese Crown’s political legitimacy and bureaucratic functions provided 
Brazil with political and social stability, they did not have a strong military power. By the 
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1800s, there were only around 2,000 troops in Brazil, which was lower in comparison to the 
6,000 troops placed in Spanish America. In contrast with the militia leader in Spanish America, 
the military officers in Brazil were mostly Brazilian born. Furthermore, the Portuguese 
Crown’s rule in Brazil was less repressive in comparison to the Spanish Crown. The 
bureaucrats, particularly the middle and low ranks, were also mostly the Brazilian-born. The 
local dominant classes were involved in policymaking. The oligarchies of the dominant 
landowners were the first generation Brazilian, whose origins were donatarios72 from the 
1500s. One third of the total Brazilian population in this period were slaves, who worked in 
the agricultural plantations, and around 30 percent of the total population were free people of 
color73 (Bethell, 1985, pp. 163-164).  
 In early 1807, the conflict between France and Britain impacted Portugal due to their 
trade relationship with Britain. France threatened the Portuguese Crown (i.e., Dom João) to 
seize their colonies if they did not close their ports to Britain. However, with the help of 
Britain74, the Portuguese Crown, and the royal court and royal treasury, escaped to Brazil as 
their largest colony as an act to refuse to be one of France’s vessel. When they arrived in early 
1808, there was no rejection from Brazilian people in the arrival of the Portuguese Crown. The 
same year, the Crown installed various state institutions in Rio de Janeiro (Bethell, 1985, pp. 
168-170). 
Rio turned into a metropolis, whereas and Lisbon became the colony due to the 
mentioned conditions. As the consequences, the Brazilian landowners used the opportunities 
to their own interest as they aligned with the Portuguese Crown. They favor open economic 
policy to boost up trade. The relations with Britain grew closer as more the British merchants 
continued to move into Rio. By 1808, there were about 150 to 200 merchants lived in the 
English community of Rio. The total number of ships, mostly British ships, which entered Rio 
increased four times within a year. It increased Brazil’s exports, including sugar, cotton, and 
coffee, after 1808. The growing economy was followed by an influx of immigrants, especially 
the educated ones (Bethell, 1985, pp. 170-173).  
 
72 A person, mostly a noble, who was granted land by the Portuguese Crown.  
73 In Spanish America, the labor forces were the native American Indians. 
74 Britain seeks to secure its trade with Brazil in this period, especially that they already suffered from trade with 
Spanish America. 
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Despite the end of European conflicts and war in 1814, Dom João had been reluctant 
to return. Brazil then became the Kingdom of Brazil a year later, a constituent Kingdom of the 
Portuguese Crown. This is unlike the case of the Spanish Crown who lost the Spanish America 
due to the defeat of Napoleon in 1808. However, the dissatisfaction towards the Crown’s 
absolutism gradually grew, especially when they failed to abolish the slave trade system with 
Britain in the 1810s. A military revolt occurred in 1817, which were joined by the planters, 
slaveholders75, wealthy merchants, crown judges, priests, and the small tenant farmers. The 
revolt spread but only lasted for two and a half months. Nevertheless, it provoked a rise of 
nationalist idea especially among the military, which was also coincided with the wave of 
revolutions in Spanish America. The Brazilian dominant class remained conservative and seek 
to maintain the colonial political-economic system. This ended with the return of Dom João to 
Portugal. However, Dom Pedro, his son, stayed in Rio as Price Regent. He sided with the 
Brazilian nationalist. The factional dispute between the Crown loyalties and the Brazilian 
nationalist cracked in Brazil. Dom Pedro declared the independence and the separation of 
Brazil from Portugal in December 1822. He then became the Constitutional Emperor and 
Perpetual Defender of Brazil (Bethell, 1985, pp. 176-187). 
Unlike Spanish America, post-independent Brazil did not experience civil war nor 
fragmentation of regions. There were several political conflicts between the conservative and 
the liberals, but the conservatives maintained their power. The political elites in the Rio de 
Janeiro and São Paulo, where the rural oligarchies have mostly developed based on plantation 
and slave labor, acted as the leader of the independence movement with the remaining 
provincial elites offered their support. Dom Pedro became the source of political legitimacy, 
which maintained stability and national unity. Thus, transition into a new independent state 
was accompanied a continuation in the political, economic, and social system, including the 
slavery system. The dominant classes maintained their economic power over the underprivilege 
groups (Bethell, 1985, pp. 195-196). 
By the 1850s, Brazil maintained political stability based primarily on coffee exports. 
The domination of the Conservatives was halted in the 1860 Election when the Liberals formed 
a coalition. By 1890, the reformers have achieved electoral reform and abolished slavery (Da 
Costa, 1986, p. 725). The Empire was ended in 1889 by a military coup d’état. The 
dissatisfaction of the military originated from the Empire’s political interference within the 
 
75 They faced lower returns due to high slave prices. 
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army. The military had desired an independent military hierarchy under the ministry of war. 
After the war against Argentina in the 1850s and Paraguay in the 1860s, the army grew to be 
more organized. The post-war damages increased the army’s dissatisfaction with the central 
government and their patron-client relations with the business groups (Da Costa, 1986, pp. 
740-742). The declaration of Brazil as a republic was enabled by a coalition between military 
factions (i.e. one-fifth of the army), plantation owners from the west of São Paulo (i.e. the 
Paulistas), and members of urban middle classes, who were united in their goal to end the 
monarchy. However, in the aftermath of the 1889 First Republic declaration, the country 
continued to depend on commodity export and foreign investments. The political power 
remained in the hand of agriculture oligarchs and the patronage system survived (Da Costa, 
1986, pp. 776-777).  
 
5.III.a.3. Political Elites’ Consensus on Economic Strategy & Short-Term Economic Strategy 
The Brazilian empire survived until the 1889 but they did not pursue any economic 
development agenda. The landowners maintained their influence behind the political power of 
the Empire. Coffee export76 experienced significant growth. Coffee plantation was suitable for 
the climate and soils in south-eastern Brazil. Coffee beans were easy to transport and did not 
require any complex industrial process to enter the market. Nevertheless, without the creation 
of national market, it was difficult to pursue developmentalist economic policy. Another 
important commodity for Brazil was natural rubber, sugar, and cotton. However, the Brazilian 
government also did not conduct any improvement in the method of production during this 
period (Dean, 1986, pp. 691-196).  
Between 1870 to 1930, along with the transitioning from the Empire of Brazil into the 
First Republic, Brazil’s export-oriented strategy reached its climax as the government allocates 
their resource to support this economic strategy. Increased investment from Britain and the 
U.S. soon followed. The export production was the center of Brazil's growth, which 
consistently became their strategy since the arrival of Portuguese Crown in Brazil period 
 
76 Thorp (1998) and Font (2010) explore how the Paulista coffee landlords dominated the post-independence 
Brazilian political economy dynamic. Their alliance with the military led to an 1889 coup. After the coup, the 
Paulistas gained enough political influence to consolidate policies that favored the coffee sector in Brazil (e.g., 
immigration subsidies for slaves to work the coffee plantations, infrastructure support for their estates). There are 
various works on the Brazil coffee valorization, for example, Hutchinson (1909); Holloway (1975); and Abreu 
and Bevilaqua (1996). 
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(Dean, 1986, p. 685). The benefits from this export-oriented strategy, however, were mostly 
enjoyed by the political elites and their political clientele, but not well-spread for the the labor’s 
welfare (i.e. redistributive policy). Industrial development in Brazil was a process of traditional 
production and import substitution. In the initial stage, the development of industry was created 
to support the interest of raw material producers or planters who did not have an export market. 
These planters also insisted on a high import tariff. By the 1920s, the industrial output in Brazil 
was mostly consumer goods, such as textiles, food processing, clothing, soap and candles 
period (Dean, 1986, pp. 716-718).  
Overall, the political system during the Brazilian Empire period was built by a coalition 
between the high-ranking bureaucrats, the rural oligarchs, and merchants who seek to contain 
any mass revolt. The oppositions only grew stronger in the late 1800s due to the emergence of 
new social classes in the new economic expansion area, especially in the coffee plantations in 
São Paulo. This group supported an establishment of a federal republic system (i.e. a 
decentralization). The First Republic (1889-1930) then was built upon three factions of power: 
1) the local coronéis or oligarchs at the lowest level; 2) the federations of coronéis at the 
intermediate level; and 3) federal government that consisted of an alliance between the 
oligarchies and the most influential federal states (Fausto, 1986, pp. 787-789). The institutional 
system of the First Republic essentially strengthened the power of these oligarchs by giving 
more power to the federal government.  
 
5.III.b. Post-Critical Juncture Period: The Continuation of Strategy 
Post-Great Depression Brazil saw the rise of Getulio Vargas and the emergence of 
populism,77 a movement which took advantage of the middle class’s weariness of the 
Republican Aristocrats (e.g., the Paulistas) and political clientelism under the Estado Novo 
regime (de Castro & Ronci, 1991; Welch & Welch, 2016). However, the Paulistas managed to 
retain their political power, and the agro-exporters continued to be favored via government 
policies (e.g., government expenditure on coffee stockpiles), like the Vargas administration 
(1930-1954) continued to promote raw material productions (Kaufman, 1990, pp. 118-119). 
Vargas also established Petrobras Brazilian, a state-owned oil corporation, in 1953. His 
 
77 Between 1930 and 1985, the military-dominated politics in Brazil, sand this period was characterized by internal 
power struggles (UCDP, n.d.). 
 116 
successor, Kubitschek (1954-1961) did not produce any clear economic achievements. The 
Medici regime, which took power in 1968, then had reduced government incentives for ISI 
policies when they was starting to promote manufacturing for export (Adewale, 2017). The 
limitation of ISI policies in Brazil was a result from the failure of the ruling elite to build a 
broad coalition (including from big business) and gain political support for long-term industrial 
catch-up (Guimarães, 2010). 
Oil became an important source for revenue in Brazil since the first oil discovery in 
196878, which was then followed by two oil shocks in 1973 and 1979. Throughout the 1970s, 
more oil fields were discovered in Brazil (e.g., Garoupa, Namorado, Badejo). In 1984, 
Petrobras Brazilian had found the first giant oil field, which later became the main source of 
oil production in Brazil. By 2011, the country became one of the world’s ten largest oil and gas 
producers. The share of the oil sector in GDP reaches 12 percent in 2011 (Cavalcanti, et al., 
2016; Monteiro & Ferraz, 2012). Moreover, similar to Argentina, the agro-industry in Brazil 
benefited from the 2000s commodity boom. The increasing food price led to an increase in 
agricultural products such as soybean, corn, and also the meat sector. Between 2003 and 2013, 
sugar cane production went up by 136 percent (Flexor & Leite, 2017, p. 400). 
According to Bastos (1995), Brazil started to develop STI policy in the late 1960s. In 
this period, the government of Brazil began to pay more attention on the national innovation 
system and real technology transfer. Industrialization in Brazil has been heavily driven by 
foreign capital and foreign technology. The industrialization process in Brazil was resulted 
from the foreign trade crisis and the aftermath of the Great Depression instead of a state-
initiated strategy. The ISI policy was introduced under “a highly conservative constellation of 
oligarchical and governmental forces” (Bastos, 1995, p. 27). The government took 
industrialization strategy due to: 1) an increasing skepticism on international trade as a growth 
stimulus; and 2) the rise of an urban society organized around the industrial and public sector. 
In other words, this came along with a wave of protectionism (e.g. CEPAL). 
 Before the 1960s, the S&T policy in Brazil had not been a form of systemic intervention 
by the government. However, in 1968, the government formed the Strategic Development 
Program to incorporate S&T to support industrial growth diversification. On one hand, this 
was related to the shortage of high-skilled labor in the ISI phase (i.e. to reduce the cost for 
 
78 Oil exploration in Brazil started in 1939.  
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imported technology). While on the other hand, this also coincided with the rise of nationalist 
military faction in the government. S&T advancement was used as the basis for military power 
legitimation. With this design, the S&T policy has become an empty shell due to its inability 
to generate indigenous innovation capabilities (Bastos, 1995, p. 81).  
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5.IV. Argentina and Brazil: Low Urgency to Pursue Industrial Catch-Up Strategy 
 
 Critical Juncture Period Post-Critical 
Juncture 
Period 
Global-External 
Circumstances 
Domestic Circumstances Political Elites 
Consensus 
A
R
G
E
N
T
IN
A
 
U
N
C
O
N
D
U
C
IV
E
 
Large incentives 
from commodity 
trade 
(Export-commodity 
boom; First wave of 
globalization) 
U
N
C
O
N
D
U
C
IV
E
 
▪ Natural resource-rich 
▪ Unstable domestic 
unity (colonial 
legacy) 
▪ Natural-resource 
oligarchs & wave of 
immigrants as labor  
Patron-Client: 
Government (Spanish 
Crown) – Commodity 
exports oligarchs 
 
Commodity exports 
strategy 
Repetition of 
low level of 
urgency 
system in the 
Post-Great 
Depression 
B
R
A
Z
IL
 
U
N
C
O
N
D
U
C
IV
E
 
Large incentives 
from commodity 
trade 
(Export-commodity 
boom; First wave of 
globalization) 
U
N
C
O
N
D
U
C
IV
E
 ▪ Natural resource-rich 
▪ Some degree of 
national unity under 
the decedents of the 
Portuguese Crown but 
challenged by the 
military 
▪ Natural-resource 
oligarchs & slavery 
Patron-Client: 
Government – 
Commodity exports 
oligarchs 
 
Commodity exports 
strategy 
Repetition of 
low level of 
urgency 
system in the 
Post-Great 
Depression 
Tab. 5.8 Low Level of Urgency 
Source: Author 
 
Present Argentina and Brazil continue to rely on the natural resource-centric sector, 
including oil and gas, to drive their economy instead of prioritizing indigenous manufacturing 
industry development. The STI policies are directed in the natural-resource centric technology. 
There is a lack of change in the direction of economic development strategy since the 
independence year as their critical juncture periods. Once the political coalition was 
established, they continue to maintain their power, which was supported by various global-
external and domestic dynamics (i.e., oil boom, commodity boom). In other words, there has 
always been an alternative growth strategy available for political elites. There is a lack of 
urgency to shift the development course into a costly and risky indigenous technology-driven 
industrial catch-up. The political elites continue to survive without altering the development 
strategy as a natural resource continues to be an essential economic channel to these countries. 
I summarize the two Latin American cases in table 5.8. above. A low level of urgency 
to pursue indigenous technology-driven industrial catch-up strategy in Argentina and Brazil 
occurred in the critical juncture period due to both unconducive global-external and domestic 
circumstances faced by the political elites. The political elites in Argentina and Brazil have 
been relying on the natural resource and low-technology sector-centric strategy since their 
critical juncture period. Various global-external circumstances, which deeply related to the 
economic dynamics in Europe, played important roles in shaping the political elites’ behavior 
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in Argentina and Brazil. International trade with the European colonial motherlands was the 
main source of economic growth of the two now-modern Latin American countries. The high 
incentives from international commodity trade provoked a low level of urgency for the political 
elites in Argentina and Brazil to pursue technology learning and industrial catch-up. 
Furthermore, instead of the presence of a pervasive threat against national survival, there was 
a lack of national unity (i.e., domestic instability) in the two Latin American countries, 
particularly due to the occurrence of civil wars. 
The domestic circumstances in Argentina and Brazil during their critical juncture 
periods presented unconducive circumstances for an indigenous-technology-driven industrial 
catch-up strategy pursuit to be initiated. I provide three reasonings for this argument. First, 
both Argentina and Brazil are natural resource-rich countries with a large size of land, which 
is conducive for the development of the agricultural sector and extractive sectors. Their 
abundant natural resource endowments have been providing the political elites in Argentina 
and Brazil with an easy revenue since the critical juncture period. Second, the wave of 
immigration to Argentina and the imports of slavery to Brazil in this period provided the 
landowners with abundant labor. It contributed to the growth of natural-resource oligarchs, 
who already have close relations with the political elites. Afterwards, these initial key events 
provoked economic inequality in the countries. 
Another important domestic circumstance, which we have to take into account, was the 
origin of the political elites in Argentina and Brazil. These political elites originated from Spain 
and the Portuguese colonial government which had relied on the natural resource exploitation 
of their American colonies to gain revenues. They then continued to rely on the same strategy 
once Argentina and Brazil gained their political independence from the colonial motherland. 
The patron-client relations maintained to be built upon a network of the political elites, both 
civilians and military government, and the landowners (i.e., the natural resource-oligarchs). 
Their policies were in favor of natural resource sector exploitation.  
We can observe similar tendencies in their post-critical juncture periods. If the political 
elites in Japan and South Korea constructed various policies with the main objective to support 
indigenous manufacturing upgrading, the political elites in Argentina and Brazil created their 
policies to protect the domestic low-technology commodity producers while relying on foreign 
capital at the same time. This preference has been maintained and strengthened throughout 
times, particularly if we take into account that the constantly occurring commodity booms. 
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Brazil, in particular, have also benefited from oil revenue since the 1970s. In sum, as we can 
observe from the first section, the manufacturing sector technology in Argentina and Brazil are 
currently far from advancing as their national innovation system is centered on a natural 
resource-centric idea. As a consequence, their largest indigenous companies are oil and gas 
companies and low-technology manufacturing companies, which are mostly state-owned. 
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CHAPTER 6 SOUTHEAST ASIA 
Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia: Medium Level of Urgency 
 
 I select Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia as the representation of Southeast Asian 
countries as the cases of other variant in level of urgency. In comparison to the Northeast Asian 
cases and the Latin American cases, I categorize the level of urgency to pursue indigenous 
technology-driven industrial catch-up in the three Southeast Asian countries at the medium 
level. These countries represent the instances where the political elites were initially exposed 
with a weaker level of urgency to boost industrial growth due to abundant natural resources 
and high external economic incentives from commodity export. In Malaysia and Indonesia, 
this was also combined with unstable domestic politics as a new state.  
In order to understand how the present political coalitions emerged in the three 
Southeast Asian countries, I went back to their critical juncture period. Independence years 
were the essential turning points for both Malaysia and Indonesia. The emergence of present 
influential political actors and prominent large businesses can be linked back to this period. 
Meanwhile, historical scholars often refer to the 1932 Monarchy Constitutional as an essential 
turning point for Thailand as a nation-state. This was the period when the prominent political 
coalitions started to build up their power. We can observe two similarities among the three 
countries. First, there is a tendency of political alliances to lean towards natural-resource 
centric strategy (e.g., rice, oil, wood products), with some degree of exception in Malaysia for 
a specified period. Second, the is a domination of MNCs within their domestic manufacturing 
sector growth, which is followed by their relatively weaker indigenous technological 
capabilities. 
In the first section, the three Southeast Asian countries do exhibit better manufacturing 
sector performances but upon a closer look, there has been a domination of MNCs. In the post 
critical juncture period, the political elites in these countries soon started to see the need to 
support industrial growth to accelerate economic growth due to some key events which 
occurred at both the global and domestic levels. Nevertheless, these events are not strong 
enough to motivate the political elites to prioritize indigenous technology-driven 
manufacturing upgrading within their STI policy because: 1) it risks to potentially hamper the 
popular sector; 2) strong and prolonging influences of natural-resource oligarchs; 3) the 
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presence of an alternative strategy on industrial growth (i.e., MNCs-driven manufacturing 
sector), particularly regarding the benefits taken due to the Northeast Asian’s expansion of 
global production network. Similar to the two Latin American countries, the STI policy mostly 
centers on the natural-resource oriented low technology sector. The timeframe below shows 
the important key events that contribute to the medium-urgency level in Malaysia, Thailand 
and Indonesia since their critical juncture periods and some events in their post-critical juncture 
period, particularly around the establishment of ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). 
 123 
 
Fig. 6.1 Timeframe of Influential Key Events for Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia  
Notes: The events above the line are external circumstances and those below the line are domestic-related events. The straight lines represent the important 
global-external circumstances that occurs in particular period of time, some events directly and indirectly influence the political elites’ behavior in both critical 
juncture period and post-critical juncture period. The dotted lines represent influential key events related to Malaysia, the dash-dotted lines are related to 
Thailand, and the dashed lines are related to Indonesia. 
Source: Author
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I divided this chapter into four main sections. I provide an overview of recent 
manufacturing and STI development in the three countries in the first section. Here, I present 
that the three Southeast Asian countries share a similarity in their high share of manufacturing 
exports within the total exports, but weaker technology sophistication within the manufacturing 
value-added in comparison to South Korea, which started their economic development in the 
similar time horizon. In addition, the three Southeast Asian countries’ STI capabilities are very 
weak (e.g., the size of GERD and the patent characteristics) in contrast to South Korea. The 
second section discusses Malaysia, then the third section elaborates Thailand and the fourth 
section examines Indonesia. The main idea of these sections is to show how the critical juncture 
period formed important decisions that shaped the political elites’ behavior in making the 
national development strategies. I discuss three main points: global-external circumstances, 
domestic circumstances, and elites’ behavior. In the post-critical juncture period, the political 
elites’ behavior tends to follow the same pattern. In the last section, I conclude why I consider 
Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia as countries with a medium urgency level to pursue 
industrial catch-up.  
 
6.I. Recent Statistical Trends: Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia 
6.I.a. Manufacturing Performances 
 
Fig. 6.2 Average Growth of Sectoral Value Added to GDP 
Notes: I select different time period to measure the average growth for a span of 25 years based 
on the first year when the share of manufacture value added surpassed the share of agriculture 
value added. I collected the data of agriculture value added, manufacture value added, and 
service value added separately from the World Development Indicators database. 
Source: Calculate by author based on (World Development Indicators, 2018a; World 
Development Indicators, 2018b; World Development Indicators, 2018c) 
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 The performance of the manufacturing sector in the three Southeast Asian countries 
shows a relatively better trend in comparison to the two Latin American countries. Malaysia, 
Thailand, and Indonesia have a higher share of manufacturing value-added in total GDP than 
Argentina and Brazil (Fig. 6.3.; Fig. 6.5.; Fig. 6.7.). Yet, the overall structural change of the 
three Southeast Asian countries are still relatively slower to South Korea. Figure 6.2. reveals 
that the average annual growth of manufacturing value-added share to GDP in Malaysia, 
Thailand, and Indonesia are slower than South Korea over the span of 25 years since the share 
of manufacturing value-added to GDP surpassed the share of agricultural value added to GDP. 
Among the three, Indonesia is slower than Malaysia and Thailand.  
  
Fig. 6.3 Change in Malaysia’s Manufacturing 
Value Added (1990, 2000, 2017) 
Source: Competitive Industrial Performance 
Index 2019 (UNIDO, 2019) 
Fig. 6.4 Change in Malaysia’s Manufacturing 
Exports (1990, 2000, 2017) 
Source: Competitive Industrial Performance 
Index 2019 (UNIDO, 2019)  
 
By 2017, Indonesia also has the lowest share of manufacturing value-added in total GDP 
and the lowest share of medium and high-technology activities in total manufacturing exports 
in comparison to Malaysia and Thailand (Fig. 6.4.; Fig. 6.6.; Fig. 6.8.). Based on the 
Competitive Industrial Performance Index (UNIDO, 2019) the largest share of Indonesian 
manufacturing value-added in the same year is resource-based (34 percent). Meanwhile, the 
largest share of manufacturing export in Malaysia and Thailand respectively are high-
technology (35 percent) and medium-technology 38 percent). However, as natural resource-
rich countries, resource-based still holds a large share within the manufacturing value-added in 
all three Southeast Asian countries (more than 20 percent).  
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Fig. 6.5 Change in Thailand’s 
Manufacturing Value Added (1990, 2000, 
2017) 
Source: Competitive Industrial Performance 
Index 2019 (UNIDO, 2019) 
Fig. 6.6 Change in Thailand’s Manufacturing 
Exports (1990, 2000, 2017) 
 
Source: Competitive Industrial Performance 
Index 2019 (UNIDO, 2019)  
 
 There is one important similarity that we can observe in the three Southeast Asian 
countries and the two Latin American countries. The high share of manufacturing exports in 
total exports has not been followed by the high share of manufacturing value-added in total 
GDP nor by an increase in the share of medium and high-technology activities in total 
manufacturing exports. Based on the Competitive Industrial Performance Index (UNIDO, 
2019), resource-based activity held large presences within the composition of the total of 
manufacturing exports in Malaysia (26 percent), Thailand (23 percent), and Indonesia (49 
percent) in 2017. This provides an opposite trend with South Korea where the growth of 
manufacturing export technological sophistication has been accompanied by the growth of 
manufacturing value-added technological sophistication since the 1990s. 
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Fig. 6.7 Change in Indonesia’s 
Manufacturing Value Added (1990, 2000, 
2017) 
Source: Competitive Industrial 
Performance Index 2019 (UNIDO, 2019) 
Fig. 6.8 Change in Indonesia’s 
Manufacturing Exports (1990, 2000, 2017) 
 
Source: Competitive Industrial Performance 
Index 2019 (UNIDO, 2019)  
 
 
MYS THA IDN 
Manufacturing Composition by 2017: Manufacturing Composition by 
2013: 
Manufacturing Composition by 2017: 
1. Office, accounting and 
computing machinery 20.3% 
1. Food and beverages 
19.3% 
1. Food and beverages 
19.9% 
2. Coke, refined petroleum 
products, nuclear fuel 13.7% 
2. Motor vehicles, 
trailers, semi-trailers 13.7% 
2. Chemicals and chemical 
products 12.4% 
3. Food and beverages 
11.8% 
3. Office, accounting and 
computing machinery 11.6% 
3. Motor vehicles, trailers, 
semi-trailers 10.4% 
4. Chemicals and chemical 
products 9.9% 
4. Rubber and plastic 
products 8.9% 
4. Rubber and plastic 
products 7.1% 
5. Rubber and plastic 
products 6.6% 
5. Chemicals and 
chemical products 5.7% 
5. Tobacco products 
6.9% 
Tab. 6.1 Manufacturing Composition of Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia 
Source: Compiled by author from UNIDO Manufacturing Profile pages (UNIDO, 2019) 
Table 6.1. above shows the composition of manufacturing sector in the three Southeast 
Asian countries by 2017. Around 20 percent of the manufacturing sector in Indonesia are food 
and beverages. There is also a noticeable presence of resource-based sectors such as rubber 
and plastic products, tobacco, coke and also chemical products in the three countries. 
Moreover, most of the top largest companies in Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia are in the 
low-technology sector (e.g., food and beverages, tobacco), oil and gas, and banks (Tab. 6.2.). 
This shows that the three Southeast Asian countries relatively have weaker indigenous 
manufacturing technological capabilities than the two Northeast Asian counterparts. As stated 
in the introduction chapter, the growth of the manufacturing sector in the three Southeast Asian 
countries have been benefited from the expansion of Northeast Asian MNCs (see Fig. 1.2. in 
Chapter 1). The report released by the ASEAN-Japan Centre (2019) shows that in ASEAN, the 
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manufacturing subsectors between 1990 and 2015, which have the largest foreign inputs (i.e., 
integration to global value chain) are motor vehicles and other transport equipment; as well as 
electrical, electronic equipment and machinery (p. 13).  
 
Rank Company Founded 
Year 
Sector (P/S)* 
MYS #394  Maybank 1960 Regional Banks (S) 
  #503  Tenaga Nasional 1949 Electric Utilities (S) 
  #620  CIMB Group Holdings 1924 Regional Banks (S) 
  #646  Public Bank 1965 Regional Banks (P) 
  #1268  Petronas Chemicals 1998 Specialized Chemicals (S) 
  #1448  RHB Bank 1997 Regional Banks (S) 
  #1508  Axiata Group 1992 
Telecommunications services 
(S) 
  #1535  Sime Darby 1910 Conglomerate (S) 
  #1568  Hong Leong Financial 1963 Investment Services (P) 
  #1624  Sime Darby Plantation N/A Food Processing (S) 
  #1779  Maxis 2009 
Telecommunications services 
(P) 
  #1811  Genting 1965 Casinos & Gaming (P) 
  #1911  AmBank Group 1975 Regional Banks (P) 
  
THA #156  PTT PCL 2001 Oil and Gas Operations (S) 
  #623  Siam Commercial Bank 1907 Regional Banks (P)** 
  #654  Siam Cement 1913 Specialized Chemicals (P)** 
  #710  Kasikornbank 1945 Regional Banks (P) 
  #819  PTT Global Chemical 1978 Diversified Chemicals (S) 
  #829  Bangkok Bank 1944 Regional Banks (P) 
  #918  CP All 1988 Food Retail (P) 
  #1078  Krung Thai Bank 1966 Regional Banks (S) 
  #1123  Thai Beverage 2003 Beverages (P) 
  #1237  Airports of Thailand 1903 Other Transportation (S) 
  #1243  Advanced Info Service 1986 
Telecommunications services 
(P) 
  #1261  
Charoen Pokphand 
Foods 1978 Food Processing (P) 
  #1289  Indorama Ventures 2003 Specialized Chemicals (P) 
  #1451  Thai Oil 1961 Oil and Gas Operations (S) 
  #1957  Thanachart Capital 1959 Major Banks (P) 
  #1991  Electricity Generating 1992 Electric Utilities (P)** 
  
IDN #415  Bank Rakyat Indonesia 1895 Regional Banks (S) 
  #489  Bank Mandiri 1998 Regional Banks (S) 
  #574  Bank Central Asia 1955 Regional Banks (P) 
  #720  Telkom Indonesia 1884 
Telecommunications services 
(S) 
  #903  Bank Negara Indonesia 1946 Regional Banks (S) 
  #1494  Gudang Garam 1971 Tobacco (P) 
Tab. 6.2 Large Companies from Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia as Listed on the Forbes 
Global 2000 (2018) 
Notes: *) “P” refer to private companies (including publicly listed company) and “S” refer to 
state-owned companies or used to be state-owned. **) The King Vajiralongkorn owns the 
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majority (23.35 percent) of Siam Commercial Bank shares; The Thailand the Crown Property 
Bureau owns majority (30 percent) of Siam Cement shares; The Electricity Generating 
Authority of Thailand owns 25.41 percent of Electricity Generating shares. For some 
companies, the founded year refers to merger year. 
Source: Compiled by Author based on the Forbes Global 2000 (Forbes, 2018) 
 
6.I.b. Science, Technology, and Innovation Capabilities (Including Patent) 
 The share of GERD in the three Southeast Asian countries' GDP shows a weak trend, 
relatively similar to Argentina and Brazil. The share of GERD in Malaysia’s 2012 GDP was 
1.13. percent, while the share of GERD in Thailand’s 2015 GDP was 0.63 percent, whereas 
the share of GERD in Indonesia’s 2012 GDP was even weaker in 0.08 percent (OECD, 2016). 
As pointed out by the OECD STI Outlook (2016), Malaysia, which has the highest economic 
income level among the three, had already been successful to move from a primary sector into 
a multi-sector economy with high-technology manufacturing. However, while generally 
Malaysia has the best STI performances79 and the highest share of medium-high technology 
activities in total manufacturing-value added,80 the OECD report points out that their national 
innovation system still needs more improvements. Furthermore, similar to Thailand and 
Indonesia, MNCs have been the main drivers in Malaysia’s manufacturing sector (Tab. 6.4. 
and 6.5.). In addition, their current national STI policy is tightly linked to natural resource-
centric technology development instead of indigenous manufacturing technology development 
(more on section 6.II.b.).  
MYS 1 H01L SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES; ELECTRIC SOLID STATE DEVICES NOT 
OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR 
  2 G06F ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING 
  3 G01R MEASURING ELECTRIC VARIABLES; MEASURING MAGNETIC VARIABLES 
  4 H03K PULSE TECHNIQUE 
  5 G01D MEASURING NOT SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR A SPECIFIC VARIABLE; 
ARRANGEMENTS FOR MEASURING TWO OR MORE VARIABLES NOT 
COVERED BY A SINGLE OTHER SUBCLASS; TARIFF METERING 
APPARATUS; TRANSFERRING OR TRANSDUCING ARRANGEMENTS NOT 
SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR A SPECIFIC VARIABLE; MEASURING OR 
TESTING NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR 
  6 H04L TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC 
COMMUNICATION 
 
79 One of the indicators is innovation index such as the Global Innovation Index. In 2018, Malaysia, Thailand, 
and Indonesia ranked 35th, 44th, and 85th respectively (Cornell University; INSEAD; WIPO, 2018). 
80 Based on the Competitive Industrial Performance Index 2018, the share of medium-high technology activities 
in total manufacturing value-added in Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia in 2016, respectively, were 44.1 percent, 
40.7 percent, and 25.1 percent. Their compositions of manufacturing exports show that more than 20 percent of 
Malaysia and Thailand’s manufacturing exports are resource-based, while more than 40 percent of Indonesia’s 
manufacturing exports are resource-based (UNIDO, 2018). 
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  7 A61K PREPARATIONS FOR MEDICAL, DENTAL, OR TOILET PURPOSES 
  8 F21V FUNCTIONAL FEATURES OR DETAILS OF LIGHTING DEVICES OR SYSTEMS 
THEREOF; STRUCTURAL COMBINATIONS OF LIGHTING DEVICES WITH 
OTHER ARTICLES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR 
  9 H05K PRINTED CIRCUITS; CASINGS OR CONSTRUCTIONAL DETAILS OF 
ELECTRIC APPARATUS; MANUFACTURE OF ASSEMBLAGES OF 
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS 
  10 G11C STATIC STORES 
  
THA 1 H01L SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES; ELECTRIC SOLID STATE DEVICES NOT 
OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR 
  2 G11B INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN 
RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER 
  3 G06F ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING 
  4 A61K PREPARATIONS FOR MEDICAL, DENTAL, OR TOILET PURPOSES 
  5 H05K PRINTED CIRCUITS; CASINGS OR CONSTRUCTIONAL DETAILS OF 
ELECTRIC APPARATUS; MANUFACTURE OF ASSEMBLAGES OF 
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS 
  6 G01R MEASURING ELECTRIC VARIABLES; MEASURING MAGNETIC VARIABLES 
  7 C12N MICROORGANISMS OR ENZYMES; COMPOSITIONS THEREOF; 
PROPAGATING, PRESERVING, OR MAINTAINING MICROORGANISMS; 
MUTATION OR GENETIC ENGINEERING; CULTURE MEDIA 
  8 G01N INVESTIGATING OR ANALYSING MATERIALS BY DETERMINING THEIR 
CHEMICAL OR PHYSICAL PROPERTIES 
  9 B23K SOLDERING OR UNSOLDERING; WELDING; CLADDING OR PLATING BY 
SOLDERING OR WELDING; CUTTING BY APPLYING HEAT LOCALLY, e.g. 
FLAME CUTTING; WORKING BY LASER BEAM 
  10 H04L TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC 
COMMUNICATION 
  
IDN 1 H01L SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES; ELECTRIC SOLID STATE DEVICES NOT 
OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR 
  2 E21B*) EARTH OR ROCK DRILLING; OBTAINING OIL, GAS, WATER, SOLUBLE OR 
MELTABLE MATERIALS OR A SLURRY OF MINERALS FROM WELLS 
  3 G06F ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING 
  4 A61K PREPARATIONS FOR MEDICAL, DENTAL, OR TOILET PURPOSES 
  5 B65D CONTAINERS FOR STORAGE OR TRANSPORT OF ARTICLES OR 
MATERIALS, e.g. BAGS, BARRELS, BOTTLES, BOXES, CANS, CARTONS, 
CRATES, DRUMS, JARS, TANKS, HOPPERS, FORWARDING CONTAINERS; 
ACCESSORIES, CLOSURES, OR FITTINGS THEREFOR; PACKAGING 
ELEMENTS; PACKAGES 
  6 G10D STRINGED MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS; WIND MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS; 
ACCORDIONS OR CONCERTINAS; PERCUSSION MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS; 
MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR 
  7 A43D MACHINES, TOOLS, EQUIPMENT OR METHODS FOR MANUFACTURING OR 
REPAIRING FOOTWEAR 
  8 B41J TYPEWRITERS; SELECTIVE PRINTING MECHANISMS, i.e. MECHANISMS 
PRINTING OTHERWISE THAN FROM A FORME; CORRECTION OF 
TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS 
  9 G06K RECOGNITION OF DATA; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; 
HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS 
  10 H04L TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC 
COMMUNICATION 
Tab. 6.3 Top 10 IPC Code (Three Digits) used by Majority of Granted Patents from Malaysia, 
Thailand, and Indonesia at the USPTO (1999-2014) 
Source: OECD Stats (OECD, 2019) 
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Fig. 6.9 Total Domestic Patent Filing at National Patent Office in Selected ASEAN Countries 
by Technology Sector 
Notes: The data available does not specify the granted patents. Patent data from each country 
have different publication coverage (MYS: 1986.08.18 - 2019.02.28; THA: 1980.08.13 - 
2019.04.19; IDN: 1987.12.02 - 2019.07.05). The numbers here included all of patents filed by 
domestic inventors and applicants. The data shows that one patent can be placed into more than 
one technological classification. The number on this table is based on the total number of 
patents for each technology category listed on the ASEAN PATENTSCOPE search engine. 
The four technological classifications are based on the ASEAN PATENTSCOPE based on IPC 
codes attached to the patent. Thus, there might be some technological overlaps. 
Source: ASEAN Patentscope database (2019)  
Table 6.3. shows the technological characteristics of granted patents at the USPTO 
originated from Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia. In comparison to Argentina and Brazil, the 
patents from the three Southeast Asian countries at the USPTO have more electronics-related 
patents. However, the patents filing statistics at each country’s national patent office show that 
the majority of the domestic patents are filed in the chemistry sector instead of electrical 
engineering (Fig. 6.9.), particularly in Thailand and Indonesia. Meanwhile, the domestic 
patents filed at the national patent office of Malaysia are more evenly spread across the five 
categories (Fig. 6.9.). Overall, the patent statistics from both ASEAN Patentscope database 
(Tab. 6.4.) and World Intellectual Property Office (Tab. 6.5) shows that the majority of patents 
granted and filed at the national patent office of Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia are filed by 
a non-residents or foreign applicants. Within those numbers, there is a significant presence of 
patent filed by Japanese inventors and applicants (Tab. 6.4.), which mostly are manufacturing-
related patents filed by the MNCs.  
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MYS  
(1986.08.18-2019.02.28) 
THA  
(1980.08.13-2019.04.19) 
IDN  
(1987.12.02-2019.07.05) 
By Domestic Inventor and Applicants 10.6% 8.5% 17.7% 
By Foreign Inventor and Applicants 
(total) 89.4% 91.5% 82.3% 
- JPN (from total patents filed) 16.3% 14.8% 30.4% 
- KOR (from total patents filed) 2.3% 2.1% 1.4% 
- CHN (from total patents filed) 2.0% 1.1% 2.4% 
Tab. 6.4 Share of Patents Filed at the National Patent Office of Malaysia, Thailand and 
Indonesia based on investor(s)’s and applicant(s)’s country of origins 
Source: ASEAN Patentscope database (2019)  
Patent Grants (MYS) Patent Grants (THA) Patent Grants (IDN) 
Year Resident 
Non-
Resident 
Abroad 
(Foreign 
Offices) 
Year Resident 
Non-
Resident 
Abroad 
(Foreign 
Offices) 
Year Resident 
Non-
Resident 
Abroad 
(Foreign 
Offices) 
2008 198 2,044 227 2008 62 904 48 2008 70 1,741 14 
2009 270 3,198 228 2009 59 787 47 2009   7 
2010 200 1,960 316 2010 306 466 85 2010   15 
2011 310 2,043 285 2011 143 757 88 2011   19 
2012 295 2,165 365 2012 57 951 87 2012   19 
2013 288 2,372 432 2013 68 1,081 114 2013   37 
2014 344 2,361 512 2014 73 1,213 125 2014   27 
2015 344 2,533 570 2015 62 1,302 157 2015   46 
2016 355 2,969 584 2016 61 1,777 164 2016 292 2,713 47 
2017 437 4,626 508 2017 88 2,992 161 2017   43 
Tab. 6.5 Patent Grants at the National Patent Office of Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia 
(2008-2017) 
Source: (WIPO, 2018c; WIPO, 2018d; WIPO, 2018e) 
Overall, the first section shows how the manufacturing sectors in the three Southeast 
Asian perform better than the two Latin American cases but way behind the Northeast Asian 
cases. It is also important to note that MNCs, instead of the indigenous manufacturing firms, 
have been the main driver of manufacturing sector growth in the three Southeast Asian 
countries. The list of large enterprises shows that most of the large indigenous enterprises in 
the three countries are banks, ICT services, and natural resource-based low technology firms 
(e.g., food processing and beverages). In addition, the present national STI policy seems to be 
centered on natural resource-centric technology, similar to Argentina and Brazil.  
Also similar to their Latin American counterparts, the majority of the patents filed at 
the national patent office are owned by foreign inventors, especially Japan. Through an 
evaluation of three cases’ critical juncture periods in the next three sections, I seek to highlight 
two important points: 1) at the beginning of independence year or modernization year, the 
initial conditions in three Southeast Asian countries show similar unconducive characteristic 
in comparison to the Argentina and Brazil; however 2) some changes in this condition pushed 
the political coalition to pursue industrial growth, but at the same time they were exposed to 
alternative strategy (i.e., MNCs-driven manufacturing growth); and 3) the change in the 
international context in post-critical juncture periods (e.g., the 2000 Palm Oil boom, the 
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regional free trade agreement through ASEAN Economic Community) also contributed to the 
survival of the political coalition (i.e., political elites and natural resource oligarchs) and the 
reproduction of the natural resource-centric strategy.  
 
6.II. The Case of Malaysia 
The case of Malaysia is the perfect example of a medium level of urgency. Among the 
other two Southeast Asian countries, the political elites in Malaysia faced higher urgency to 
boost their manufacturing sector due to the 1969 Racial Riots. This incident provoked a shift 
in Malaysia’s national economic development strategy. It also ended with an emergence of 
strong political coalition. However, the coalition itself did not last long and was accompanied 
by enough urgency to pursue industrial catch-up. Similar to Thailand and Indonesia, the 
abundance of natural resources and the dynamics of global economic dynamics (e.g. palm oil 
boom) provided Malaysia with other growth strategies, that were politically and economically 
less costly. Therefore, I focus on how the occurrence of events in this period contributes to the 
minimum urgency for the Malaysian government to prioritize indigenous technology-driven 
industrial catch-up despite the opportunities presented by the ASEAN Economic Community 
regime. Due to these dynamics, I classified the global-external circumstances during the critical 
juncture period of Malaysia as unconducive circumstances, while the domestic circumstances 
as mixed circumstances. The interaction between the two types of circumstances produced a 
medium level of urgency to pursue an indigenous technology-driven industrial catch-up 
strategy. 
 
6.II.a. Critical Juncture Period: The 1969 Racial Riots and the 1970 New Economic Policy 
6.II.a.1. Global-External Circumstances 
While it is more straightforward to clearly identify the key global-external 
circumstances that directly influenced the political elites’ behavior in Japan and South Korea, 
it is quite challenging to do so for the three cases of Southeast Asian countries. The most 
important turning point in Malaysia’s national economic strategy was more to a domestic 
circumstance, which was the 1969 Racial Riots. The riots, however, was indeed a result of 
colonial legacy left by the British on the national unity and socio-economic dynamics of 
Malaysia before their independence. The bygone day’s relic was also an excess of the global 
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trade expansion, which has begun since the 1400s to 1600s. This period is more notably 
referred to as the Age of Commerce of Archipelago Southeast Asia following the work of 
Anthony Reid (1988). This was the era when early European capitalism resulted in the 
integration of trade-based cities in Southeast Asia into the global trade system. The colonial 
government sought to transform the region into a center of tropical agriculture (Reid, 1988).  
Other important global-external dynamics worth mentioning was the World War II in 
Southeast Asia. Similar to the two Latin American cases, the external conflicts were not 
threatening enough for the three Southeast Asian cases to provoke an alteration of their national 
economic strategy. In terms of regional conflict, post-World War II Southeast Asia suffered 
from a number of political disputes, such as the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation in 1963 to 
1966, the Malaysia-Philippines dispute over Sabah in 1963 to 1964, and Thailand’s border 
conflicts with Cambodia during 1966 to 1978 and the Lao PDR in 1986 to 1988. The 
establishment of ASEAN in 1967 is often cited as a successful mechanism for maintaining 
regional stability (Tarling, 2006). In addition, the development of ASEAN into the ASEAN 
Economic Community in the post-critical juncture period weakened the level of urgency even 
more. The political elites in these three countries, including Malaysia, were offered an 
alternative strategy to boost up manufacturing sector (i.e., MNCs-driven manufacturing sector 
growth). 
In sum, these global-external circumstances were unconducive to provoke a high level 
of urgency among the political elites in the critical juncture period of Malaysia to pursue an 
indigenous technology-driven industrial catch up strategy. There was a lack of threat presence 
against national survival from outside, which was needed to encourage a broad coalition. 
Instead, the threat came from domestic circumstances. Thus, this threat forced the political 
elites to alternatively rely on foreign capital, rather than strengthening the indigenous industrial 
capabilities. Later, it is important to note that in the post-critical juncture period, the 
government of Malaysia shift back to natural resource-centric strategy. 
 
6.II.a.2. Domestic Circumstances 
 Overall, the domestic circumstances in the critical juncture period of Malaysia were 
characterized by an abundant natural resource (minus the oil revenue) and the lack of national 
unity due to the socio-economic structure problem. This combination led to the National 
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Economic Policy (NEP) 1970, which marked the turning point in Malaysian economic strategy. 
The NEP foster the structural change in Malaysia. However, once the coalition that supported 
the strategy broke (i.e., when Mahathir retired from politics in 2003 after leading Malaysia for 
more than two decades), so did their industry-centric development strategy. The political elites 
in the post-critical juncture switched their focus on the agricultural sector, particularly with the 
palm oil boom in the 2000s.  
Malaysia’s political-economic history has been linked tightly to a combination of 
international trade incentives and its agricultural sector. The pattern of commodity export 
production (e.g., cloves. nutmeg, mace, rubber) and the rise of international trade in the 1400s-
1500s centered around the Malay sultanate of Melaka (Drabble, 2000, pp. 5-6). Although its 
soils are not generally fertile, the heavy rainfall and warm temperatures in Malaysia are perfect 
for the growth of rainforests (Andaya & Andaya, 2001, p. 2). Thus, the agricultural 
development in the Federation of Malaya under the Strait Settlements began with experimental 
plantations (e.g., coffee, cotton, tea, tobacco, and spices) established by the Europeans and 
those of the Chinese agriculturalists81 (e.g., sugar, tapioca, pepper, and gambier) (Andaya & 
Andaya, 2001, p. 139).  
One of the legacies from the colonial era in independent Malaysia is the economic 
disparities among the different ethnicities in Malaysia, particularly between the Chinese 
Malaysians and the Bumiputera. The British colonial government stratified Malaysian society 
based on its ethnic groups. The Bumiputera were the colonial masters. The Chinese and Indians 
were both laborers and entrepreneurs, whereas the Europeans provided technical expertise. The 
Japanese occupation in 1942 sharpened the economic competition among the Chinese 
population and the Bumiputera, who received more favorable status from the Japanese 
occupational power (Andaya & Andaya, 2001).  
Initially, after the Malaysian independence in 1963, the focus of the Malaysian 
economic policy was to promote agricultural sector in order to erase the economic disparities. 
However, while these projects were underway, the perception82 of the Bumiputra as the rural 
poor was increasing. The domestic ruling elites’ economic prioritizations (i.e., the incumbent 
 
81 The Chinese migrants in Malaya developed extensive pepper and gambier estates in Singapore by the mid-
1830s and profited from trade with both China and Europe. 
82 The United Malays National Organization (UMNO) assembled the Bumiputera Economic Congress to address 
the complaints dealing with the lack of representation of the Bumiputera in both the commerce and industry 
sectors in 1965 and 1968.  
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Alliance)83 sparked dissatisfaction among the Chinese and Indian communities. The opposition 
party, i.e., the Democratic Action Party (DAP), benefited from this dissatisfaction by 
promoting ethnic equality and the end of special privileges for the Bumiputra. A significant 
loss of votes from the Chinese and Indian Malay communities in the 10 May 1969 election 
ended the Alliance’s two-thirds majority. The victory celebration over the opposition’s victory 
on 12 May 1969, led to the riots (Andaya & Andaya, 2001).  
 
6.II.a.3. Political Elites’ Consensus on Economic Strategy & Short-Term Economic Strategy 
The 1969 riots caused the ruling political elites in Malaysia to change their economic 
strategy. They saw economic disparities between ethnicities in Malaysia as the primary threat 
to the nation’s future (Andaya & Andaya, 2001, p. 300). They published both the Second 
Malaysia Plan (1971-1975) and the New Economic Policy (NEP) (1970) in the aftermath of 
the 1969 riots. The success of the Malaysia’s industrial policy as part of the NEP is connected 
closely to coalitional politics centered on interethnic relations. The NEP had two principal 
objectives: 1) poverty reduction and eradication, irrespective of race; and 2) reconstruction of 
society so that identification of race with economic function would be reduced and ultimately 
eliminated. The NEP’s second objective was manifested in the government’s emphasis on the 
Bumiputera’s education through an establishment of various universities and technical 
institutes. In the following decades, the Bumiputera gradually abandoned agricultural works in 
favor of employment in modern sectors (secondary and tertiary sectors) (Jomo, 2004; Ritchie, 
2005; Andaya & Andaya, 2001).  
Occupation Bumiputera Chinese Malay Indian Malay Other 
1970 2000 1970 2000 1970 2000 1970 2000 
Professional & technical 47.0% 63.9% 39.5% 25.8% 10.8% 7.6% 2.7% 2.7% 
Teachers & nurses - 73.2% - 18.4% - 6.9% - 1.5% 
Administrative & managerial 24.1% 37.0% 62.9% 52.3% 7.8% 5.5% 5.2% 5.2% 
Clerical & related 35.4% 56.8% 45.9% 32.9% 17.2% 8.6% 1.5% 1.7% 
Sales & related 26.7% 37.3% 61.7% 49.8% 11.1% 6.8% 0.4% 6.1% 
Services 44.3% 57.7% 39.6% 21.8% 14.6% 8.5% 1.5% 12.0% 
Agriculture 72.0% 61.2% 17.3% 10.3% 9.7% 6.9% 1.0% 21.6% 
Production, transport, & other 34.2% 44.7% 55.9% 33.8% 9.6% 10.0% 0.3% 11.5% 
Tab. 6.6 Share of Employment by Occupation and Ethnic Group in Malaysia (1997 and 2000) 
Source: (Jomo, 2004, pp. 14-15) 
 
83 From the 1950s on, the Malaysian coalition government, the Alliance, consisted of the UMNO, the Malaysian 
Chinese Association (MCA), and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). 
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The NEP’s main goal was to restructure the society. The Malaysian government, 
through MARA (the People's Trust Council), i.e., the agency used to promote education and 
training for the Bumiputera, aimed to reduce the unemployment rate and increase the incomes 
among rural Malays. In addition to various labor policy programs, the Malaysian government 
also provided agricultural subsidies and restructuration of industries. Furthermore, the 
Malaysian government implemented a redistribution policy (labor quota), which required 
domestic firms and MNCs to employ Malay workers. In the early 1970s, the Malaysian 
government increased FDIs instead of relying on capital from Chinese-Malaysian businesses. 
However, due to the fast growth in FDIs, indigenous technology development, particularly that 
of the smaller Chinese-Malaysian firms, was slow (Ritchie, 2005, p. 748). 
In the Second Malaysia Plan (1971-1975), the Malaysian government acknowledged 
that the enhancement of primary industries alone was not enough and started the expansion of 
the manufacturing sector by adopting an urban-industrial strategy. Mahathir was the key figure 
in Malaysia’s economic transformation. As the Minister of Trade and Industry in 1980, he 
initiated the Heavy Industry Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM) as part of his Look East policy. 
This resulted in joint venture products, such as Proton Saga (with Mitsubishi) and Kancil (with 
Daihatsu and Ford). He began the privatization of state-owned enterprises in the 1980s to ease 
the government burden due to the global economic slowdown (Drabble, 2000). 
In sum, before the 1969 Riots and the 1970 New Economic Policy, more referring to 
moments after their independence in 1957, the majority of the enterprises in Malaysia were 
foreign-owned and overseas Chinese-owned. The government started to promote export in the 
late 1960s. Through the 1970 New Economic Policy, they imposed an ethnic ownership 
condition, with the exception of the export-oriented foreign firms. The foreign firms only had 
to employ more Bumiputera (i.e. labor quota) to receive government incentives. By the 1980s, 
the Malaysian government established the Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia, a state-
controlled joint venture with foreign capitals. This was resulted in the establishment of Kedah 
Cement, Perwaja Steel, and Proton. However, the non-resource-based technology-intensive 
exports in Malaysia were mostly involved a large amount of capital-intensive resource 
processing (i.e., palm-oil processing). From the late 1980s, only the manufacturing firms 
located in the Western region of the country which grew to be more technologically intensive 
due to labor shortage (e.g., Penang, Klang Valley, Johor, Seremban, and Melacca). By 1990s, 
MNCs continued to be the driver of manufacturing sector as the local firms have weak 
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technological capabilities and continued to conduct original equipment manufacturer or OEM 
activities (Rasiah, 2003, pp. 49-55). 
 
6.II.b. Post-Critical Juncture Period: The Continuation of Strategy 
In its effort to promote MNCs expansion in the Malaysian manufacturing sector, 
Malaysia sacrificed its smaller firms. In addition, when Mahathir stepped down in 2003, the 
domestic ruling elite’s coalitions weakened; hence the dictation of the Malaysian economic 
strategy for the sake of short-term political survival (Ritchie, 2004). Therefore, the post-
Mahathir Malaysian economic strategy, as put forth by the Ninth Malaysian Plan, emphasized 
the agricultural sector and agriculture-based technology (The Government of Malaysia, 2006). 
Overall, the government’s decision to speed up the movement of labor from agriculture to the 
manufacturing industry was provoked by social conflict rather than the need to pursue 
industrial and technological catch-up. Its decision and the following result of rapid economic 
growth throughout the 1970s to the 1990s contributed to the survival of the domestic ruling 
elite. 
Since the 1980s, the growth of palm oil trade has been increasing significantly. The 
palm oil annual average production growth between 1980 to 2009 reached 7.8 percent. Both 
Malaysia and Indonesia contributed to almost 90 percent of palm oil production in this period 
(Sanders, et al., 2012, p. 1). This also led to an increase in the growth of palm oil plantations 
in Malaysia. Between 1975 to 2005, the land area of mature palm oil in Malaysia increased 
from 0.4 to 3.6 Mha. Then, there was an increasing world demand for palm oil in the 2000s; 
hence the high palm oil price. As the palm oil sector gained more profits, the palm oil 
production has been expanding. Based on the 1997 to 2005 data, the annual average growth for 
the palm oil-related land expansion in Malaysia was 4.3 percent. The Malaysian Palm Oil 
Board projected that the total area of palm oil production area in Malaysia will reach 5.1 Mha 
by 2020 (Wicke, et al., 2011, p. 199). 
The government of Malaysia started to develop their palm oil sector since the early 
1980s ever since the Malaysian Palm Oil Board (MPOB) had extensively developed palm 
biodiesel in 1982. They collaborated with Petronas for the pilot projects, which resulted in the 
production of 3000 metric tons of palm oil methyl ester annually. Despite the economic 
stagnation in early 2000s, the government of Malaysia continued to promote various policy to 
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support biodiesel, such as the National Biofuel Policy in 2005. The MPOB also conducted 
various collaboration with foreign companies, such as Brandies University from the U.S., 
Prignitzer Eisenbahn (PE) Arriva from the U.K., Cycle & Carriage and Diamler-Benz from 
Germany, Mission Biofuels from Australia and Enertech Co., Limited from South Korea (Lim 
& Teong, 2010, pp. 941-942). While the private palm oil companies are the largest players 
which control 60 percent of the palm oil cultivation in Malaysia, the government of Malaysia 
owned 30 percent of it, while the remaining 10 percent belongs to independent stakeholders. 
The public investment in the palm oil sector comes from government investment fund, pension 
and pilgrim fund, as well as various stakeholder settlement schemes. They also hold indirect 
control over some of the largest plantation companies, such as Sime Darby, Guthrie and Golden 
Hope (now merged into Sime Darby). Between 2001 to 2006, the export earning of Malaysia 
rose by 124 percent due to the high pam oil price. In 2007, the total export earnings from palm 
oil industry increased by 42 percent from the previous year (Lopez & Laan, 2008, pp. 14-15).  
The 1997/1998 Asian Financial Crisis provoked the three Southeast Asian countries to 
seek more foreign investments to move their manufacturing sectors forward, unlike the Great 
Depression in 1930 that provoked Argentina and Brazil to adopt ISI policies. Since the crisis, 
the ASEAN Economic Community has been continuously promoting the integration of the 
Southeast Asian countries into the global production network led by ASEAN’s external 
partners (e.g., Japan, South Korea, China, the U.S.) (ASEAN, 2008; ASEAN, 2015). Since the 
late 1970s to early 1980s, the three Southeast Asian countries owe their superior manufacturing 
sector performances (vis-à-vis Argentina and Brazil) to the expansion of the global production 
network on the part of Japan and other first-tier New Industrialized Economies (NIEs) (e.g., 
South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore). Unlike South Korea, however, there is a 
minimum level of urgency on the part of the ruling political elites to move away from 
agriculture and resource-based economic strategies, despite the opportunity presented by 
MNCs through ASEAN Economic Community arrangement in 2007. 
Starting in 2006, the post-Mahathir government of Malaysia constructed their national 
economic strategy around agricultural development. The Ninth Malaysian Plan (2006-2010) 
stated that it was “the third engine of economic growth” and that Malaysia “must think 
progressively and remove misperceptions that agriculture is a low value-added economic 
activity capable of only generating small incomes” (The Economic Planning Unit of Malaysia, 
2006, pp. 16-17). The government increased its spending on agricultural sector by 70 percent 
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from the previous plan84 (i.e., the Eight Malaysia Plan 2001-2005). The Tenth Malaysian Plan 
(2011-2015) emphasized the problem of middle-income trap, but the government continued 
their resource-based prioritization, as they established 12 potential National Key Economic 
Areas: 1. Oil and gas; 2. Palm oil and related products; 3. Financial services; 4. Wholesale and 
retail; 5. Tourism; 6. ICT; 7. Education; 8. Electrical and electronics;85 9. Business services; 
10. Private healthcare; 11. Agriculture; and 12. Greater Kuala Lumpur (The Economic 
Planning Unit of Malaysia, 2010, p. 122). In addition, instead of attempting to catch up with 
the technologically advanced countries, the government of Malaysia have persistently 
competed for FDIs “not just against countries in the immediate region, but against those in 
South America and Eastern Europe” (The Economic Planning Unit of Malaysia, 2010, p. 2). 
The Tenth Malaysian Plan and Eleventh Malaysian Plan (2016-2020) also 
addressed/address SMEs development, particularly in regard to opportunities that come from 
the ASEAN Economic Community scheme.  However, there are no mechanisms to support 
indigenous manufacturing technology development (i.e., technology dissemination through 
triple-helix coordination). The government have been aiming to support MNC and SME 
partnerships to intensify export promotion (market access) (The Economic Planning Unit of 
Malaysia, 2015, pp. 8-21), which represents a passive FDI-dependent strategy. 
 
Sub-sector Description 
Halal Industry Develop halal industry by linking Malaysian halal standards to 
international standards and promote the alternative ingredients industry. 
Islamic Finance Reinforce Malaysia’s position as a global Islamic finance marketplace 
through innovative Islamic financial products and services. 
ICT Improve exports of ICT products and services by developing ICT 
technology focus areas, infusing ICT in other sectors and strengthening 
ICT industry support ecosystem. 
Oil & Gas 
Services 
Develop Malaysia as an oil and gas hub in the Asia Pacific region 
through strengthening upstream capability and improve collaboration 
between industry and higher learning institutions. 
Private Healthcare Grow healthcare travel through international accreditation, increased 
insurance coverage, and leverage regional referral network. 
 
84 They allocated it to the development of infrastructure for irrigation and drainage, R&D, enhancing credit 
facilities and implementing entrepreneur development programs. The government of Malaysia also expanded 
more than 380,000 hectares of land for rubber and palm oil and built 28 permanent food production parks (almost 
2,400 hectares in size), an Agropolis district (i.e. food production), and national food terminals (The Economic 
Planning Unit of Malaysia, 2006, p. 18). 
85 This is the only manufacturing sector mentioned on the Tenth Malaysia Plan, in which there is a lack of concrete 
planning to support foreign technological learning (The Economic Planning Unit of Malaysia, 2010, p. 131). The 
plan provides more concrete programs for other economic areas. 
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Private Higher 
Education 
Continue to develop reputable and high-quality private higher 
education institutions through ratings and quality assessments and self-
regulation incentives. 
Ecotourism Position Malaysia as a premier ecotourism destination by leveraging 
biodiversity assets and increased branding and promotion. 
Professional 
Services 
Promote Malaysia as an outsourcing center for professional services to 
increase exports through capacity building. 
Tab. 6.7 Modern Services Subsectors as Presented on the Eleventh Malaysia Plan 
Source: (The Economic Planning Unit of Malaysia, 2015, pp. 8-19) 
Prior to the government change in 2018, the Ministry of Science, Technology, and 
Innovation (MOSTI) was the main agent responsible for the national STI policy. Based on the 
National Policy on Science, Technology, and Innovation (Ministry of Science, Technology, 
and Innovation of Malaysia, 2016) and the Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Science, 
Technology, and Innovation 2016-2020 (Ministry of Science, Technology, and Innovation of 
Malaysia, 2017), the National Science Research Council have established nine priority areas 
within their national R&D programs: i. Biodiversity; ii. Cyber Security; iii. Energy Security, 
iv. Environment and Climate Change; v. Food Security; vi. Medical and Healthcare; vii. 
Plantation Crops and Commodities; viii. Transportation and Urbanization; and ix. Water 
Security (Fig. 8) (Ministry of Science, Technology, and Innovation of Malaysia, 2017, p. 9). 
Later on, MOSTI transformed into Ministry of Energy, Science, Technology, 
Environment, and Climate Change (MESTECC) in 2018 when Mahathir returned to 
Malaysian politic as its seventh prime minister. In 2018, the government of Malaysia renewed 
their national economic strategy86 in the Mid-Term Review of the Eleventh Malaysia Plan 
2016-2020: New Priorities and Emphases (The Economic Planning Unit of Malaysia, 2018). 
However, there is no trace of a mechanism to support indigenous manufacturing technology 
development within its five main elements,87 which were developed “to move up the value 
chain” (The Economic Planning Unit of Malaysia, 2018, p. 19).  
 
 
86 Due to the corruption scandal involving the incumbent political coalitions, the revised Eleventh Malaysia Plan 
emphasizes government (public sector) transparency. The Barisan National coalition, which had ruled Malaysia 
since its independence in 1957, lost to the opposition alliance after the 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) 
scandal. In 2015, news broke that about US$ 700 million was allegedly moved from the 1MDB project into Prime 
Minister Najib’s personal bank account (Reuters, 2018).  
87 These five elements are: 1) Encourage digitalization and innovation to boost growth; 2) Focus on knowledge-
intensive services to expand the modern services sector; 3) Energize manufacturing sector to produce more 
complex and diverse products;  4) Modernize agriculture by accelerating adoption of farming technology and 
promoting a cluster- based approach through vertical integration of the supply chain for selected crops; 5) Foster 
sustainable practices and enhance knowledge content to transform the construction sector (The Economic 
Planning Unit of Malaysia, 2018, p. 19). 
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Fig. 6.10 Projects Funded by the Malaysian Technology Development Corporation 
Categorized by Its Technology Clusters 2016-2018 
Source: (Portal Data Terbuka Malaysia, Goverment of Malaysia, 2018) 
The National Policy on Industry 4.0, which was released in 2018, does acknowledge 
the challenges of ASEAN Economic Community’s global production network expansion 
scheme for the indigenous manufacturing sector, which contains 98.5 percent SMEs (Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry of Malaysia, 2018, pp. 27-28). The policy’s strategy is 
called F.I.R.S.T (i.e., Funding, Infrastructure, Regulations, Skills and Talent, and Technology). 
MESTECC is mainly responsible for Malaysia’s technology strategy (Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry of Malaysia, 2018, p. 66). However, its priorities consist mostly of green 
technology, energy efficiency, and environmental issues (Tab. 6.8.). Meanwhile, the electrical 
and electronic equipment is the sector with the highest share of value-added in ASEAN (see 
Fig 3) and employs 25 percent of the Malaysian manufacturing sector workforce (Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry of Malaysia, 2018, p. 25). 
 
 
1. Green and 
Efficient Energy 
Sector 
• To increase the percentage from 2% to 20% of renewable energy 
for electricity generation 
• To improve the national energy efficiency 
• To improve the efficiency and transparency of the energy 
market to ensure the best tariffs for energy consumers 
2. Environmental 
Pollution-free and 
• Leading the country towards a free non-biodegradable plastic 
• To reduce pollution through education and enforcement 
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Resistance to 
Climate Change 
• To prepare country to address climate change through 
adaptation and mitigation 
3. Wealth 
Creation Through 
Science and 
Technology 
• Demand-driven R&D through close collaboration with the 
industry 
• To increase technology commercialization into marketplace 
• To increase industrial productivity through science & 
technology applications 
Tab. 6.8 MESTECC’s Focusses 
Source: (Ministry of Energy, Science, Technology, Environment, and Climate Change of 
Malaysia, 2019a) 
 
MESTECC offers two types of R&D funding schemes. The first scheme is for 
designated for SMEs and is called the MESTECC R&D Fund. This fund prioritizes three 
research areas: 1) Water, Food, and Energy; 2) Green Growth for Sustainable Development; 
and 3) Medical and Healthcare (Ministry of Energy, Science, Technology, Environment, and 
Climate Change of Malaysia, 2019b). The second scheme is the International Collaboration 
Fund (designated for Government Research Institutions, Government STI Agencies, and 
Public and Private Institutions of Higher Learning (IHLs) with accredited research programs), 
which prioritizes five research areas: 1) Biotechnology; 2) Engineering and Technology; 3) 
Computer Science and ICT; 4) Medical and Health Sciences; and 5) Agriculture and Forestry 
(Ministry of Energy, Science, Technology, Environment, and Climate Change of Malaysia, 
2018). In sum, the Malaysian national STI policy is still bounded to natural-resource 
technology development instead of prioritizing indigenous manufacturing technology 
development as a part of an industrial catch-up strategy.  
Overall, the government of Malaysia’s current development strategy is to lean on a 
natural resource-oriented strategy instead of an indigenous technology-driven industrial catch 
up. Their STI policy shows this tendency. Despite making some shift in the 1970s to prioritize 
industrial growth instead of agriculture-centric strategy due to the racial riots (i.e., the image 
of Bumiputera as the rural poor), the government of Malaysia chose to lean towards MNCs-
driven industrial growth. The expansion of the global production network in the 1990s 
contributed to this alternative strategy, which was also presented to the other two Southeast 
Asian country cases. The coalition between government and foreign capital continues as the 
political elites also benefited from the palm oil sector to gain revenues. 
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6.III. The Case of Thailand 
 Similar to Malaysia, Thailand is another case where the political elites in the critical 
juncture period faced a medium level of urgency to pursue an indigenous technology-driven 
industrial catch-up strategy. However, if what happened in Malaysia was the result of an 
interaction between unconducive global-external circumstances and mixed domestic 
circumstances, the case of Thailand offers a different combination. Here I argue that the 
political elites in Thailand faced both ‘mixed’ global-external circumstances and ‘mixed’ 
domestic circumstances. At the global-external level, there was a time when Thailand was 
challenged by larger powers, yet they have successfully avoided being colonialized. Their 
strategic position for the big powers and their natural resource endowments (i.e., lack of oil 
revenue but rich in other natural resources), did provoke the need for self-sufficiency industry, 
but was not followed by the need to support indigenous technology-development or industrial 
catch-up. 
 Unlike Malaysia and Indonesia, Siam (Thailand) remained un-colonialized in the 
1900s. However, they were subjected to the same foreign economic forces as the rest of 
Southeast Asia (Reid, 2001, p. 54). Similar to the case of Japan, I select the modernization 
period as the critical juncture point of Thailand. The 1932 Siamese Revolution is often referred 
as an important period in Thailand’s political system as it marked a change in governmental 
system from an absolute monarchy into constitutional monarchy, as well as the turning point 
for the modernization of Thailand. Another defining moment in Thailand was the 1947 military 
coup which then followed by the expansion of Thailand’s agricultural sector under the context 
of the Cold War in Southeast Asia. Among the three Southeast Asian countries examined in 
this Ph.D. dissertation, Thailand’s economic development history has the most significant 
connection to their agricultural sector development. In comparison to Malaysia and Indonesia, 
Thailand has the largest share of arable land, but also the smallest share of oil rents (see fig. 
3.3. and fig 3.4. on Chapter 3). Therefore, it is essential to select a critical juncture period when 
the political coalitions among political elites and the natural resource sector started to have a 
prominent role in the modern state of Thailand. I focus on how the occurrence of events (i.e., 
global-external and domestic circumstances) as the initial conditions that contributes to the 
minimum urgency for Thailand to prioritize indigenous technology-driven industrial catch-up 
despite the opportunities presented in their relations with a major power in the region. 
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6.III.a. Critical Juncture Period: The 1932 Monarchy Constitutional and 1947 Coup 
6.III.a.1. Global-External Circumstances 
Similar to the case of Malaysia, I mostly categorize the events within the global-
external circumstances in the critical juncture as indirect circumstances. The international trade 
before the 1900s, the coming of Japan in the 1940s, Thailand-U.S. relations in World War II 
and the Vietnam wars (i.e. relations with the U.S.) were important global-external 
circumstances. It contributed to the expansion of Thailand’s agricultural production. These 
events also highlighted the importance of agricultural products for Thailand’s diplomacy (e.g., 
rubber, tin).  
After the Ayutthaya period (1351-1767), the monarchy government in Siam built close 
relations with Chinese merchants, who gradually expanded their political power (Phongpaichit 
& Baker, 1995). Thailand’s close relations with foreign powers influenced its economic 
strategy. Throughout the 1800s, the Siamese Monarch heavily protected the traders and the tax 
farmers. By the end of the Ayutthaya period, trade became an important source of power as the 
monarch sold various forest goods in exchange for weapons and other luxury goods. The Phra 
Khlang was the key government institution that acted as the foreign ministry, port authority, 
export warehouse, and treasury (Phongpaichit & Baker, 1995, p. 93).  
This was the period of tributary and trading system, which was mostly done in the 
Chinese market. The foreign merchants (i.e., the Chinese, Arabs, Persians, and Europeans) 
were slowly absorbed into the local society as the members of court and administration. Some 
were even absorbed into the armies and received patronage from the Monarchy. The majority 
source of King’s revenues came from the monopoly over the forest good for the Chinese 
markets. Ayutthaya's position as a major entrepôt for the Chinese market and other Southeast 
Asian ports also provided the monarch with revenues from tax and tariffs. As the Chinese 
merchants received a friendly policy in the Ayutthaya period, their community grew larger and 
they absorbed into the society and the monarchy88 (Phongpaichit & Baker, 1995, pp. 92-93). 
This was the period of trade expansion, urban expansion, and rice economy expansion in 
Thailand, which shaped the political design as the Bangkok rulers backed up the commodity 
trade.  
 
88 According to Phongpaichit and Baker (1995), some of the important figures in Thailand elites were the 
decedents of these Chinese merchants, such as General Thaksin, who established the state centered on the 
Bangkok region, and the mother of King Rama I, the founder of Chakri Dynasty (p. 93).  
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 Another example of how global-external circumstances affected the expansion of 
agricultural production occurred in World War II (i.e., the relations with Japan) and the Cold 
War era (i.e., the relations with the U.S.), specifically the Vietnam War. The 1932 Siamese 
revolution was followed by the rise of nationalism sentiment within the military. Under Prime 
Minister Plaek Phibunsongkhram or Phibun, this rise of nationalism in Thailand was reinforced 
with the rise of Japanese power in Asia in the 1930s. He pursued an economic nationalization 
and built up the army as Thailand grew closer to Japan (Martin, 1963, p. 451). The military 
government in this period also sought to reduce the dominant role of foreign Chinese 
businesses as a part of their campaign to free their peasants from the domination of the 
businessman.  
In 1937, the military government imposed an immigration control directed toward 
Chinese immigrants. In 1938 and 1939, they passed a law that banned the ethnic Chinese from 
various economic activities. This law also allowed the government to monopolize the salt and 
tobacco trades, which was previously dominated by ethnic Chinese89 (Phongpaichit & Baker, 
1995, pp. 118-119). However, the dominance of ethnic Chinese in the economy remained. For 
example, the military government established and fully supported the Thai Chamber of 
Commerce in 1933, which was designed to counter the dominance of the Chinese and Western 
chambers. Yet, many of the leaders in the Thai Chamber of Commerce were ethnic Chinese 
(Hewison, 1989, p. 69). Overall, the anti-Chinese policy only affected smaller merchants as the 
larger Chinese capitalist remained to be dominant economic players and they received favor 
from the political elites. When the war ended, the Chinese businesses expanded mostly in 
banking sector as they had been investing in various natural resource industries, especially rice 
trade (Hewison, 1989, pp. 71-72).  
Along with the growing intensity of the war in the Pacific, Thailand held an important 
position for Japan to enter the vicinity of Malaysia and Indonesia (i.e., British Malaya and the 
Netherlands Indies). Japan has been building its economic relations with Thailand since the 
1930s. In the 1940s, Thailand bought 100 planes, armaments, and munitions, from Japan. In 
return, Japan increased its purchase of rice, tin, and rubber from Thailand. Prior to 1940, most 
Thai rubbers went to British Malaya but in 1939, Japan bought 10 percent of Thailand’s rubber 
exports. Tin production played an important role in Thailand as it holds the interest for various 
 
89 It is important to point out that this occurred under the context of World War II and the Second Sino-Japanese 
War (1937-1945). 
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major power such as Britain, Australia, Japan, Italy, and Germany. The political elites of 
Thailand used their natural resource endowment in rubber and tin to seek various assistance 
from these major economic powers. For example, Thailand received USD 3 million loans and 
commercial credits from the U.S. in exchanges from the assurance for tin and rubber access 
from Thailand (Martin, 1963, pp. 456-457). 
 Thailand’s position as the source for raw materials in the global economics was 
strengthened in the Post World War II as the U.S. began to assert their influence in Southeast 
Asia. The U.S. saw Thailand as holding a significant importance in the Vietnam War (i.e., 
against communism), concerning its resource endowment (Hewison, 1989, p. 81). Thailand 
played a vital part in the U.S. Cold War strategy between 1947 and 1950 due to their strategic 
position as U.S. military base for Indo-China operation. The U.S. was also involved in 
Thailand’s internal politics as the U.S. sought to establish strong government and rapid 
economic growth based on Thailand’s private capital. This resulted in an alliance between the 
U.S. and the Thailand military leaders. Throughout the 1950s to 1970s, the U.S. provided 
Thailand with USD 2.5 billion worth of military aid, military installations, and other military 
support for troops. In addition, The U.S. provided USD 627 million worth of non-military aids. 
These foreign relieves thus caused in an inflated government revenue (Phongpaichit & Baker, 
1995, p. 126).  
The impact of U.S. strategic interest in Thailand became more apparent during the Sarit 
Thanarat period, who took the power after the 1947 military coup. In the 1950s, Sarit had 
negotiated various aids and military deals with the U.S. as he was building up various economic 
sectors such as shipping, construction, insurance, manufacturing, trading, and joint ventures 
with large Thai-Chinese business figures. He started the economic reconstruction in 1959, 
following various policy recommendations from economic reports released by the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)90. The U.S. used the report as the basis for 
its aid to Thailand. The Thailand government then established various administrative bureau 
under the assistance from the U.S.: The Budget Bureau, National Statistical Office, National 
Economic Development Board (NEDB), and Board of Investment. The NEDB became the 
main bureau in charge of national development planning (Phongpaichit & Baker, 1995, pp. 
127-128). The economic reconstruction during the Sarit period opened up Thailand's economy 
to foreign capital. The U.S. investment in transportation infrastructure led to a primary 
 
90 This resulted in the privatization of state enterprises. 
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commodities-export boom. The total agricultural export increased with an average growth of 
10 percent between 1960 to 1975. The revenue in agriculture, foreign capital, and military aid 
supported the balance of payment in Thailand (Phongpaichit & Baker, 1995, p. 129).  
 
6.III.a.2. Domestic Circumstances 
The domestic circumstances in the critical juncture period of Thailand was 
characterized by abundant natural resources (minus the oil revenue), a less problematic national 
unity as a new state (i.e., in comparison to Malaysia and Indonesia), and a socio-economic 
structure, which has been shaped by Thailand’s interaction with foreign power for hundreds of 
decades. Overall, Thailand’s during the critical juncture period showed a case of how the 
patron-client relations between political elites or government with foreign capital, bankers, and 
natural resource oligarch (particularly sugar) have been shaping throughout times despite a 
regime change or political system change. The agricultural sector, particularly rice and sugar, 
has important political significance power in Thailand. The expansion of this agricultural sector 
in Thailand particularly started in the Chakri period (1782).  
In the early 1800s, a large number of the Chinese merchants arrived in Bangkok as they 
transformed the small area of Chao Phraya Delta into a major trading city with the support of 
the monarch. The Chinese immigrants also changed the nature of trade in that period as they 
diversified their trade goods and export market. They expanded the trade of elephant tusks and 
specialty timber. They also expanded the market for rice and agriculture goods (e.g., sugar, 
pepper, tobacco) into China and other parts of Asia. They developed processed goods and 
industries such as wood products, metal utensils, dried meats, prepared betel and oil extracts. 
With the growth of private trade, the Monarch withdrew their trade activities and switched into 
taxation. In the late 1820s, King Rama III abolished all of the royal trade monopolies except 
for sugar trade (Phongpaichit & Baker, 1995, pp. 93-94). The close relations between the sugar 
industry and the monarch survived throughout history and had strong influences on the national 
economic strategy as exhibited in the post-1932 Siamese Revolution era.  
The 1932 Siamese Revolution, which transformed the absolute monarchy in Thailand 
into a constitutional monarchy, became a turning point for Thailand on its path in becoming a 
modern state. While Meiji Restoration led to industrial catch-up, the same cannot be said with 
the Thailand modernization period. Hewison (1989) provides a complete history of Thailand’s 
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political and economic development after the 1932 revolution. Aside from the end of the 
absolute monarchy, post-Revolution Thailand also saw the continuation of the aristocrat’s 
economic power, as they kept their rights to collect rents. The domestic ruling elite began a 
nationalist economic strategy through the expansion of state enterprises (e.g., rice mills, salt, 
trading companies, banks, shipping, and so forth). However, the agricultural sector remained 
Thailand’s main priority (37 percent of the state budget went to the agriculture sector), as 
agricultural activities, including animal husbandry, dominated Thailand’s economy (87 percent 
of the population was involved in agriculture in 1937). In addition, between 1932 and 1948, 
most of the new industries established in Thailand dealt with commodities extracted from 
natural resources (e.g., beer, cigarettes, paper, sugar, cement) (Hewison, 1989, p. 66). 
In 1933, the nationalist sentiment within the military government also influenced the 
industrial policy under a self-sufficiency principle. However, self-sufficiency did not directly 
lead to industrial catch-up (i.e., manufacturing upgrading). In this period, the new industrial 
establishments were mostly producing daily goods. For example, the military government 
formed a semi-government-owned company called Thai Niyom Company in 1939, they stated 
that the purpose of the founding was to provide the daily goods made in Thailand for Thai 
people. In the same year, from 285 new industrial establishment founded in Bangkok-
Thonburi, the majority of them produced daily goods such as: tanneries (32 units); power rice 
and timber mills (27 units); textile factory (26 units); food canning and bottling (21 units); 
machinery shops (20 units); and ice factories (12 units). Overall, up until 1942, state investment 
in the industry went mostly to the natural resource-centric sector such as paper and sugar mills, 
silk factories, distilleries and textiles, and glass, hat-making, coconut oil, and farm equipment. 
It did not change much by the end of the decade (Hewison, 1989, pp. 69-71).  
Throughout the 1940s, the Chinese business continued to grow stronger. Despite the 
anti-Chinese sentiment promoted by the military leaders, the civilian political elites from the 
People’s Party continued to use state funds to support the business owned by Chinese-descents. 
The patron-client relations benefited political elites with revenues (Phongpaichit & Baker, 
1995, p. 120). The military coup d’état in 1947 led the politicians to use their power to 
monopolize the banks and business opportunities. The coup was supported by an alliance 
between the Chinese capitalists (e.g., the rice groups, banking businesses) and the military 
group leaders in Thailand. These alliances became the backbone for new trading firms and new 
banks (Phongpaichit & Baker, 1995, p. 125).  
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Thai banks emerged in the 1940s and was dominating the domestic business. In 1957, 
the banks branched into the rural area to facilitate agricultural sector development (e.g., paddy 
and upland crops). Bangkok bank was the most influential bank in this period with close 
connections to the agribusiness and construction sector. When the government lessened of the 
control over rice trade, Bangkok bank continued to finance the major five families who were 
the dominant players in rice trade until the 1970s. They were also involved in textile expansion, 
especially when the textile firms were affected by the 1970s oil crisis. Bangkok Bank-financed 
42 percent of Thailand’s total exports. Another example of influential groups in Thailand is the 
Lamsam group, under cooperation with Thai Farmers Bank, which played a huge role in the 
expansion of the agro-processing business. Overall, in this period, the political economic 
network were mostly banks, military backing, and agriculture and resource-based industries 
(Phongpaichit & Baker, 1995, pp. 132-133).  
 
6.III.a.3. Political Elites’ Consensus on Economic Strategy & Short-Term Economic Strategy 
Since the transformation of Thailand into a modern state, bankers and technocrats 
(Ministry of Finance) have controlled industrialization via a market-friendly approach without 
paying enough attention to the development of indigenous technological capabilities. The 
Thaksin administration (2001-2006) was the first to construct an explicit, vertical industrial 
policy91 in Thailand. However, in the end, the Thaksin government failed to enact this long-
term economic plan to pursue industrial catch-up. Thaksin faced resistance from various actors, 
as he failed to build a broad coalition to support this policy (Intarakumnerd, 2011; Doner, et 
al., 2009). Currently, since Thailand’s economy have failed to transform from an agricultural-
based to an export-oriented manufacturing-based, the majority of its workforce flows in the 
low technology sectors, with 40 percent of the workers remaining in the agricultural sector. 
Furthermore, the manufacturing sector, which already possessed by Thailand, has been relying 
on “technology lending” instead of “technology transfer”92 (ADB 2015, 19). 
The agriculture sector in Thailand had a great deal of political significance since there 
was a close relationship between the state and private capital. The largest shareholders in the 
 
91 This expression refers to a specific policy in which the government provides support for specific industrial 
sectors, particularly the manufacturing sector. Thaksin’s administration promoted industrial competitiveness and 
technological upgrading through continuous investment in research and development activity (Intarakumnerd, 
2011). 
92 In which Thailand possesses a high-technology sector without having a high-technology economy. 
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Thai Rice Company (formed in 1938), for example, were political figures (Hewison, 1989, p. 
75). Two important activities occurred during the post-World War II period: 1) various aid 
arrangements and arms deals with the U.S.; and 2) the expansion of agricultural production, 
which gave rise to large family businesses in rice, sugar production, and sugar mills in the 
1960s93. During the Sarit administration, the strong motivation to reduce manufactured imports 
(selective import ban) was not accompanied by any promotion of domestic manufacturing to 
overcome the consequent shortages94 (Phongpaichit & Baker, 1995; Hewison, 1989). 
The government of Thailand started to pay more attention to manufacturing 
development in the late 1950s, after the end of World War II. However, there was no concrete 
industrial strategy plan. In addition, there was also no emphasis on technology development. 
Nevertheless, there was also no anti-Chinese sentiment in Thailand's industrial policy95. The 
export-oriented strategy was started in the 1970s, however, between 1970 to 1991, Thailand’s 
manufacturing sector was dominated by low-technology subsectors, such as textiles and 
garments. There was also an expansion of MNCs from the 1960s. In 1986, the government of 
Thailand introduced export subsidies and business taxes to attract foreign export-oriented 
manufacturing MNCs. Similar (Rasiah, 2003) to Indonesia, the indigenous automotive sector 
have yet to develop higher technological capabilities (Rasiah, 2003, pp. 55-58). 
Sector Foreign-owned (%) Thai-owned (%) 
Automobiles 55.5 44.5 
Textiles 54.7 45.3 
Petroleum 96.0 4.0 
Cement - 100.0 
Sugar 2.0-10.0 90.0-98.0 
Tin 90.0 10.0 
Steel 20.0 80.0 
Milk 6.0-70.0 30.0 
Soap products 65.0 35.0 
Tab. 6.9 Estimated Ownership of Thailand Manufacturing Industry in 1980  
Source: Table 11 on Hewison (1989), p. 114 
In the late 1950s and the early 1960s, the manufacturing sector started to grow 
remarkably along with the implementation of tariff protection. The share of manufacturing 
 
93 The sugar industry in Thailand has been one of the most influential rural industries in Thailand, with the strong 
presence of the Sugar Barons (oligopoly family), who hold powerful bargaining power with the policymakers 
(Hewison 1989, 137). 
94 In addition, while the original purpose of the ISI policy was to establish industries that would produce originally 
imported goods, the Thai government hoped that ISI would reduce imports (Hewison 1989, 117). 
95 It is important to consider the Thailand monarchy history with the Chinese merchants that can be traced back 
to the 1500s.  
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exports in total exports grew from 1 percent to 31 percent between 1960 to 1981. The 
population worked in the manufacturing sector increased from 3.4 percent to 8 percent from 
1958 to 1980 (Hewison, 1989, p. 101). However, if we pay attention to the establishment of 
manufacturing industries in the 1960s, they are mostly low-technology sectors such as glass 
factories, cement work, downstream iron, steel plants, and paper manufacture. The textile 
industry became the most important sector. These textile firms were the result of agricultural 
sector diversification. Entering the 1970s, the Japanese investment into Thailand grew to 
replace the dominance of the U.S. investment, which mostly in a form of 100 percent ownership 
in petroleum and chemical sectors. The investment from Japanese firms was mostly in the form 
of joint ventures. The Japanese government also offered to reduce trade duties and to increase 
their load to Thailand. As stated before, the textile industries received the largest impact due 
to the close relation between Japanese textile firms with a key figure in the Thai military 
government96 (Phongpaichit & Baker, 1995, pp. 137-138).  
Since Thailand’s inception as a modern state in 1932, the agricultural sector has played 
an important part in Thailand’s economy due to its political clout.97 Throughout Thailand’s 
economic history, the Thaksin administration (2001-2006) represented the first and only period 
in which the government of Thailand pursued industrial catch-up under a long-term industrial 
policy. However, Thaksin ultimately failed to build a broad political coalition to support his 
policy (Doner, et al., 2009; Intarakumnerd, 2011). After the Thaksin administration had ended, 
the government of Thailand constructed a national economic strategy around a self-sufficiency 
philosophy,98 in which the national STI policy sought to develop agriculture, energy and 
resource efficiency, and a green economy. A report by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 
2015 states that Thailand continued to rely mostly on technology lending, as the majority of its 
workforce was still in low-technology sectors and mostly the agricultural sector (ADB, 2015, 
p. 19). 
 
 
96 Pramanrn Adireksarn, from the Rachakhru military faction, was the key figure who facilitated a joint venture 
between Japanese textile groups (e.g., Toray, Teijin, Kanebo), and the local partners, as he became a major 
shareholder himself  (Phongpaichit & Baker, 1995, pp. 137-138). 
97 Hewison (1989) and Phongpaichit and Baker (1995) are two important works on Thailand’s economic history 
which cover the expansion of the agricultural sectors in Thailand (e.g., rice, sugar). 
98 It was initiated by His Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadev as a strategy to cope with the aftermath of the 
1997/98 Asian Financial Crisis. 
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6.III.b. Post-Critical Juncture Period: The Continuation of Strategy  
Since 2007, four volumes of the National Economic and Social Development Plan 
(NESDP)99 have placed a high priority on the agricultural development sector. Hence, it often 
emphasized that global environmental problems, such as food security and energy security, 
have the potential to threaten their agricultural products (The Office of the National Economic 
and Social Development Board of Thailand, 2012, p. ii). By 2017, the Twelfth NESDP (2017-
2021) stated that the first sectoral priority of the national research agenda were food, 
agriculture, and the biotechnological industry (The Office of the National Economic and Social 
Development Board of Thailand, 2017, p. 18). The latest twenty-years national plan (i.e., the 
National Strategy 2018-2037) also re-confirms that the government of Thailand’s aims to 
increase national competitiveness through strategies based on agricultural value-added 
exploration, tourism diversification, and resource-based development (The Office of the 
National Economic and Social Development Board of Thailand, 2018, pp. 6-7). 
 The National Science, Technology, and Innovation Policy and Plan 2012-2021 states 
that there are two main sectoral priorities: biotechnology and nanotechnology. Upon a closer 
look, the main goals of these two sectoral priorities are to support sufficiency in agriculture, 
resource efficiency, health, and environmental protection (National Science, Technology, and 
Innovation Policy Office of Thailand, 2019). The majority of the STI projects reported by the 
National Science and Technology Development Agency of Thailand in 2017 were natural 
resource-centric technology development projects (Tab. 6.10). In 2018, the government of 
Thailand released Thailand 4.0, an economic development model, as their national strategy to 
“unlock the country from a middle-income trap” and “advance the country towards the first 
work country within the context of the 4th industrial revolution” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Thailand, 2018). However, the focus of the government of Thailand is more on digitalization 
and adoption of ICT (e.g., smart farming) instead of on developing indigenous manufacturing 
technology. 
Categories Programs (Outputs) 
Smart Farm nutritious and anti-oxidant rich Riceberry, flash-flooding tolerant Homcholasit rice 
for the community, diagnostic kits for shrimp diseases to minimize risk and increase 
farmers’ income, and Agri-Map: a tool for agricultural management. 
Smart Food Dezigner-8: an innovative delivery system to enhance egg quality, low-fat 
frankfurter, and Active PAKTM fresh produce packaging. 
Smart Health Dentii Scan: a scanner for dental and maxillofacial structures, safety- enhanced 
ambulance cabin to save lives and medical equipment, and Thai School Lunch to 
 
99 This paper investigates the tenth (2007), eleventh (2012), and twelfth (2017) National Economic and Social 
Development Plans published by the Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board, the national 
economic planning agency of Thailand.  
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help schools prepare lunch menus to meet nutritional requirements and available 
budget. 
Smart Energy nanomaterial coating and coating technique to enhance solar thermal energy 
efficiency. 
Smart Industry NETPIE: a platform to facilitate interconnecting IoT devices, and ENZease: a duo-
activity enzyme for one-step biodesizing and bioscouring process of cotton fabric, 
100% replacement of chemicals. 
Organization Agricultural Technology and Innovation Management Institute (AGRITEC), was 
founded under NSTDA, to facilitate the transfer of technologies to farmers. 
AGRITEC now works with 220 communities in 45 provinces, covering 36 key 
technologies. Some outstanding projects include organic rice cultivation in 
Yasothon province and greenhouse technology with photo selective plastic 
covering. 
Tab. 6.10 STI Projects in 2017 as Reported by NTSDA 
Source: (The National Science Technology Development Agency of Thailand, 2018, p. 8) 
 
Agenda 1. Prepare Thais 
4.0 for Thailand 
becoming a first world 
nation 
1. Reform education system to prepare Thais for Thailand becoming a first world 
nation 
2. Setup skills development program 
3. Measures to support Refill and Reform strategy to improve the status of Thais 
1.0-2.0 (poverty cycle) 
Agenda 2. Development 
of Technology Cluster 
and Future Industries 
5 Groups of Technology and Targeted Industries: 
(1) Food, Agriculture and Bio-Tech 
(2) Health, Wellness and Biomedical 
(3) Smart Devices and Robotics – Mechatronics 
(4) Digital, Internet of Things (loT), Artificial Intelligence and Embedded 
Technology  
(5) Creativity, Culture and High-Value Services 
Agenda 3. Incubate 
Entrepreneurs and 
Develop Networks of 
Innovation-Driven 
Enterprise 
1. A shift from traditional farmers to” Smart Farmer” 
2. A transformation of traditional SMEs into “Smart SMEs” 
3. A switch from traditional services to “High Value Services” 
4. Startup development promotion 
Agenda 4. Strengthening 
the Internal Economy 
through the Mechanisms 
of 18 Provincial Clusters 
and 76 Provinces 
18 Provincial Clusters: 
o Upper Northern Region 1: Creative Cluster and Agricultural and Food 
Innopolis 
o Upper Northern Region 2: Gateway to GMS and ASEAN+3 and Green 
Tourism Destination 
o Lower Northern Region 1: Indo-China Trade and Service Center and 
Gateway to Myanmar 
o Lower Northern Region 2: Rice Business Center and Heritage Tourism 
Destination 
o Upper Northeastern Region 1: GMS Trading Center and Gateway to 
Eastern ASEAN & China 
o Upper Northeastern Region 2: Agricultural and Livestock Center and 
Northeastern Green Tourism Destination 
o Middle Northeastern Region: Northeastern Agricultural Food Innopolis 
and Logistics Hub 
o Lower Northeastern Region 1: Khmer Civilization and Sport Creative 
Cluster and Agricultural Trading Center 
o Lower Northeastern Region 2: World Jasmine Rice Production Center 
and Gateway to Eastern ASEAN 
o Upper Central Region 1: Cultural Heritage Tourism Hub and Food 
Innopolis 
o Upper Central Region 2: Organic Food Production Base 
o Middle Central Region: Green Industry Hub, Green Tourism, and 
Gateway to ASEAN & Global 
o Lower Central Region 1: Western Creative Tourism and Trade 
Destination 
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o Lower Central Region 2: Seafood and Agricultural Trade Center and 
Global Tourism Destination 
o Eastern Region: Organic Fruits & Clean Industry, and Medical Tourism 
Destination 
o Southern Region (Gulf of Thailand): Southern Agricultural Trading 
Center (Rubber, Oil Palm, Fruits) 
o Southern Region (Andaman Coast): World Class Tourism, and Creative 
Cluster – City of Gastronomy 
o Southern Border Region: Agricultural and Food Innopolis (Rubber, 
Fishery, Halal Food) 
5 Innovation Hub: 
⇒Innovation Hub for Agriculture and Food 
⇒Innovation Hub for Aging Society 
⇒Development of a Smart City 
⇒Innovation Hub for Smart Energy 
⇒Creative Hub for Creative Economy 
Agenda 5. Integrating 
with ASEAN and 
Connecting Thailand to 
the Global Community 
1. Positioning Thailand as a Trading Nation and one of Asia’s Business Centers: 
2. Economic Integration in CLMVT Context 
3. International Business Models in the 21st Century 
Tab. 6.11 Five Agendas of Thailand 4.0 and Its Targets Related to Industrial and STI 
Development and ASEAN Economic Community 
Source: (Royal Thai Embassy, Washington D.C. , 2019) 
Overall, the case of Thailand shows how the agricultural sector, supported by banks, 
plays a vital role in the economic development strategy. The agricultural sector in Thailand has 
had high political value for the elites. Similar to Malaysia and Indonesia, the industrial growth 
in Thailand relies on the MNCs. There is no challenge against political survival. Political elites 
(i.e., the military) survival, and their power grows, has been supported by the agriculture 
sectors, banks, and foreign capital or the MNCs-driven industrial growth. There is a lack of 
urgency to pursue a costly long-term indigenous technology-driven industrial catch-up. 
6.IV. The Case of Indonesia 
 Indonesia is the third case of a medium level of urgency from Southeast Asia. As 
presented in the first section, Indonesia has the weakest relative income growth and 
manufacturing sector performances despite that they are the largest economy (i.e., geographical 
size, population size, and abundant resources). Generally, I found that among the three 
Southeast Asian cases, the political elites in Indonesia has got the weakest level of urgency to 
pursue an indigenous-technology driven industrial catch-up since their critical juncture period, 
due to various historical events within both the global-external circumstances and domestic 
circumstances. The critical juncture period in Indonesia was their early independent years 
(since 1945) and the New Order regime system (1961-1998). This was the period where the 
political elites started to establish their power. There are two key elements developed within 
this critical juncture period. The first element was the failed attempt of Sukarno’s nationalist 
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economic strategy under the Old Order period, which was built under the context of new state 
development and anti-colonialism sentiments. The second element was the birth and expansion 
of natural resource oligarchs during the New Order period, which was under the context of the 
economic failure of the previous Old Order regime. The case of Indonesia shows how a 
medium level of urgency was a result of the interaction between mixed global-external 
circumstances and unconducive domestic circumstances, which offers different combination 
with Malaysia nor Thailand.  
 
6.IV.a. Critical Juncture Period: From the Old to New Order 
6.IV.a.1. Global-External Circumstances 
Overall, the global-external circumstances during Indonesia’s critical juncture period 
showed a similar characteristic to Malaysia and Thailand. During the colonial period and prior 
to the start of World War II, Indonesia was benefitted from the incentive it got from 
international trade due to their abundant resources. Colonial Indonesia was an important 
economic entity during the Age of Commerce. International maritime trade in this era was a 
prominent feature especially for the archipelago Southeast Asia throughout the 14th until the 
16th century. The merchant capitalism during that period, led by a combination of the European 
colonial power and the Chinese merchants, was driven by the spices and pepper as the 
important trade commodities. International maritime trade was followed by the growth of 
production areas and commercial centers that started from the areas near the ports. The spread 
of cloves and pepper production around Southeast Asia in the 16th century, including Indonesia, 
were due to the increasing demand particularly from the Dutch, English, Chinese, and 
Portuguese buyers (fig. 6.11 and fig. 6.12). The maritime trade shaped the structure of the 
Southeast Asian cities100 (Reid, 1988). 
 
100 Banten, and most of the other major cities like Melaka, Jakarta-Batavia, Gresik, Makassar, Ternate, were built 
to maximize the advantage of shipping and to welcome the foreign traders’ need (Reid, 1988, p. 85). 
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Fig. 6.11 Estimated Export to Europe during 
the Age of Commerce: Spices 
Source: Reid (1988: p. 14) 
Fig. 6.12 Estimated Export to Europe during 
the Age of Commerce: Pepper 
Source: Reid (1988: p. 21) 
 
 Moreover, similar to Malaysia, Indonesia’s involvement in the regional conflict in the 
early independent years, did not provoke a national level threat as it did not originate from nor 
provoked by any regional major power. In post-colonial Indonesia, particularly in the aftermath 
of World War II, there was a wave of rising nationalism in Southeast Asia under the context of 
decolonization. There was a dramatic emergence of new nation-states across Asia and Africa 
whose self-determinism sourced from their respective colonial experiences101. This was 
accompanied by vast international recognitions. The period of 1949 to 1965 in Indonesia was 
the period when the domestic political elites’ main objective was to dismantle the colonial 
economic structure, particularly the dominance of Dutch and Chinese bourgeoise (Berger, 
1997; Robinson, 2009). 
Overall, due to the wave of anti-colonialism that spread in Asia and Africa, as well as 
under the import-substitution trend in Latin America102, the political elites in the early 
independent years of Indonesia also took protectionist measurement instead of opening up to 
foreign capital. However, later due to the later failure of the strategy taken by the political elites 
in the first two decades after Indonesia’s independence, Suharto, who took over the government 
 
101 Unlike the cases of Argentina and Brazil in Latin America, however, the political elites in the independent 
Southeast Asian countries were not originated from the colonial motherland. As consequences, later on, the next 
part, we can see how this led to the nationalist ambition anti-foreign sentiment among the political elites in 
Indonesia during the Old Order administration, which was manifested in the effort to develop indigenous capital 
and import-substitution policy dedicated to reducing imports. 
102 It is important to note that in the 1950s, the post-Great Depression political elites in the Latin American 
countries took a protectionist approach. One of the important events that marked this trend was the creation of the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (UNECLAC) in 1948, which was 
also related to the dependency theory.  
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and established the New Order regime, decided to take a different approach and opened up to 
the flow of foreign capital. Here, the two oil shocks in the early and late 1970s contributed to 
a high government revenue which lessened the need to pursue an indigenous technology-driven 
industrial catch-up. However, the 1980s Oil Gut affected the national economy severely that 
the government started to pursue industrialization. Yet, at the same time, Indonesia has also 
been heavily benefited from the expansion of the Japanese production network since the 
1980s103, especially after the 1985 Plaza Accord. A combination of these dynamics contributed 
to a mixed characteristic of global-external circumstances in Indonesia’s critical juncture 
period. Later on, the lack of urgency to pursue a technology-driven industrial catch-up strategy 
continues despite the opportunities presented by the ASEAN Economic Community regime in 
the late 2000s. Similar to Malaysia, the 2000s Palm Oil boom have also weakened the level of 
urgency in the post-critical juncture period.  
 
6.IV.a.2. Domestic Circumstances 
Overall, similar to Malaysia, the domestic circumstances in Indonesia during the critical 
juncture period was characterized by abundant natural resources. However, Indonesia muchly 
benefitted from oil revenue, particularly after the 1970s oil shock. Initially, Indonesia’s lack of 
national unity was similar to Malaysia, due to its colonial legacy in the socio-economic 
structure. While the case of the 1969 Racial Riots forced the political elites in Malaysia to rely 
on foreign capital to boost the Bumiputera’s job opportunities in manufacturing sector, the anti-
Chinese policy in the 1950s Indonesia under Sukarno was also accompanied by an anti-foreign 
capital sentiment. As a result, the Indonesian economic continued to decline. When Suharto 
took over the government from Sukarno in the 1960s, he opened the country for foreign capital 
especially in the labor-intensive sector and the oil sector. The oil revenue supported the high 
government spending on agricultural sector. 
  After their Independence, Indonesia faced internal instability and intra-national 
revolts, particularly if we consider its archipelago-based structure. The early domestic ruling 
elites in Indonesia originated from the vast nationalist movement whose agenda was to stand 
against the colonial government (Anderson 1983). After Indonesia’s independence from the 
Dutch in 1945, these ruling political elites faced the occurrence of intra-national (regional) 
 
103 Akamatsu’s Flying Geese concept gained global popularity in the 1960s.  
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revolts across the archipelago (Allen 1970). The Sukarno administration mostly promoted a 
nationalist economic stance, focusing on the absorption of foreign assets which was fully 
achieved by 1963. Consequently, this led to the increasing power and organization of the army. 
The authoritarian regime which was established between 1957 to 1960s saw the rise of the 
military. The military had a strategic position in the Cabinet, the Supreme Advisory Council, 
the Parliament and also in the regional-local bureaucracy. They also managed to secure access 
to state oil companies and trading enterprises (Robinson, 2009, pp. 66-67). The army leaders 
also built close ties with the U.S.-backed Suharto, the first commander of the Army Strategic 
Reserve (KOSTRAD), who assumed power from Sukarno through a 1966 coup (Anderson, 
1983). 
The Suharto’s New Order regime (1966-1998) was the key period to understand 
Indonesia’s economic growth and industrialization. His economic strategy was a reaction 
towards what had happened in the previous Old Order. Previously, the Old Order had 
established a new socio-economic and political structure in Indonesia Between 1949 to 1965. 
It built up patron-client relations between the political parties (e.g., the Communist Party, the 
Nationalist Party, and the Islamic parties), the merchant bourgeoise and the banks. Initially, 
between 1949 to 1959, the political elites had had no political capabilities to establish a 
coherent set of policies and to organize capital formation. The domestic capitalist classes were 
mostly in petty trading and commodity production (Robinson, 2009, pp. 37-38).  
As a whole, there was a consensus to avoid dependence on foreign capital and built up 
indigenous capital in the early years of post-independence Indonesia. However, in 1952 the 
government started to develop a friendlier approach to foreign capital. Wilopo, as the leader of 
the Nationalist Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia), stated that Indonesia's industrial 
development would take place under the support of foreign capital and foreign exports 
(Robinson, 2009, p. 39). The government started to establish various banks104 as they were 
taking over some profitable enterprises. While the government did promote the creation of a 
national industrialized economy, the government only provided infrastructure and finance for 
the growth of indigenous (non-Chinese Indonesian) bourgeoise. For example, the Indonesian 
 
104 Between 1949 to 1957, the government involved in several important economic activities. The government 
established a central bank, which has resulted in the transition from Java Bank into Bank of Indonesia. They also 
established State Industrial Bank or the BIN, which was merged with other banks into Mandiri Bank, and State 
Bank of Indonesia or BNI). Through these banks, the government started to finance state corporations in the 
industrial sector such as cement production, textiles, automobile assembly, glass and bottle manufacture 
(Robinson, 2009, p. 40).  
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government did not allow the Chinese-Indonesian owner to become a member of the boards of 
rice milling companies. Another government’s effort to foster the growth of indigenous 
importers in the 1950s was the Benteng program105 (i.e., reserving license) (Robinson, 2009, 
pp. 41-42).  
Alien enterprises using Alien capital IDR 90 million 
National enterprises using all or part Alien capital IDR 26 million 
National enterprises using “warga negara” 
(Indonesian Chinese) capital 
IDR 24 million 
National enterprises using indigenous capital IDR 5 million 
Tab. 6.12 Estimation of Capital Ownership in the Weaving Industry in Bandung in the late 
1950s based on Its Sources 
Source: (Robinson, 2009, p. 44) 
However, all of those efforts were not followed by the significant growth of the 
indigenous capital. The Chinese-Indonesian population remained economically dominant as 
they expanded their ownership in the agricultural estates. By 1952 they owned 19 percent of 
estates in Java. Meanwhile, a large number of the government-financed indigenous enterprises 
were failing due to misuse of government credit (Robinson, 2009, pp. 42-43). Due to the 
continuing dominance of Chinese-Indonesian capitals, the political parties also undertook 
business ventures with Chinese-Indonesian partners as it became the main source of 
revenues106 for these political parties. Later, the legacy of Benteng program became the basis 
of politico-business oligarchs that developed in the New Order period (more on Chapter 7).  
 
105 Initially, the program was part of the Urgency Plan in the Natsir Cabinet (September 1950 – March 1951). In 
this period, the government granted access to Benteng program membership only for the new indigenous 
Indonesian importers. The government provided credit through BNI. It was heavily promoted later on by the 
Minister of Economic Affair in the Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet (August 1953 – November 1954) with the main 
objective to secure indigenous dominance in the import sector. The government sought to transform the import 
sector as the base for indigenous capital accumulation. Throughout time, the recipients of the Benteng credit were 
the individuals with a close connection to the powerful bureaucrats who failed to repay the BNI credit. This was 
the start of close networking between political elites’ indigenous merchant bourgeoisie and a group of licensed 
brokers and political fixers (Robinson, 2009, p. 44). 
106 The majority of the parliament members from the Indonesian Nationalist Party or PNI (i.e., 59.6 percent) had 
a business interest. Several examples of prominent bureaucrats with close relations with the business sector were: 
Herling Laoh, a former cabinet minister, with the construction companies (N.V. Perintis and N.V. Paka); Moh. 
Tabrani, former director of National Public Bank, with his partnership with N.V. Indonesian bottlers or the Coca 
Cola franchise holder and N.V. Indos Knitting Factory. Other parties such as the Masyumi and Socialist Party of 
Indonesia had close relations with banks (Robinson, 2009, pp. 49-50). Another example of an important party 
client was the Sumatran businessman, such as Hashim Ning, who benefitted from his close relations with Moh. 
Hatta who was Indonesia’s first Vice President (1945-56), third Prime Minister (1948-49), fourth Minister of 
Defense (1949-1950), and forth Foreign Minister (1949-50). During the colonial period, Ning worked in Dutch 
automobile importer N.V. Velodome. In the post-Independent Indonesia, he took over the Velodome Motors. He 
continued to import automobile as he was securing military contracts. Later he established Daha Motors, a sole 
agency for Fiat cars. He was also involved in another business such as oil (Robinson, 2009, pp. 54-55).  
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 Overall, the Old Order saw the birth of patron-client relations between the political 
elites and the large business. The member of political parties moved into the business sector 
and banking in the 1950s. With their effort to boost up the indigenous capital by targeting 
specific sectors such as banking and infrastructure, they failed to support the industrial sector. 
There was a capital shortage and a decline in foreign earnings. Entering the 1960s, the 
government implemented the Eight-Year Plan, which heavily relied on oil, rubber, and 
commodity exports to fund public welfare projects (Robinson, 2009, p. 1974). The absorption 
of foreign assets was achieved fully by 1963 with a price of dissatisfaction within the military, 
which also increased the cohesion within the army. The army leaders also built close ties with 
the U.S.-backed Suharto, the first commander of the Army Strategic Reserve (KOSTRAD), 
assumed power from Sukarno through a 1966 coup d’état. Suharto’s “New Order” regime 
(1966-1998) covered a key period in Indonesia’s economic growth and industrialization. He 
inherited a state that was too weak and chaotic to rely on domestic capital. Faced with 
hyperinflation, stabilization of prices and restoration of balance in society were his main 
priorities. In order to accomplish these tasks, he needed external support (e.g., MNCs and 
FDIs). These foreign economic institutions provided the government with the revenues they 
required (e.g., taxes, commissions) without being accompanied by political ambitions, which 
might have accompanied by assistances from powerful indigenous business class (Anderson, 
1983, p. 489). 
 
6.III.a.3. Political Elites’ Consensus on Economic Strategy & Short-Term Economic Strategy 
An anti-foreign sentiment in the Sukarno administration resulted in the lack of 
government support to indigenous firms, particularly the overseas Chinese private business. 
When Suharto took over the government in 1966, he started to promote the private sectors, 
mostly the labor-intensive resource-based import-substitution industries, particularly oil 
industries. The export-oriented strategy was introduced in 1978 but the government continued 
to emphasize the import-substitution policy until the mid-1980s. The government promoted 
import substitution policy for industries in liquified natural gas, oil refining, metals, 
petrochemicals, fertilizers, and machineries. Unlike the Northeast Asian cases, the import 
substitution policy was not followed by any strategy to develop the indigenous technology. 
However, similar to the other Southeast Asian cases, the export-oriented industries were mostly 
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driven by foreign firms which had relocated their lower value-added production to Southeast 
Asia (Rasiah, 2003, pp. 31-36). 
For the next 32 years, Suharto’s New Order administration (1966-1998) favored 
agriculture development more than other developing countries did in that same period since 
they had benefited from high oil revenue. In the early 1960s, almost three-quarters of 
Indonesians were employed in the agricultural sector. The New Order government provided 
large subsidies for agricultural inputs (e.g., fertilizers, pesticides) and the stabilization of the 
price of rice and made large investments in rural infrastructure. Indonesia only shifted into 
resource-based manufacturing and labor-intensive manufacturing in 1980s due to the fall of oil 
and rubber prices, followed by a sharp rise in deficit (Temple, 2001). 
The New Order government instituted policy reforms for the banking sector in 1983 
and 1988, as well as liberalizing regulations for exporters in 1986, which followed by a gradual 
lift on tariff barriers. In the mid-1980s, labor-intensive exports became a significant engine of 
growth. However, an increase in foreign ownership within the manufacturing sectors following 
the 1980s was not followed by the national government’s pursuit of industrial catch-up, nor 
support for private enterprise development. After the mid-1970s, the Suharto administration 
with B.J. Habibie as the main figure, aimed to develop a strategic-defense industry, but they 
came up against the merchant mentality of the big businesses in Indonesia (Amir, 2007, p. 79). 
The New Order government invested in this strategic-defense sector through various 
government agencies (e.g., the Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology, 
Agency for the Management of Strategic Industry, National Research Council, and Advanced 
Technology and Aeronautical Technology107). 
Sector 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 
All sectors 30 22 22 29 39 36 
Food and beverages 21 12 8 11 16 22 
Textile, clothing, and footwear 22 29 17 24 35 34 
Wood products 12 13 10 12 9 14 
Paper products 13 9 30 32 12 28 
Chemicals  42 27 34 41 46 33 
Non-metal products 55 41 21 25 38 35 
Iron and steel 32 19 24 43 39 24 
Machinery, automotive, etc 44 29 46 44 66 63 
Other 60 41 20 62 48 30 
Tab. 6.13 Share of Foreign Ownership in MVA (%) in Indonesia 
Source: (Aspinall & Fealy, 2010, p. 55) 
 
107 This was a special division within Pertamina, Indonesian state-owned oil and Natural Gas Corporation. 
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Following Temple’s (2001) argument, the key problems that New Order Indonesia 
faced were Suharto’s power and the lack of political competition, as the government relied on 
a combination of political patronage (crony capitalism and rent-seeking activities), violence, 
and political repression, which resulted in peripheral poverty. One important key to 
understanding Indonesian political-economic dynamics is the oligarchy thesis. Prominent 
studies such as Robinson and Hadiz (2005), Hadiz and Robinson (2013), and Winters (2013), 
discuss thoroughly on how the New Order regime gave birth to politico-business oligarchs, 
which survived both reforms in the 1980s and 1998. These politico-business oligarchs have 
taken benefits from Indonesia rich natural resources (e.g., forest products, oil, gas, and 
minerals)108.  
When the 1997/98 crisis hit, the pro-democracy movement seized the momentum to 
overthrow Suharto’s regime (Aspinall & Fealy, 2010). However, in contrast to South Korea, 
where student reform was followed by institutional reform, the 1998 reformation movement 
also signaled the rise of populism (the people against the elite), which took advantage of anti-
Suharto sentiments. Along with the rise of populism, Hadiz (2012) argues that the collapse of 
the regime was not followed by an emergence of ‘a cohesive coalition of reformist interest’, 
instead the old predatory behaviors were cultivated as money politics usually follows during 
electoral processes (p. 72). After B.J. Habibie’s failure to continue the high-technology 
projects, anti-New Order sentiment caused the ruling elite to return to an agriculture-centered 
economic strategy. Since 2004, the Indonesian government has been promoting resource-based 
economic planning under the “Maritime and Agrarian Comparative Advantage” idea 
(Warburton, 2016; Warburton, 2018). The Indonesian government currently promotes self-
sufficiency in food and agricultural development heavily.  
 
6.IV.b. Post-Critical Juncture Period: The Continuation of Strategy 
Since 2004, the Indonesian government has been promoting resource-based economic 
planning to pursue a “Maritime and Agrarian Competitive Advantage,” as stated in the 2005-
 
108 Gellert (2005) and Seda (2005) explores how the oil and gas and forestry sectors became the source of wealth 
for large state-owned enterprises (e.g., Pertamina, PT. Telkom, PT. Indosat) and natural resource-based 
conglomerates (e.g., Bob Hasan, Prajogo Pangestu, Eka Tjipta Wijaja). According to Winters (2013) and Morse 
(2019), the major natural-resource oligarchs from the New Order period remain influential in the current 
Indonesian political parties. Morse (2019) points out that there is a lack of debate on natural resource policy in 
the recent 2019 election in Indonesia. I provide more information about the oligarchy thesis in the next chapter.  
 164 
2025 Long-Term National Development Plan (Ministry of National Development Planning of 
the Republic of Indonesia, 2005). The current Indonesian government, under President Joko 
Widodo (since 2014), has constructed the Nawa Cita strategy using the same main idea. As 
presented in the 2015-2019 Medium-Term National Development Plan, this particular strategy 
prioritizes agro-industry, wood and forestry, fisheries, and mining to accelerate national 
economic growth (Ministry of National Development Planning of the Republic of Indonesia, 
2014a). With the main focus on maritime and agrarian sectors, the Indonesian government 
emphasized the danger of a mass flow of foreign products into the Indonesian market when the 
ASEAN Economic Community went into effect in 2016, which has the potency to harm local 
producers, particularly the agricultural sector and SMEs (Ministry of National Development 
Planning of the Republic of Indonesia, 2014b, p. 5.6). Additionally, instead of an industrial 
catch-up, the government of Indonesia sought to push for Indonesian leadership in the regional 
maritime sector and connectivity sectors (e.g., maritime security, maritime resources, maritime 
food security, maritime tourism, fisheries) (Ministry of National Development Planning of the 
Republic of Indonesia, 2014b, pp. 5.27-2.28). 
Research Area 
Priority Rank Based on Development Period 
2015-
2019 
2020-
2024 
2025-
2030 
2030-
2034 
2035-
2039 
2040-
2044 
Natural resource-based technology 1 6 5 4 3 2 
Natural resource-based advance 
technology 
2 1 6 5 4 3 
Applied technology in manufacture 3 2 1 6 5 4 
Applied technology in services 4 3 2 1 6 5 
High technology 5 4 3 2 1 6 
Frontier technology 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Tab. 6.14 Indonesian National Research Priority Agenda (2015-2044) 
Notes: This priority rank refers to government’s budget allocation (from first to sixth as 
follows: 40 per cent, 20 per cent, 15 per cent, 12.5 per cent, 7.5 per cent, and 5 per cent). 
Source: National Research Plan 2015-2045 Version 3.5.2. (Ministry of Research Technology 
and Higher Education of the Republic of Indonesia, 2016a, p. 34) 
In 2018, the Ministry of Industry released a new national industrial strategy called 
“Making Indonesia 4.0.” The ministry aims to promote five main sectors: 1) Food and 
Beverages; 2) Textile and Clothes; 3) Automotive; 4) Chemical, and 5) Electronics. This short 
document shows that the government of Indonesia continues to rely on MNCs (i.e., by offering 
tax incentives) to drive the medium and high-technology manufacturing sectors (i.e., 
automotive and electronics) (Ministry of Industry of the Republic of Indonesia, 2018, p. 7). 
Instead of aiming to be a champion for higher manufacturing sectors, the documents state that 
the government seeks to transform Indonesia into a powerhouse for food and beverage industry 
in ASEAN and a world-class clothing producer (Ministry of Industry of the Republic of 
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Indonesia, 2018, pp. 4-5). In addition, similar to what has happened in Thailand and Malaysia, 
the industry 4.0. documents discuss mostly digitalization and the implementation of industry 
4.0. technologies instead of indigenous manufacturing technology development. 
The National Research Plan 2015-2045 states that there are seven priority fields109 on 
the Indonesian National Research and Technology Agenda: 1) Food Security; 2) Energy and 
New Energy; 3) Health and Medicine; 4) Transportation; 5) ICT; 6) Defense and Security 
Technology; and 7) Advanced Materials (Ministry of Research Technology and Higher 
Education of the Republic of Indonesia, 2016a, p. 39). Table 9 shows that the prioritization of 
resource-based industries continues. The National Research Plan 2015-2045, in particular, 
emphasizes the food and pharmaceutical industries, cosmetics, and the health equipment 
industry as priority industries that need support from technology development (Ministry of 
Research Technology and Higher Education of the Republic of Indonesia, 2016a, p. 26). The 
prioritization of resource-based technology development has also been manifested in various 
STI policy programs implemented by the Ministry of Research, Technology, and Higher 
Education of the Republic of Indonesia110.  
Overall, the case of Indonesia shows that the political coalitions that became the 
foundation for the natural resource-centric strategy were established in the critical juncture 
period. The coalitions only grow more influential in the post-critical juncture period. Various 
changes that have the potential to disturb the system (e.g., oil crisis, the student movement, 
financial crisis, political reform) did occur. Still, it only makes the natural resource-centric 
strategy gain more popularity. The political elites have not made any shift to pursue a costly 
long-term indigenous technology-driven industrial catch-up strategy. The presence of MNCs 
drives industrial growth as the government neglects indigenous manufacturing sector 
development. In the next chapter, I use the case of Indonesia to deeply elaborate on how the 
political elites built up public legitimacy over this natural resource-centric strategy. 
 
  
 
109 The 2017 version of this document adds three more priority fields: maritime research, disaster management, 
and social humanities. The. Maritime research mostly aims to develop a maritime economy, such as fisheries, bio-
technology maritime, tourism, ships. (Ministry of Research Technology and Higher Education of the Republic of 
Indonesia, 2017, pp. 73,76, 82).     
110 I provide more details on the STI policy programs and budget in Indonesia in the next chapter. 
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6.V. Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia: Medium Urgency to Pursue Industrial Catch-
Up Strategy 
 
 Critical Juncture Period Post-Critical 
Juncture 
Period 
Global-External 
Circumstances 
Domestic Circumstances Political Elites 
Consensus 
M
A
L
A
Y
S
IA
 
U
N
C
O
N
D
U
C
IV
E
 
Incentives from 
international trade 
(Colonial period 
trade; the expansion 
of Japanese global 
production network) 
M
IX
E
D
 
▪ Natural resource-rich 
(Agriculture-sector; Forest 
products; and later oil) 
▪ Stable coalitional politics 
under Barisan Nasional 
▪ 1969 Racial Riots (Legacy 
of European colonial 
Japanese Occupation) and 
economic inequality between 
Chinese Malay and 
Bumiputera 
 
1969 Racial Riots provoked 
the need to boost up 
manufacturing sector growth 
Patron-Client: 
Government – Foreign 
Capital – Bumiputera 
 
MNC-driven 
manufacturing growth 
Unstable 
politics in Post-
Mahathir and 
Palm-oil boom 
resulted in a 
shift of 
government 
prioritization 
into resource-
based sector 
T
H
A
IL
A
N
D
 
M
IX
E
D
 
Strategic position for 
the big powers & 
Incentives from 
international trade 
(Trade with Chinese 
Merchants; World 
War II & Japan’s 
interest; Cold War & 
the U.S.’ interest; the 
expansion of 
Japanese global 
production network) 
M
IX
E
D
 
▪ Natural resource-rich 
(Agriculture-sector 
particularly rice and sugar; 
forest products) 
▪ Unity under Monarchy that 
was supported by Chinese-
Merchants but fraction with 
Military 
▪ Monarchy close relations 
with natural-resource 
oligarchs and merchants 
Patron-Client: 
Government – Foreign 
Capital – Bankers – 
Sugar Oligarchs 
 
MNC-driven 
manufacturing 
growth; Resource-
centric strategy 
(expansion of 
agriculture from 
foreign capital 
support) 
Thaksin’s 
failed effort to 
promote 
vertical 
industrial 
policy 
IN
D
O
N
E
S
IA
 
M
IX
E
D
 
Incentives from 
international trade  
(Age of Commerce 
and Archipelago 
Southeast Asia; the 
expansion of 
Japanese global 
production network) 
 
1980s Oil Glut 
disturbed 
government revenue 
and forced the 
regime to promote 
manufacturing sector 
U
N
C
O
N
D
U
C
IV
E
 
▪ Natural resource-rich 
(Agriculture-sector; forest 
products; Oil-revenue) 
▪ Domestic instability as new 
state with archipelago 
structure (Separatism 
movements) 
▪ New Order regime coalition 
with foreign capital and 
natural resource sector 
oligarchs. 
Patron-Client: 
Government – Foreign 
Capital Natural resource 
oligarch 
 
MNC-driven 
manufacturing 
growth; Resource-
centric strategy 
(agricultural subsidies 
from oil revenues) 
Failure in high-
technology 
pursuit in the 
end of New 
Order leads to 
heavy 
promotion of 
resource-
centric sector 
Tab. 6.15 Medium Level of Urgency 
Source: Author 
  
The three Southeast Asian cases present how the initial conditions led to the emergence 
of political coalitions behind the selection of natural resource-oriented development strategy. 
This strategic choice, which was less costly and provided faster revenue, contributed to the 
emergence and survival of natural resource oligarchs. Unlike the two Latin American countries, 
the development timing of the three Southeast Asian countries coincided with the 
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industrialization wave across the world and the expansion of the global production network 
(i.e., started with Japanese MNCs). This contributed to better manufacturing sector growth vis 
a vis Latin American cases. Yet similarly, this only led to a neglection over indigenous 
manufacturing sector development. The national innovation systems in all three cases are 
characterized by resource-centric technology development. This is reflected in their 
manufacturing sector performance, patent characteristics, and the list of large enterprises, 
which offers a contrast with the case of South Korea. 
Table 6.15. summarizes the three Southeast Asian cases. In comparison to the Northeast 
Asian and Latin American cases, I find that the global-external circumstances and domestic 
circumstances in the three Southeast Asian countries were somewhere between conducive and 
unconducive (i.e., mixed). Initially, the political elites in the three countries faced unconducive 
global-external and unconducive domestic circumstances in their early formation as a nation-
state. However, the political elites started to see the importance of manufacturing sector growth 
due to some developments in the global-external and domestic circumstances (i.e., the 1970 
Racial Riots in Malaysia, the oil crisis in the 1970s and 1980s, the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis, 
and also the opportunities from the ASEAN Economic Community since 2007). Yet, these 
changes also allowed or enabled the political elites to rely on the MNCs (i.e., foreign capital) 
as the main drivers for manufacturing growth. By doing this, the political elites maintain their 
patron-client relations with the natural resource sectors particularly as the 2000s palm oil boom 
have benefited the Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia. As we can 
observe, the political elites in the post-critical juncture period continue to prioritize natural 
resource-centric national development policies; hence extended to their national STI policy 
(i.e., national innovation system).  
 I position Malaysia as the country whose political elites have faced the highest urgency 
to boost up manufacturing sector growth among the three Southeast Asian cases. The 1969 
Racial Riots urged the political elites in Malaysia to boost up the income of the rural 
Bumiputera and reduce the strong economic influence of Chinese-Malay. Consequently, 
instead of relying on indigenous capital to support manufacturing growth, which was 
dominated by the Chinese-Malay businesses, the political elites chose to rely on foreign capital. 
This patron-client relation between political elites, foreign capital (MNCs), and the Bumiputera 
supported faster structural change and at the same time became the foundation for the long-
rule of Barisan Nasional coalition in the government. However, once the political coalition 
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had broken and the palm oil sectors experienced a boom in the early 2000s, the palm oil sector 
gradually moved at the center of the Malaysian economic growth strategy. 
 The case of Thailand shows how a country’s economic strategy is deeply intertwined 
with foreign interests. From the pre-modern period until the Cold War period, the construction 
of patron-client relations has been built around the government, bankers, foreign capital, and 
natural resource oligarchs. Unlike the military regime in South Korea which made a momentum 
through the Korean War to build up their manufacturing sector, Thailand’s involvement in 
World War II and Cold War led to the expansion of their agricultural sector. Despite some 
domestic dynamics involving an anti-Chinese sentiment, the ruling political elites in Thailand 
have maintained close relations with the local Chinese businesses in natural resource industries. 
In the 1960s to 1970s, the political elites pursued export-oriented industrialization by relying 
on foreign capital from the U.S. and Japan (i.e., joint-venture companies). Despite the linkage 
to foreign capital, there has been a lack of effort by the government of Thailand to pursue an 
indigenous technology-driven industrial catch-up. As we can see from the first section, 
Thailand continues to rely heavily on foreign technology. The only period when the political 
elites in Thailand pursued vertical industrial policy in the post-critical juncture period was 
during Thaksin’s administration. Yet he also failed to gather a broad political coalition to 
support his industrial catch-up policy. 
 Among the three Southeast Asian cases, Indonesia is the country with the weakest 
urgency to pursue a technology-driven industrial catch-up. The political elites in Indonesia 
were faced with domestic instability in their early post-independent years rather than of a 
severe external threat. The country still has a lack of national unity as one nation-state 
particularly due to their characteristics as an archipelago country which tends to be prone to 
separatist movement. Stable politics finally occurred under the New Order military regime 
when they took control of the government in 1966.  
The New Order regime inherited a nation-state which was too weak and chaotic to rely 
on domestic capital. Upon this circumstance, the regime decided to rely on foreign capital and 
foreign technology to gain revenue from oil and natural resource industries. This gave birth to 
the natural resource-oligarchs, which have remained influential until the present time. The 
immense oil revenue supported the regime’s high spending on agricultural sector and build up 
high-technology projects. The regime only started to promote manufacturing development 
when they suffer from the Oil Gut in the 1980s. However, the repressive politics practiced 
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under the New Order resulted in the rise of anti-New Order. The end of the New Order regime 
in 1998 was followed by the end of the high-technology projects and a strong promotion over 
natural-resource centric strategy. In sum, the occurrence of regime-change and a democratic 
transition in the post-critical juncture period has not been followed by a prioritization over an 
indigenous technology-driven industrial policy (more on Chapter 7). 
 Overall, the three cases from the Southeast Asian region show that the political elites’ 
economic strategy tends to go back to a natural resource-centric prioritization since the critical 
juncture period. In the current promotion over the importance of the national innovation system 
to support economic growth, these countries continue to promote natural resource centric STI 
activities. Furthermore, the increasing opportunities to develop indigenous technology 
capabilities from foreign technology, brought by the ASEAN Economic Community 
mechanism, has not been followed by a serious effort to prioritize the indigenous 
manufacturing upgrading. A combination of an MNCs-driven manufacturing sector and the 
abundance of natural resource-sector contribute to the lack of urgency to prioritize a 
technology-driven industrial catch-up strategy as the political elites continue to construct a 
national development planning around natural resource sector. In, the next chapter, using the 
case of Indonesia as a sub-case study, I explore how the political elites build up public 
legitimacy for their natural resource-centric under the democratic system. The purpose here is 
to highlight the mechanism of contingency with path-dependence logic. 
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CHAPTER 7 INDONESIA AS A SUB-CASE STUDY 
The Case of Economic Nationalism Discourse and A Stagnated National Innovation System 
in Democratic Indonesia (2004-2019)111 
 
 In the previous three chapters, I have discussed how the political elites in the seven 
different countries encountered different level of urgency to pursue an indigenous technology-
driven industrial catch-up strategy during their critical juncture period. Throughout their 
journey in post-critical juncture period, the political elites continue to replicate the same 
development strategies. The political elites in the two Northeast Asian countries have 
maintained their prioritization upon an indigenous technology-driven industrial development. 
The two Latin American countries exhibit an opposite tendency, as they continue to rely on 
natural resource-centric strategy and foreign capital. Among this trend, I find that the three 
Southeast Asian countries are somewhat in the middle. Their political elites still facilitate the 
manufacturing sector development, but they have relied on MNCs and foreign technology as 
the main driver instead of focusing on indigenous manufacturing technology development. In 
the current trend of the role of national innovation system to support indigenous manufacturing 
sector upgrading, the Science, Technology, and Innovation (STI) policy in the three Southeast 
Asian countries exhibited a continuous preference over a natural-resource centric technology 
development.  
Concerning the path-dependence logic, the seven country cases show that the present 
development strategy is rooted in the past (i.e., the first main characteristic of path-
dependence). The initial conditions (i.e., the global-external and domestic circumstances) 
before and during the critical juncture period provoked the emergence of political coalitions 
behind the selected development strategy. The actors select one particular policy that suits their 
interest the most (i.e., the second defining feature of path-dependence). As consequences, we 
can see how the outcomes (i.e., present the indigenous manufacturing sector and indigenous 
technological capabilities) adhere to the decision made in the critical juncture period. Historical 
lock-in is observable through the reproduction of strategy, notably as exhibited by their STI 
policy as the primary mechanism of an indigenous-technology driven industrial catch-up. (i.e., 
the third defining feature of path-dependence). The two Latin American cases and the three 
 
111 A shorter version of this chapter is published on Rangsit Journal of Social Science and Humanities, under the 
title “Technology-Driven Structural Change and the National Science Technology and Innovation Policy in 
Indonesia: The Problem of Economic Nationalism Discourse” (Purbantina, 2019). 
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Southeast Asian cases show that the national innovation system in these countries leans toward 
natural resource-centric technology development instead of manufacturing sector upgrading. 
The governments can avoid a costly indigenous industrial catch-up strategy as the presence of 
MNCs already support the industrial growth (i.e., employment). 
 Through a comparison of over seven country cases, I have presented three levels of 
urgency in the critical juncture period using a historical approach (i.e., path-dependence). The 
primary purpose of this Ph.D. dissertation is to understand what happened in the critical 
juncture period. Therefore, Indonesia, as a sub-case study, mostly act as a supportive chapter.  
As I have presented in the third chapter, the discussion of path-dependence logic can still be 
extended further into an evaluation over self-reproducing sequence (see section 3.I). In other 
words, we want to observe the exact channel that enables us to observe how the pollical elites 
continue to replicate the same development strategy in post-critical juncture period.  
In this chapter, my focus lies on how the government has been able to maintain the 
natural resource-centric development strategy, particularly within the national innovation 
system since critical juncture period. With the current popularity of STI policy as the primary 
channel to increase indigenous manufacturing technological capabilities, the question is how 
does the government justify a natural resource centric STI policy? I evaluate policy discourse 
to capture how STI policy is being framed in Indonesia. The manifestation of economic 
nationalism is used by the political elites in democratic Indonesia to gain public legitimation 
for their natural resource-centric STI policy.  
While I emphasize “discourse” or “idea” here, I do not argue that this is the only leading 
cause for the contingency or lock-in. Discourse observation here simply acts as one mechanism 
to observe contingency112. Another critical factor, as I have presented in the previous three 
chapters, is the survival of the political coalitions that support the selected strategy (i.e., the 
clients). In this regard, I start the chapter by providing a little more depth into the survival of 
political coalitions, especially the natural-resource oligarchs, despite the occurrence of the 
1998 Political Reform. The end of the New Order regime in 1998 marked Indonesia’s political 
transition into a democratic political system, which supposedly end the problematic patron-
 
112 In accordance with an analysis over policy discourse, we can also observe that the national patent data. It shows 
how Indonesian technological capabilities have been stuck in low technology level for the past 23 years (see 
section 7.III.a.). 
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client relations in the New Order, particularly between the political elites and natural resource 
oligarchs.  
After a brief overview over the survival of natural-resource oligarchs, including their 
deep entangle into contemporary Indonesian politics, I examine the two channels of the 
discursive institutionalism approach. Upon the evaluation of these two channels, I found that 
there is a strong presence of economic nationalism discourse, manifested in natural resource 
protection, within Indonesian development strategy and their national STI policy. While most 
of study on economic nationalism discourse in Indonesia is often connected exclusively to the 
resource policy (Patunru, et al., 2018), I argue that it also influences the framework of national 
innovation system in the contemporary democratic Indonesia (2004-2019). The key arguments 
here are: 1) economic nationalism manifested in an anti-colonialism message, in which the 
government continues to associate it with natural resource protection as a maritime and 
agrarian country; thus, 2) it act as a powerful legitimating device (justification) for the political 
elites to prioritize natural resource-centric strategy in a general national economic development 
context and specific STI policy. 
 
7.I. The Survival of Natural-Resource Oligarchs and The Rise of Populism in Democratic 
Indonesia (Post-1998 Political Reform) 
This section provides a closer look into the political coalitions in Indonesia during the 
post-critical juncture period. Here, I emphasize how the patron-client relationships between the 
political elites and natural resource oligarchs survived the 1998 Political Reform. In order to 
be provide a comprehensive evaluation, I start with an elaboration over the political coalitions 
during the New Order period in a more detailed manner in comparison to the previous chapter 
(Section 6.III). The key here is to pay a closer look into the influential figures behind both the 
businesses and the large main political parties in Indonesia. 
Studies conducted by Robison and Hadiz (2005), Hadiz and Robison (2013), and 
Winters (2013) provide a thorough exploration over the birth of these politico-business 
oligarchs during the New Order period. These politico-business oligarchs remain as influential 
figures in the present Indonesian political-economic arena. These oligarchies survived both the 
oil crisis in late 1980s (i.e., the period when the Indonesian government first introduced various 
neoliberal reforms) and also the 1997/98 Asian Financial crisis, which was followed by the 
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1998 Political Reform in Indonesia. The New Order regime’s patronages mostly involved 
Chinese-Indonesian business and also Pribumi contractors. The Chinese-Indonesian businesses 
had started out from trade, forestry, and property before they expanded into resource industries 
(forestry), infrastructure, petrochemical, banking, property, and manufacture113. While the 
politico-business oligarchs survived the 1998 Political Reform in Indonesia, reformist 
movements have successfully challenged the old-style machine politics. Robison and Hadiz 
borrows the term state-qua-state (state for itself) to describe a system of state-sponsored 
predatory capitalism in Indonesia. The New Order regime under Suharto was the period when 
“public authority and private interest were fused and where state capitalism gave way to the 
rise of politico-business oligarchies emerging from the state itself” (Robison & Hadiz, 2005, 
p. 30). 
After he had taken the office from Sukarno in 1960s, Suharto started to consolidate his 
regime by first extracting national wealth (natural resource) before he promoted business 
partnership between Chinese Indonesian businesses and the military generals. Winters (1996) 
argues that Suharto learned that Sukarno’s downfall was a result of economic development 
neglection. By early 1960s Indonesia’s export declined, goods became scarce, and cost of 
living increased sharply (Winters, 1996, pp. 47-48). According to Resosudarmo (2005), when 
Suharto came to power in 1966-67, he understood the value of Indonesian natural resource 
(e.g., forest, oil, gas, and minerals). He also realized that a large-scale extraction required 
multinational companies’ involvement. Therefore, the New Order regime facilitated MNCs to 
exploit Indonesian natural resource through various regulations, particularly oil as it became 
the major source of government revenues throughout the 1970s (Resosudarmo, 2005, pp. 2-3). 
According to Seda (2005), until the 1966, the regime granted mining concession for foreign 
companies under a ‘contract of work’. But in 1966, they implemented a new ‘production-
sharing contract’ (PSC), which granted the regime with large revenue from oil and gas 
industry114. 
 
113 Here, it is also important to note that the prior to the birth of New Order oligarchies, the effort to conduct land 
reform in early 1960 failed due to the landlords who blocked the land redistribution (Studwell, 2013, p. 50) 
114 Pertamina, Indonesia’s only state-owned oil company that was established in 1968, have held authority for 
domestic distribution and the allocation of drilling concession. Through Pertamina, Suharto and the military 
received large benefits. However, it was plagued with corruption issues in 1975. Seda argues that Pertamina’s 
wealth was used to fund various state enterprises’ large projects such as high-tech industries based on economic 
nationalism ideals. Yet, these projects were unable to generate significant revenues and these nationalist projects 
were soon abandoned when the oil crisis occurred in 1980s (Seda, 2005, pp. 184-185). The debate on high-tech 
state enterprises’ projects continued even after Indonesia recovered in the 1990s. Nonetheless, the Indonesian 
government remained to provide support for large state enterprises but only few perform well such as PT Indosat 
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Gellert (2005) argues that despite the World Bank dubbed Indonesia as one of 
successful cases in manufacturing miracle economy by early 1990s, it was natural resources 
(e.g., oil, gas, mining, and forestry) that boosted the power and wealth of Indonesian oligarchs. 
Forestry was one of the important sectors for New Order regime due to the booming of log 
exports in the 1970s, plywood exports in the 1980s and 1990s, and also the recent pulp and 
paper exports. Suharto regime established the root for timber oligarchs through a twenty-years 
forest concession rights and various other incentives. By 1990s, up to 585 forest concession 
rights were allocated, covering 60 million hectares of Indonesian forest without the 
acknowledge of millions of population living in the area (Gellert, 2005, pp. 146-147). Initially, 
the regime gave the rights to foreign firms, but slowly they were forced to create join venture 
with most of Chinese-Indonesian conglomerates such as M. (Bob) Hasan, Prajogo Pangestu 
and Eka Tjipta Widjaja. In addition, the military also received economic benefit from the 
timber oligarchs (Gellert, 2005, pp. 148-149). Another important aspect in the timber industry 
was Japanese market. Hasan, through Apkindo (or the Indonesian Wood Panel Association), 
controlled the Indonesian plywood exports. He also formed an alliance with Kanmatsu Trading 
Company to create Nippindo, which became the sole importing partner for Apkindo’s plywood 
export (Gellert, 2005, p. 149). However, plywood exports along with other Indonesian forest 
products received hits from the 1997/98 Asian Financial Crisis.  
After the 1997/98 crisis and the 1998 political reform, the politico-business oligarchs 
had to find new ways to survive under the new wave of democratization and globalization. 
Hadiz and Robison (2013) argues that the neoliberal reformers failed to dismantle the 
“resilience of the networks for political authority and economic interest” that support the 
oligarchic system (p. 50). They provide example on how institutions such as Corruption 
Eradication Commission can be pressured by powerful figures, such as Aburizal Bakrie. The 
agenda of Chinese Indonesian large businesses have been about maintaining close alliance with 
powerful political elites instead of replacing them with open market and transparency. 
Meanwhile, the middle-class reform movements often becomes uncoordinated and small-
scaled while the local political arena is dominated by old generation politicians and business 
figures who supported old authoritarian regime (Hadiz & Robison, 2013, pp. 52-54).The 
oligarchs and the political elites in Indonesia are adapting to the new democratic game and 
have remained to possess their material wealth (i.e., money, media, networks) to dominate the 
 
and PT Telkom, which are in telecommunication sector. Seda notes that none of them developed into major 
exporters (Seda, 2005, p. 186). 
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political arena. Winters points out the oligarchic dominance in Indonesian media and political 
parties which shows similarities in other democratic practices such as the U.S. The main 
contrast, however, is that Indonesia’s civil society and rule of law are significantly weak 
(Winters, 2013, p. 33).  
Politicians Oligarch Oligarch Backers Media Owns/Bought 
Party 
Aburizal Bakrie  
(11% of TV) 
Yes Self 
 
 
 
Dahlan Iskan 
(also SBY links) 
TVOne, ANTV, Visi 
Media Asia, 
Vivanews.com 
(Anindya) 
Jawa Pos Group 
(Radar, TV network) 
Yes (Golkar) 
Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono 
(27percent of 
TV) 
Hidden 
(Yes) 
Budi Sampoerna, 
Sunaryo Sampoerna, 
Ramadhan Pohan 
Chairul Tanjung 
 
 
James Riady 
(Peter Gontha) 
 
 
 
 
 
[2004 Aburizal Bakrie, 
Jusuf Kalla] 
Squeezed Chinese 
Media Nusa Pradana 
(Jurnal Nasional) 
 
Trans Corp 
(TransTV, Trans7), 
Detik.com 
 
Lippo Media, 
Berita Satu Media 
Holdings (Suara 
Pembaruan, Jakarta 
Globe, Investor 
Daily, 
BeritaSatu.com) 
Yes (Democrat 
Party) 
Surya Paloh  
(36percent of 
TV) 
Yes Self Metro TV, Media 
Indonesia 
Yes (NasDem) 
Prabowo Yes Self 
Hashim (brother) 
Trying to buy TC 
stations 
Yes (Gerindra) 
Wiranto Yes Self (Cendana?) 
Hary Tanoesoedibjo 
(had SBY links, then 
Surya Paloh links) 
- 
MNC Group, RCTI, 
Global TV, MNC 
TV, Sindo Radio, 
Seputar Indonesia, 
Okezone.com 
Yes (Hanura) 
Megawati Hidden Taufik Kiemas 
Arifin Panigoro 
- Genetic 
(PDIP) 
Jusuf Kalla Yes Self - Yes (Golkar 
2004, 2014) 
Tab. 7.1 Indonesia’s Oligarchic Democracy 
Source: (Winters, 2013, p. 28) 
Current major political parties in Indonesia are still headed and financed by major 
oligarchs that mostly originated from the old regime despite the occurrence of 1998 political 
reform. Morse (2019) writes an article on how natural resource oligarchs funded both 
presidential candidates’ campaign in Indonesia’s 2019 election. He argues that this might 
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contribute to the lack of debate on natural resource policy in Indonesia. Aspinall (2005b) uses 
the term ‘semiopposition’ to characterize the opposition style in New Order regime. The regime 
controlled two opposition parties and also various societal organizations (ormas) such as 
religious organization, student groups and others. The societal organizations which supported 
the regime received patronage in form of contracts, subsidies, sponsorships (Aspinall, 2005b, 
p. 7). Aspinall (2005b) also points out that while modernization thesis argue that a stronger 
middle class would support democratization, it was not the case for Indonesia in 1970s. Middle 
classes were part of the coalition that support the authoritarian regime. Aspinall argues that 
these middle-class people mostly remained dependent to state because “they were civil servants 
or had business links with state officials or larger crony capitalist” (Aspinall, 2005b, pp. 28-
29). 
In the mid-1980s, PDI started to attract supports from growing independent middle 
class such as urban professionals (e.g., lawyers, intellectuals, journalists) and also some 
medium-level entrepreneurs. Their primary support base, however, comes from lower social 
groups or the “small people” such as small businesses, small retailers, small restaurant owners. 
As pointed out by Aspinall (2005b), PDI stood upon “the heterogenous populist constituency 
of “Sukarnoism,” which promoted equal chance for “small people” such as middle-class 
professional who often lose against the well-connected economic players (pp. 175-176). In 
addition, the economic collapse in 1998 affect students nationwide as they were unable to pay 
their tuition fees (p. 223). This marks the starting point of populist campaign to defend the 
small people as the central point of development strategy. 
The new government (from President Abdurrahman Wadid to President Megawati) 
suffered from economic crisis devastation, widespread corruption, separatist conflicts (e.g., 
Poso, the Moluccas, Aceh, and Papua), an ill-planned decentralization law115, and the difficulty 
to control the military. Adding to that, the rise of Megawati, who replaced Wahid, did not come 
from popular election but by elitist power battle (Bünte & Ufen, 2009, p. 15). In 2004 election, 
majority of voters casted their voices for the new Democrat Party (PD) and the Islamist Justice 
and Welfare party (PKS). These two parties were relatively new parties without any 
predecessors from 1950s or the New Order regime (Ufen, 2009, p. 15). The 2004 Election saw 
 
115 Under the centralized New Order regime, the political center controlled the national economy and the 
development of periphery outside Java area was ignored. When the regime ended, there were unprecedented civil 
welfare in Kalimantan (West and Central provinces), Central Sulawesi, and the Moluccas fueled by religious and 
ethnic sentiments. It caused 10,000 causalities and 1.3 million refugees. The series of decentralization reform 
between April 1999 to January 2001 was a top-down plan that ignored regional / local power struggle. In addition, 
it only benefitted the resource-rich regions (Nordholt, 2012).   
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General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as the first president won direct presidential election 
(Bünte & Ufen, 2009, p. 16). Yudhoyono won against Megawati in 2004 Election by appealing 
to the media as a modern and non-partisan politicians who possess a calm and leadership 
quality as oppose to Megawati who is a product of the old political machine system (Aspinall, 
2005a, p. 21). 
Still, the money politics and old-style political machine remains. Mietzner (2012) 
points out that despite introducing important institutional reform between 1998 and 2005, 
“conservative segments of the elite” seek to disturb the reforms (pp. 215-216). Yudhoyono, for 
example, never pursued radical reform that would have reduce capital accumulation of 
oligarchs despite claiming to seek corruption eradication (Fukuoka, 2012, pp. 61-62). Hadiz 
and Robison (2017) argue that the populist tendency in Indonesian contemporary politics 
sustains the growth of oligarchies, which involves both phenomenon of “populism from above” 
and also “Islamic/religious and secular/nationalist populisms from below” (p. 490). They argue 
that Indonesian populism has taken roots back to Sukarno’s populist appeal to gain mass 
support when he lacks party power. It came back again with Yudhoyono’s wining in the 2004 
election and currently with the rise of Jokowi and Prabowo in both the 2014 and the 2019 
election. Hadiz and Robison (2017) discuss how both Jokowi and Prabowo claim to be political 
outsiders who seek to appeal to the people under nationalist and anti-foreign sentiment in the 
2014 Election by promising to protect Indonesia’s natural resource from foreign interest.  
Hadiz and Robison (2017) point out that it is important to notice that Prabowo and his 
brother, Hashim Djojohadikusumo, are both leading business tycoon whose business interest 
are ranging from mining and resources, energy and agriculture, to cement production sector 
(Hadiz & Robison, 2017, p. 493). When Jokowi had won in 2014, he failed to conduct his 
reform agenda due to challenges posed by the oligarchic forces within the Indonesian politics. 
He was also in a ‘triple minority’ position. First, he was a marginal figure in his party (PDI-P). 
Second, he was supported by a political coalition which did not have majority of parliament 
seats. Third, he was a newcomer (Muhtadi, 2015, p. 357). Overall, while Jokowi seek to 
facilitate economic development through good governance mechanism and bureaucratic 
reform in the first place, he is politically vulnerable to the power of oligarchs as he eventually 
granted access to political patronage as exhibited during his first year in office (Muhtadi, 2015). 
In sum, the section provides more detailed how key figures within political coalitions 
survived the financial crisis and the democratization process. On the next section, I seek to 
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present how the survival of political coalitions in post-critical juncture Indonesia is also 
accompanied by a continuation of natural resource-centric strategy within their STI policy. 
Despite a short period of Habibie’s effort to develop high technology, this failed along when 
the 1998 financial crisis occurred. The public’s anti-New Order sentiment also manifested in 
an anti-high technology sentiment. The oppositions then took advantage of this through 
populist policy that promotes agriculture sector. This resonated with the pro-small people 
sentiment during the 1998 movement. 
 
7.II. A Deeper Look into National Innovation System in Indonesia: The STI Policy in 
Indonesia During and Post New Order Government 
The New Order’s (1966-1998) STI policy pursued strategic sector-based 
industrialization while was still promoting agricultural technology. Oil revenue played an 
important part here. During this period Suharto’s regime committed to a technology-based 
industrialization in strategic-defense sector with the support of B.J. Habibie and his team of 
technological experts116. B.J. Habibie played an important role in Indonesian STI policy from 
the mid-1970s to late 1990s. He was the Minister of State for Research and Technology, as 
well as Chair of BPPT (Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology), BPIS 
(Agency for the Management of Strategic Industries), and DRN (National Research Council) 
(see Fig. 7.1.). Habibie led the ATTP (Advanced Technology and Aeronautical Technology), 
which then transformed into ATP (Advanced Technology Pertamina). At the end, ATP finally 
split into IPTN (Nusantara Aircraft Industry, now Indonesian Aerospace) and BPPT. While 
IPTN focused on the manufacture of airplanes, BPPT was in control of major technology 
development projects (Bishry & Hidayat, 1998; Amir, 2007; Amir, 2013). 
 
116 Amir (2007) argues that one of the plausible reasons behind the strategic-defense technology-based 
industrialization in the New Order era was the “merchant mentality” of the Indonesian big business and their 
reluctance to invest in R&D activities (p. 79). Additionally, the early years of the New Order era were years of 
instability due to the Cold War and domestic insurgencies (Tan, 2012). During his visit to the U.S. on July 5, 
1975, Suharto conveyed his concerns over communist activities in Southeast Asia in a meeting with the U.S. 
President, Secretary of State, and NSA representatives. In the meeting, he emphasized the importance of building 
up Indonesian military capabilities (U.S. Archive, 1975). 
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Fig. 7.1 STI Policy Agents during New Order Regime 
Notes: re-drawn by author 
Source: Djojonegoro citing on (Bishry & Hidayat, 1998, p. 173)  
 
Under the New Order regime, national development plan for Indonesia was based on 
the Five-Year National Development Plan (REPELITA). The REPELITA III (1978/80-
1983/84) contained a vision of structural change through industrial technology development 
for the promotion of agricultural sector (e.g., equipment and machinery). The New Order 
government started its push for strategic-defense technology in REPELITA IV (1984/85-
1988/89). This plan also revealed that the S&T projects received a boost in its budget. 
Throughout the six volumes of the REPELITA, the New Order government had had two 
industrial goals: 1) agro-industry (including machinery to support agricultural production) 
development; and 2) defense-strategic development (aerospace and ship industries). Table 4 
shows the composition of STI budget as written on the second to sixth REPELITA. Agriculture 
research have received high priority in the New Order regime, particularly in comparison to 
industry research.  
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Tab. 7.2 STI Budget Composition based on Subsectors based on REPELITA II-V 
Notes: The first REPELITA does not provide STI budget composition 
Source: Compiled by author based on REPELITA documents 
The New Order relied on a combination of violence and political repression. Behind 
the high economic growth lay high debt and wealth concentrated in a small group of 
conglomerates (Aspinall & Fealy, 2010). The peripheral areas of Indonesia suffered from 
poverty. When the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis had occurred, the pro-democracy movement 
seized the moment to overthrow the oppressive regime. Thus, the 1998 Political Reform 
provided the momentum for populist politics (“the people” against “the elite”) as anti-New 
Order sentiments constantly grew. Since the end of the New Order regime, the Indonesian 
government had started to place more emphasis on agricultural development as part of a pro-
Subsectors
REPELITA II 
(1974/75 — 
1978/79 
Budget)
Subsectors
REPELIT
A III 
(1979/80 — 
1983/84 
Budget)
REPELITA 
IV (1984/85-
1988/89 
Budget)
REPELITA 
V (1989/90 - 
1993/94 
Budget)
1. S&T Development 10.5% A. S&T Development 12.8% 43.4% 57.1%
2. General Research 8.3% B.1. General research 21.8% 10.4% 9.1%
3.a. Agriculture research 34.1% B.2. Agriculture research 24.7% 17.3% 17.7%
3.b. Industry and mining 
research 13.3% B.3. Industry research 5.0% 3.7% 1.4%
3.c. Transportation and 
tourism research 10.9%
B.4. Mining and energy 
research 1.7% 2.0% 1.9%
3.d. Trade and cooperative 
research 0.8%
B.5. Transportation and 
tourism research 3.5% 7.2% 1.1%
3.e. Labor and 
transmigration research 1.5%
B.6. Trade and 
cooperative research 0.4% 0.4% 0.7%
3.f. Regional and rural area 
research 0.9%
B.7. Labor and 
transmigration research 4.9% 1.1% 0.4%
3.g. Religion research 0.7%
B.8. Regional and rural 
area research 0.4% 0.3% 0.6%
3.h. Culture and education 
research 1.1% B.9. Religion research 0.3% 0.1% 0.0%
3.i. Health, family planning, 
and social welfare research 2.7%
B.10. National culture 
and education research 1.0% 0.6% 0.2%
3.j. Public housing and 
water research 0.8%
B.11. Health, family 
planning, and social 
welfare research 4.3% 0.8% 0.8%
3.k. Public communication 
research 0.8%
B.12. Public housing 
research 4.2% 0.1% 0.1%
3.l. Civil servant research 1.6%
b.13. Social 
communication research 0.9% 0.1% 0.1%
3.m. State finance  research 0.7%
B.14. Civil servant 
research 1.8% 2.2% 1.0%
4. Statistics Research 11.4% B.15. Statistics research 6.3% 10.2% 7.9%
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poor approach. The 2000 National Development Budget Plan, as part of the 1999-2004 Broad 
Guidelines of State Policy (GBHN), states that the Indonesian national budget allocation for 
STI dissemination shall be used to develop agriculture-centric and natural resource-based 
technology.  
The 2005-2025 Long-Term National Development Plan, released under the Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono’s administration, claims that the Indonesian national economic strategy 
is directed to achieve their comparative advantages as maritime and agrarian country. The long-
term development plan further states that the Indonesian industrial development prioritizes the 
national food security issues and national raw material potentials, in which resource-based 
industrial development is their future interest (pp. 30-33). When the President Joko Widodo 
presented his Nawa Cita strategy through the 2015-2019 Medium-Term National Development 
Plan, he offered similar strategy. Among the nine points of Nawa Cita, the sixth and seventh 
strategies are strategies designed to achieve national economic competitiveness through a set 
of sectoral priorities, i.e., food sovereignty; energy sovereignty and electric power; maritime 
and marine; and tourism and industry priorities. 
 
Fig. 7.2 Nine Nawa Cita Priorities under Three Development Dimension 
Notes: Re-drawn by Author 
Source: (Ministry of National Development Planning of the Republic of Indonesia, 2018, p. 
III.3) 
Despite a regime change in 1998, most of the STI agents from the New Order era 
remained relevant (Fig. 7.3). The Ministry of Research, Technology, and Higher Education is 
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the main ministry in charge of STI policy. They receive support from other agencies, including 
the National Nuclear Energy Agency (BATAN), Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency 
(BAPETEN), Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), National Institute of Aeronautics and 
Space (LAPAN), Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology (BPPT), and 
Geospatial Information Agency (BIG). Universities act as STI policy agents through various 
government programs under the Ministry of Research Technology and Higher Education. One 
of the key programs that emerged to boost the involvement of universities in R&D activities 
was the Centers of Excellence (COEs) program117. The House of Representative of the 
Republic of Indonesia, as one of national legislative assemblies in Indonesia, oversees the 
national budget allocation for policy programs from different sectors. Among a total of eleven 
commissions, Commission VII of the House of Representative of the Republic of Indonesia is 
responsible for STI policy. Based on the Minutes of Meeting of Commission VII pertaining to 
STI policy program coordination, the Ministry of Industry is not involved118. 
 
Fig. 7.3 Current STI Policy Agents in Indonesia 
Note: This figure only incorporates selected sub-bodies that possess STI development function  
Source: Author’s construction based on various governmental documents. The author 
constructs the figure as a modification from Bishry and Hidayat (1998, p. 10) and Amir (Amir, 
 
117 Most of these centers and programs are geared toward natural resource development (agriculture and agro-
industry). There are only two universities that conduct research on electronics and automotive systems, the Institut 
Teknologi Bandung and the Institut Teknologi Sepuluh November. The Institut Pertanian Bogor, a state-run 
agricultural university, owns the majority of CoEs at the university level. 
118 Hill and Pane (2018) argue that within the current economic nationalism approach which favors a state-led 
industrialization strategy, the Indonesian Ministry of Industry remains a minor player. 
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2013, p. 67) who provide organizational structure of STI policy agents in Indonesia throughout 
New Order regime.  
 
Within the Ministry of Research, Technology, and Higher Education, the Directorate 
General of Innovation Strengthening is the key agent in charge of various technology 
innovation policy programs since 2016. They also facilitate cooperation between universities 
and industries. The four main programs  of the mentioned institution are listed as follow: 1) 
Innovation system development (policy study); 2) Innovation strengthening for industry 
program; 3) Technology innovation strengthening for industry program; 4) Technology 
Business Incubator program; 5) Technology-based beginner company program; and 6) 
Technology-based beginner company for university program. The second to the sixth programs 
are funding schemes, which all prioritize eight sectoral innovation fields: 1) food; 2) energy; 
3) health and medicine; 4) ICT, 5) transportation; 6) defense and security; 7) advanced material; 
and 8) maritime (Directorate General of Innovation Innovation Strenghtening, 2019). Most of 
the projects funded under technology-based beginner (start-up) company (including university-
based) between 2016-2018 are developing natural resource-based products such as agriculture, 
food, advanced materials. 
 
Tab. 7.3 Industrial Innovation Incentives (2017-2018) 
Source: Directorate General of Innovation Strengthening, Ministry of Research Technology 
and Higher Education documents119.   
 
119 These documents are retrieved through email correspondence with the staff of Directorate General of 
Innovation Strengthening, Ministry of Research Technology and Higher Education. The documents includes: 1) 
The Decree of Directorate General of Strengthening Innovation, Ministry of Research Technology and Higher 
Education on Industrial Innovation Incentive Program for 2017 Batch 1, No. 01/PPK/SK/INOVASI INDUSTRI-
DII/III/2017; 2) The Decree of Directorate General of Strengthening Innovation, Ministry of Research 
Technology and Higher Education on Industrial Innovation Incentive Program for 2017 Batch II, No. 
02/PPK/SK/INOVASI INDUSTRI-DII/III/2017; 3) The Decree of Directorate General of Strengthening 
Innovation, Ministry of Research Technology and Higher Education on Industrial Innovation Incentive Program 
for 2018, No. 005 /F1 / PPK.1 / Kp / IV /2018.  
Fields Number of Project Total Budget Number of Project Total Budget
ICT 9 7,351,000,000IDR    10 8,285,000,000IDR       
Defense-Security 5 5,085,000,000IDR    2 1,390,000,000IDR       
Raw Material 9 6,189,552,000IDR    6 2,361,000,000IDR       
Advanced Material 6 4,522,308,000IDR    5 4,234,000,000IDR       
Energy 6 4,510,795,000IDR    6 3,231,000,000IDR       
Transportation 14 17,361,000,000IDR  10 6,696,000,000IDR       
Health & Medicine 11 8,905,120,000IDR    6 4,810,000,000IDR       
Food 10 6,675,225,000IDR    7 6,500,000,000IDR       
2017 2018 (excludes Univ-based)
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On Chapter 6, I already provided the overall information on the Indonesian patents from 
the ASEAN Patentscope. On figure 7.4. and table 7.3., I provide a detailed information on the 
Indonesian patent based on the data I collected from the Indonesian national patent office. 
Despite the number of patents increasing in the past several years, there is a lack of the 
technological upgrading needed to proceed to a higher technological level (Fig. 6.10.). For the 
past 23 years (1993- 2016), most Indonesian patents have continued to be issued mostly for 
agriculture products (A01), including food (A23). Majority of the patents for medical science 
(A61) were issued for organic-based medicine or beauty products (108 out of 163). 
Furthermore, patents owned by the Indonesian government and universities are showing 
similar characteristics. 
 
Fig. 7.4  Most Used IPC Codes (3 digits) in Indonesian Domestic Patents (Valid & Expired) 
1993-2016 
Note: Different shades of grey represent different year (from bottom to top: 1993-2016). Each 
patent can be attached to more than one IPC code. These are the codes used by more than 50 
patents from a total of 1394 patent data. This figure only counts patent data under “valid” and 
“expired’ status. The patent data last checked on 07/08/2018. 
Source: Compiled by author based on the patent data from the Indonesian Patent Office (2018) 
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Tab. 7.4 Most Used IPC Codes for Indonesian Patents Owned by Government and University 
Source: Compiled by author based on the patent data from the Indonesian Patent Office (2018) 
 
7.III. The Problem of Economic Nationalism Discourse within Indonesian STI Policy in 
Indonesia  
7.III.a. The Manifestation of Economic Nationalism in Indonesia 
[…] it should be stressed that nationalism involves notably amorphous ideas 
and dispositions. Because nationalism is typically linked to structures of 
feeling and emotion more than to the world of rationality and intellect, its 
advocates often pay little heed to the logical consistency or implications of 
their positions. Nationalism is also highly fungible, with nationalists able to 
combine different aspects of nationalist thinking, and overlay them on other 
political philosophies and ideas, with almost infinite variation. (Aspinall, 
2018, p. 37) 
 
Before evaluating the presence of economic nationalism within Indonesian STI policy, 
first, I provide a brief overview of the manifestation of economic nationalism discourse in 
Indonesia. Following Gellner (1983), nationalism is deeply intertwined with the idea of a 
political legitimacy because of it tangles with people’s sentiment. In his term, “nationalist 
sentiment is the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of 
satisfaction aroused by its fulfilment”, which is connected to the idea of “an intolerable breech 
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of political propriety” (Gellner, 1983, p. 1). This dissertation does not place a focus on the 
emergence of nationalism in Southeast Asia, but rather it seeks how nationalism discourse 
manifested in Indonesian contemporary policy, specifically their STI policy. As pointed out by 
Lai120 (2018) existing comparison on domestic economic structure is not enough to explain 
national development strategy. An examination over political wills behind economic policy 
provides another angle to understand different policy choices (p. 151). Aspinall (2018), and the 
whole series of writings within Patunru, et. al. (2018), explore how nationalism discourse in 
Indonesia gives distinctive characteristics within their contemporary political landscape.  
Nationalism refers to the existence of a common destiny and common future in a certain 
geographical territory (Anderson, 1999, p. 6). In Southeast Asia, it is often linked to anti-
imperialism sentiment (Reid, 2010). Aspinall (2018) classifies contemporary Indonesian 
nationalism, in which he uses the term New Nationalism, further into territorial nationalism121 
(territorial integrity against foreign aggression), economic nationalism122 (protection of 
domestic producers and national resources against foreign competition), and cultural 
nationalism123 (protection of national culture) (pp. 39-40). Aspinall’s starting point for his New 
Nationalism in Indonesia is the 1998 political reform period that marked Indonesia’s transition 
into electoral democratic system. He argues that the political elites still frame the new 
nationalism in Indonesia under the language of anti-colonial sentiment. It is then often 
connected to the idea of an anti-foreign capital (p. 42). Nationalism has become a useful 
legitimizing device for political elites to gain popular support; hence, the lack of significant 
programmatic policy offered by the political candidates on their campaign (p. 47). 
While, most of the discussion of nationalism discourse within Indonesian economic 
policy have been giving abundant attention into the more obvious sectors (e.g. energy sector, 
trade sector), less are given to how it also affects Indonesian national technology capabilities. 
 
120 Her work explores the economic nationalism in South Korea and Taiwan to explain the choice of economic 
development strategies. She argues on how Park Chung-Hee and Chiang Kai-shek justified their policy while 
establishing economic nationalism at the same time. 
121 According to Aspinall, territorial nationalism relates to Indonesian nationalists’ consistent concern on maintain 
“Indonesia’s territorial integrity in the face of alleged external aggression and internal separatism” (e.g. the case 
of Australian-led UN intervention in East Timor, the case of territorial dispute over Sipadan and Ligitan with 
Malaysia) (Aspinall, 2018, p. 39).  
122 Aspinall argues that while the protection of domestic producers against foreign competitors has a long history 
in Indonesia, the 2009 commodity boom led to President Yudhoyono’s return to a nationalist policy under anti-
colonial and anti-nationalist terms. His administration imposed various import restrictions, which mainly seek to 
protect domestic natural resource sectors (e.g., minerals, rice) (Aspinall, 2018, p. 40).  
123 According to Aspinall, the government of Indonesia promotes the nationalist agenda through modern 
communication technologies to mobilize people with sensitive issues such as cultural theft (e.g. tension with 
Malaysia over Balinese Pendet dance, East Javanese Reog masked dance) (Aspinall, 2018, pp. 40-41). 
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With Amir’s works as starting point, this essay puts an emphasis over how nationalism 
discourse is manifested into Indonesian STI policy. Amir (2013) discusses how nationalism 
within New Order’s national technology construction sought to achieve three purposes: 1) to 
unify Indonesia through the use of technology as national identity; 2) to assert national 
sovereignty through a promotion of self-sufficiency in technology; and 3) to empower the state 
to integrate the whole nation through the use of cutting-edge technologies (Amir, 2013, p. 11). 
 According to Amir (2013), the N250 airplane projects was a concreate manifestation of 
technological nationalism discourse. The N250 roll-out ceremony was the arena for the regime 
to showcase the rhetoric of technological independence to the public. According to Amir, there 
were two key attributes that signified this rhetoric. The first attribute is the “Gatotkaca” name 
for N250 airplane first prototype, which comes from a hero character in Hindu-Javanese 
mythology. The second attribute is the commemoration of the Patriots Day that was selected 
as the day for “Gatotkaca” roll-out ceremony (Amir, 2013, pp. 132-134).  
In sum, we can see that the manifestation of nationalism in Indonesian policy and 
politics mostly is related to the use of anti-colonialism and domestic protection sentiments by 
political elites to gain popular support from the public. Therefore, the policy offered by the 
political elites often framed under this sentiment. On the next section, I seek to highlight the 
presence of economic nationalism within the national STI policy in Indonesia. In this regard, 
economic nationalism refers to a broad sense of protection of domestic producers and natural 
resources against the foreign competitors. The next section also highlights some degree of 
technology nationalism, especially within one of the coordinative channels.  
 
7.III.b. Evaluating Coordinative and Communicative Channel to Evaluate Economic 
Nationalism within the STI Policy Stasis in Indonesia 
Table 7.5. below summarize all the documents analyzed on this thesis. Due to the 
availability of data, I mostly focus on the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014) and Joko 
Widodo (2014-2019)124 administration. I conducted an analysis from various official 
documents. I classify the documents into two policy discourse channels to observe how the 
economic nationalism discourse contributes to a policy stasis. In order to complement the result 
of those document analysis, I incorporate two types of local level observations on the fifth 
 
124 At the time of this Ph.D. dissertation writing, Joko Widodo is still the current President of Indonesia. He was 
elected for the second term on April 17, 2019. 
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section: 1) local government; and 2) local R&D institutes. Due to data limitation, this thesis 
can only conduct deeper exploration on Joko Widodo’s administration with regards to 
coordinative channel125.  
Types Document’ Titles Communicative 
Channel 
Coordinative 
Channel 
National 
development 
plan books 
A. New Order regime (1966-1998) 
- 5-Year Development Plan / REPELITA I-VI 
(includes national budget for S&T 
development) 
B. Post New Order regime (1998-2018) 
- 2000 Budget Plan – Transitional period 
(Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati 
administration) 
- Long-term National Development Plan (2005-
2025) – Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
administration 
- Medium-term National Development Plan 
(2015-2019) – Joko Widodo administration 
- Annual Development Plan (2017, 2018) 
O O 
National STI 
policy 
documents 
(Joko Widodo 
administration) 
A. Ministry of Industry Documents 
- Making Indonesia 4.0 (2018) 
- National Industry Development 2015-2035 
(Facts & Figures 2015) 
B. Ministry of Research Technology and 
Higher Education Documents 
- National Research Priority Agenda 2015-
2044 
- Annual Report (2015, 2016) 
- Ministerial Performance report (2015, 2016) 
O  
Minutes of 
Meetings 
The Minutes of Meeting of Commission VII, 
House of Representative of Republic of 
Indonesia (January 17, 2017) 
 O 
Presidential 
Speech 
Transcript (as 
coordinative 
channels) 
a. President Joko Widodo’s speech in front 
of National Innovation Forum 2015 at the 
Centre for Research, Science and 
Technology (April 13, 2015) 
b. President Joko Widodo’s speech in front 
of the meeting between Echelon I and II 
officials, the head of universities, and the 
head of higher education services from 
the Ministry of Research Technology and 
Higher Education (October 10, 2018) 
c. President Joko Widodo’s speech in front 
of the cabinet plenary session to evaluate 
the 2015-2019 Medium-Term National 
Development Plan (December 2, 2018) 
 O 
Presidential 
Speech 
Transcript (as 
communicative 
channels) 
a. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s 
speech to Commemorate the 10th National 
Awakening Day (August 10, 2005) 
b. Transcript of Address of the President of 
Republic of Indonesia at the Annual 
Session of the People’s Consultative 
O  
 
125 This chapter incorporates electoral (presidential) debates transcript as one of the key data (from 2014 and 2019 
general elections) to show that both incumbent and opposition are promoting similar economic nationalism 
tendencies to the public. 
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Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia 
2006-2009 (Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono; 
2015-2018 (Joko Widodo)  
c. Press Release for the “Four-years 
Achievement of the President Joko 
Widodo’s administration on Campus 
Affirmation Policy and Citizen 
(indigenous) Innovation Growth” by the 
Minister of Research Technology and 
Higher Education (October 26, 2018) 
Electoral 
Debates 
a. 2014 Electoral Debate on the topic of: 
Economic Development (15 June 2014) 
b. 2014 Electoral Debate on the topic of: 
Human Capital and S&T (29 June 2014) 
c. 2019 Electoral Debate on the topic of: 
Infrastructure, Food, Energy, Natural 
Resource, and Environment (17 February 
2019) 
d. d. 2019 Electoral Debate on the topic of: 
Economy, Social Welfare, Finance, 
Innovation, and Industry (13 April 2019) 
O  
Tab. 7.5 List of Documents 
Source: Author 
 
 
7.III.b.1. Coordinative Channel 
The discursive institutionalism approach offers two categorizations of channel to 
observe policy discourse. Coordinative channel refers to various medium of interaction 
between the policy makers. The best representation of coordinative channel is a Commission 
VII126 open meeting (House of Representative of Republic of Indonesia, 2017). The meeting 
discussed the 2016 STI policy outputs and the 2017 STI policy plan. 
The sentiment “a protection over national resources” often appears in the reasoning 
from both the Members of Parliament and the STI policy agents. First, the meeting confirms 
the parliament members’ demands for a prioritization of R&D in the energy, maritime and food 
sectors. They stated repeatedly that the agricultural and fisheries sectors were vulnerable 
sectors that needed protection. The statements made during the meetings show that the 
motivation for the STI policy programs is not technological changes or upgrades, but national 
resource protection.  
Therefore, in my opinion, we have spent useless budgets for years, which have 
not resulted in technology that solves national problems, both in food and 
industrial sectors. […] How far does your ministry protect these technologies 
so that they will not be sold to foreign interests? One of the examples is fish. 
 
126 Commission VII of the Indonesian House of Representatives oversees the national budget for the STI sector 
and supervises STI policy. The open meeting occurred on January 17, 2017 and was attended by legislative 
members (31); the Minister of Research, Technology, and Higher Education; and the heads of BATAN, 
BAPETEN, LIPI, BPPT, and BIG. 
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Can the public access the technology? [translation by author] (A legislative 
member from the National Mandate Party) (2017) 
 
We, Commission VII, are excited to launch satellites A6, A7, A8 next, to fly 
the CN235 passenger-type aircraft, to not always use ATR aircraft, the French 
ATR72 and ATR42 aircraft, but replace them with Mr. Habibie’s R80, with 
our CN235 passenger-type aircraft. How can we conduct the survey? How can 
we have data for us to fight (perang) at the National Board of Arbitration? We 
do not have our own ship, please think strategically… This is to protect our 
sea border, economic value and transportation value [emphasis added; 
translation by author] (A legislative member from Great Indonesia Movement 
Party) (2017) 
 
In response to the Members of Parliament, the STI agents (non-elected bureaucrats) 
emphasized their programs for agricultural sector development. The head of BATAN claimed 
that BATAN works to increase the income level of farmers. The head of BPPT promised to 
reduce the dependency on imported salt. The head of LIPI promoted their programs for food 
preservation, amphibian rice variety, and food supplements for animals. The Minister of 
Research, Technology, and Higher Education highlighted the Ministry’s cooperative program 
with the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries and Bogor Institute of Agriculture (IPB) to 
boost local fishermen’s productivity. There was no discussion of indigenous medium-
technology development for the manufacturing industry.  
[…] BATAN owns one Science and Techno Park (STP) unit located at Pasar 
Jumat and three units that we refer as Agro Techno Parks because of their 
focuses on the agricultural problem. Therefore, we put focus on training, 
revitalization, and infrastructures at Pasar Jumat. Subsequently, we also 
conduct training on animal feed production at the three Agro Techno Park 
units, which are located at Musi Rawas, Klaten, and Polewari Mandar, in 
addition to the breeding and seed dispersal activities there. [emphases added; 
translated by author] (Head of BATAN) (2017) 
Subsequently, this local canned food […] Therefore, this can become business 
in food preservation sector, particularly during the Haji season; there are a lot 
of local foods that can be taken there. Next, we have also developed what we 
call ‘amphibian rice variety,’ which we have not launched yet. Next, we also 
conduct food supplements for animals, for example, we give cows vitamins 
[emphases added; translated by author] (Deputy Head of LIPI) (2017) 
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Another examples for coordinative channel are various occasions when President Joko 
Widodo delivers speeches in front of policymakers, particularly the STI agents127. He often 
emphasizes on resource-based development, mainly agriculture technology and innovation 
(e.g., coffee, palm oil, corn, salt). He framed national technological development and national 
innovation under the resource-based idea instead of technological upgrading to support 
indigenous manufacturing sector. When President Joko Widodo made a remark on the need for 
Indonesia to catch-up economically, he did not frame it under technological upgrading context 
(Widodo, 2018a). Additionally, agricultural sectors also became his main points when he 
discussed human resource development and overseas training (Widodo, 2018a; Widodo, 
2018b). Below are some of his remarks on the Indonesian technological development.  
In the relations with food sector, or cement, there is a wide price gap (between 
islands), from IDR 60,000-70,000, it increases to IDR 2,500,000 when it 
reaches a regency in Papua. These are the problems that need solutions from a 
good research. […] I saw in Subang (a regency in Java), rice seeds that reach 
8-9 tons per hectare. We already tried and confirmed the result. But it was a 
small-scale research. How (can we) nationalize this? [translated by author] 
(Widodo, 2015b) 
I am not sure (when), around two or three years ago, I delivered my idea on 
the need to establish a university level Coffee Study. At that time, some 
laughed (at me). In my view, a coffee-study (and) palm oil-study are our big 
industries! And I was being serious […] At the U.S. and Italy, there are coffee 
institutes, you can search for it yourself. Coffee is learned, researched, taught, 
from its method of planting and processing, industrialization stage, branding, 
packaging, and selling. They have these details. This is a multidisciplinary 
study on a world-class huge economic turnover. [translated by author] 
(Widodo, 2018a) 
Perhaps, from the Ministry of Agriculture, I am asking for several hundred 
(people) from our fieldwork program to be sent for overseas training. 
Furthermore, in my understanding, our Ministry of Agriculture maintains a 
good relationship with Taiwan, which possesses good agricultural capabilities. 
[translated by author] (Widodo, 2018b) 
 
 
127 Other than the speeches from President Widodo, President Yudhoyono also once shared a similar message on 
his state speech to commemorate the 10th National Technology Awakening Day in 2015. He stated, “I traveled 
across Indonesia, saw our agricultural products, our handicraft products, small enterprises, medium, and a lot of 
local activities, such as fruits here, vegetables, and so on. I saw several good ones with good quality in large sizes. 
[…] Therefore, go and contribute. We face an oil crisis because of the high world oil price. We are still importing, 
while we are also exporting. If the technology, research, and development are contributed to be pure; oil is 
extracted from perhaps palm, sago, or castor bean, then it already provides large contributions for our energy 
sustainability and our security of oil supply. Again, I ask you to go in that direction.” (Yudhoyono, 2015) 
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7.III.b.2. Communicative Channel  
Communicative discourse examines the mediums through which policymakers attempt 
to influence the public. One of the most effective mediums is the annual presidential speeches 
to commemorate Indonesian Independence Day at the Annual Session of the People’s 
Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia. Along with the context of an 
Independence Day commemoration, the President always emphasizes along Indonesia’s 
colonial legacy and the protection of national resources as he describes Indonesian 
technological achievements. During his first speech as president (2015a), he stated that self-
sufficiency in food and illegal fishing was the two among four major problems that he wanted 
to tackle. Instead of promoting the Indonesian indigenous manufacture sector, he connected 
the challenges of globalization with the government effort to push for self-sufficiency in food 
(e.g., rice, corn, meat, chilies, and shallots). Economic nationalism discourse framed a national 
development strategy that resonated with the public sentiment on the anti-colonialism history 
in Indonesia. Throughout various occasions, President Joko Widodo have continued to promote 
agricultural sector development rather than indigenous technological upgrading for 
manufacturing sector. This extends to his STI policy. 
We must be brave to fight against the theft of our marine resources. We must 
be brave to sink illegal fishing to protect our fishermen. We must be brave to 
protect every inch of earth (bumi pertiwi) for the welfare of our people. 
[translation by author] (Widodo, 2017) 
There is no way we can become a nation which possess food sovereignty if we 
have a very limited number of dams and irrigation channels across our 
agricultural land. [translation by author] (Widodo, 2017) 
Another example of a communicative channel is the recent press conference on the 
“Four-years Achievement of the President Joko Widodo’s administration on Campus 
Affirmation Policy and Citizen (indigenous) Innovation Growth” by Muhammad Nasir, the 
Minister of Research Technology and Higher Education of his first presidency. On October 26, 
2018, The Minister presented some of their achievements on technology and innovation 
products. On this occasion, the Minister also echoed the President’s intention to develop a 
university-level coffee-study. The minister made a recommendation to the Indonesian 
universities to open a Coffee Science study, Coffee Economy study, Barista Education study, 
and other visionary majors needed by the market (Ministry of Research Technology and Higher 
Education, 2018)  
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Furthermore, the minister stated that, as an agrarian country, the development of 
technology and innovation capability in Indonesia needs to support society’s welfare. Under 
this light, the Ministry of Research Technology and Higher Education stated that he aims to 
push and to escort the higher educational institutions in Indonesia to develop innovation in 
agriculture and plantation sectors. The Minister pointed out some of the best innovation 
products, such as a rice innovation from the Bogor Institute of Agriculture and a salt innovation 
from Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology (BPPT). Additionally, the 
minister also made a remark on an innovation on fishing vessels, which can contribute in 
raising the welfare of local fishermen in a maritime country (Ministry of Research Technology 
and Higher Education, 2018).  
The next important medium to evaluate the communicative channel are various public 
appearances, such as presidential speeches128 and the electoral campaign debate129. I presented 
various quotations from the political elites who spoke in front of public appearances. I selected 
and translated important quotations from several presidential speeches delivered by Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono and Joko Widodo. These are the annual presidential speeches to 
commemorate Indonesian Independence Day. These speeches are presented at the Annual 
Session of the Parliament of the Republic of Indonesia. I seek to show a continuation of natural-
resource centric stance, which are framed in the language of natural resource protection and 
pro-poor approach.  
An increase in people’s prosperity cannot be separated from the agricultural 
sector performance, rural economy, as well as food security. In this regard, the 
government have proclaimed a revitalization program for agriculture, fisheries, 
and forestry sectors. [emphasis added; translation by author] (Yudhoyono, 
2006) 
 
Alternative energy development becomes a crucial option, both to reduce 
dependency in oil, with its price continue to rise, and also to solve the problem 
of poverty, unemployment and environmental management. […] Our country 
possesses various source of energy alternative in a large scale, for example gas, 
coal, hydro power, geothermal, solar power, and so on. […] The government 
continue to construct plan to develop a biology-based alternative energy or 
biofuel. These national programs have started this year, started with a research 
in palm-oil-based, sugar-cane-based, cassava-based, and castor-bean-based 
energy. [emphasis added; translation by author] (Yudhoyono, 2006) 
 
128 Please refer to APPENDIX 1 for a complete list of presidential speeches quotes from both Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono and Joko Widodo.  
129 Please refer to APPENDIX 2 for a complete list of quotes from 2014 and 2019 General Election Debates. 
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I would like to prove that we must never turn our back on the ocean or the sea. 
Our vast seas have economic, defense, and unity potentials. Our marine 
environment now being threatened by the climate change needs to be salvaged. 
We have to protect our seas from the security threats, such as illegal fishing and 
plundering of marine resources. Any vessels that are caught stealing our fish 
must deal with our stern actions, including by being sunk. International laws are 
also against illegal fishing and plundering of marine resources. […] Along with 
that, we also have to explore maritime culture and maritime identity of the 
Indonesian nation further. We have to demonstrate to the world that Indonesia 
is a maritime nation. A nation which preserves and empowers her seas sincerely. 
This is our initial effort to be the World’s Maritime Fulcrum. The Maritime 
Fulcrum initiation is not only a matter of national defense, but also regional and 
global defense. This strategy is being hammered out and will be incorporated 
into the Indonesian National Marine Policy. [emphasis added; translation by 
author] (Widodo, 2015a) 
 
On many occasions, I have always been repeating [the message] that we are a 
great nation. Once again, Indonesia is a great nation. Indonesia is great not 
only for its 250 million populations. Indonesia is great not only for its 17,000 
islands. Indonesia is great not only because of its abundant resources. 
[emphasis added; translation by author] (Widodo, 2017) 
 
We still have more promises to deliver. As we reflect upon ourselves, we have 
to admit that it would be impossible for Indonesia to become an advanced nation 
if the people all over the countries have yet to enjoy electricity at their houses. 
It would be impossible for us to become a competitive nation if the cost of our 
logistics are high. It would be impossible for us to become a Global Maritime 
Fulcrum if we do not possess seaports where large ships that transport our 
products can be berthed. It would be impossible for us to reach self-sufficiency 
in food sector if the number of dams and irrigation channels that irrigate our 
agricultural fields all over the country are limited. [emphasis added; translation 
by author] (Widodo, 2017) 
 
In the midst of rapid and extreme globalization wave, Indonesia’s independence 
is one very important pillar to support people’s prosperity and to uphold social 
justice. The government will continue to work hard to achieved self-sufficiency 
in food by increasing the production of strategic foodstuffs, mainly rice, corn, 
beef, chilies, and shallots. [emphasis added; translation by author] (Widodo, 
2017) 
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On another medium, the 2014 and the 2019 Electoral Debate, the candidates from the 
opposing parties130 were under the same consensus on the policy direction. All of them sought 
to appeal to the popular sector by emphasizing on the use of STI for agriculture sector. The 
STI or national innovation system does not function as an indigenous technology-driven 
industrial catch-up strategy. These are done in order to show that these candidates, despite 
sitting from opposing side, promote the same economic nationalism which built upon the idea 
of natural resource protection, including the protection over the economic actor in the natural 
resource sector (e.g., farmers, fisherman). 
Tonight, we are gathering here to discuss the most important issues for the 
nation, which are infrastructure, food, energy, natural resource, and 
environment. These are the key problems within our life as a nation state. We 
have visions to seriously build up our independency in these sectors in order to 
be a successful country. We must stand upon our own feet. We must achieve self-
sufficiency in food, in energy, in water, in order to survive as a nation. [emphasis 
added; translation by author] (Opposition party, 2019) 
 
We will immediately prepare fertilizer ready as much as needed by the farmers. 
This is our commitment. We believe that Indonesia can stand on our own feet. 
We will secure all national economic sources. We will protect Indonesian 
economic wealth and prevent it from flowing out from the country. The 
fundamental problem of our nation is that our wealth does not reside in our 
republic. [emphasis added; translation by author] (Opposition party, 2019) 
 
If you ask me what my strategy is, my answer is our strategy is to push palm oil, 
it is not limited to palm oil, but also palm sugar, cassava, and even ethanol from 
sugar. We shall use everything we have in order to avoid importing energy from 
outside. That is our strategy. [emphasis added; translation by author] 
(Opposition party, 2019) 
 
A factory that often operate, an automotive factory in German, that often 
employs fifteen thousand workers now can be replaced with robots and only 
employs less than fifty workers. This will have some impacts, but the key point 
that I seek to deliver is that [while] we are talking about industry 4.0, we have 
yet able to protect our own farmers. This is what we need discuss. We have yet 
able to guarantee an affordable food price for our own people. This is the 
problem that I concern about. It is good that we discuss industry 4.0 but I prefer 
to be able to guarantee that Indonesia can achieve self-sufficiency in food 
 
130 During the 2019 Electoral Debate, the opposition party were represented by Prabowo Subianto and Sandiaga 
Uno and the incumbent party were represented by Joko Widodo and Ma’aruf Amin). During the 2014 Electoral 
Debate, the opposing parties were Candidate No. 1 (i.e., Prabowo Subianto and Hatta Rajasa) and Candidate No. 
2. (i.e., Joko Widodo and Jusuf Kalla). 
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without importing it from any other countries. [emphasis added; translation by 
author] (Opposition party, 2019) 
 
I am very much optimistic that we are more than able to achieve self-sufficiency 
in energy. Hence the high potentials of the palm oil. We can use all our palm oil 
products to be transformed into biofuel and biodiesel. And this will increase the 
income level of our farmers, which is currently falling. We can increase its price 
and we have to be responsible to improve their welfare. [emphasis added; 
translation by author] (Opposition party, 2019) 
 
Mr. Jokowi has been in power for four and a half years, why do you allow 
farmers’ import to be destroyed. Why don’t you do industrialization but instead 
you put your focus on infrastructure? It is possible that this infrastructure eases 
the flow of foreign products to enter Indonesia instead of the opposite. This is 
the problem that, in our opinion, requires a strategic reorientation. It requires a 
stern strategy to stop the money flowing out of the country and then be focused 
to build industry in various sector. I agree with a downstream process but why 
haven’t you release a permit for this for four and half years? Instead you allowed 
foreign commodities to easily enters Indonesia. [emphasis added; translation by 
author] (Opposition party, 2019) 
 
I want the Indonesian people to know that currently, Indonesian palm oil 
production has reached 46 million per year, which involve more or less 16 
million farmers. I think this is a significant number. And in order to inform Mr. 
Prabowo, we already started the B20 [biodiesel] and the production process has 
reached 98 percent of what we expected. This means that B20 is finished. We 
are moving towards, what we called, B100. Therefore, we expect that 30 percent 
of palm oil’s total production will go to biofuel. We have already explained the 
plan in a rigid and clear way. This is what we are working on to avoid oil imports 
dependency. [emphasis added; translation by author] (Incumbent party, 2019) 
 
And I believe that with a well-prepared human resource, our nation is ready to 
face industry 4.0. For example, farmers. The farmers need to be introduced to 
an online marketplace that bring the farmers and their consumers closer. We 
also need to prepare small businesses, micro businesses, supermicro businesses 
to understand how to maximize the benefit from this online system. A 
development of both offline and online ecosystem needs to be achieved in a 
relatively shorter amount of time. These are what we have been working on at 
the field level so that our country does not loose against other country in the 
wave of industrial revolution 4.0. [emphasis added; translation by author] 
(Incumbent party, 2019) 
 
It is correct that for too long we have been relying on foreign market and for too 
long we have been exporting raw materials, such as rubber, palm oil, fisheries, 
and also agriculture commodity. Therefore, the future strategy is downstream 
and industrialization. We need to build fishery industry as many as we can, food-
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canning industry so that we can export final goods, which are processed and 
labelled by local brand here. This strategy is also applicable for forestry 
commodities. In the future we need to do downstream in order to avoid exporting 
raw materials. Instead we need to be able to send final or intermediate products. 
Also, for agriculture-related products, we know that the younger generation now 
is already able to build online ecosystem, which can be extended to offline 
ecosystem for agriculture-related products in order to facilitate farmers to 
connect with consumers through digital economy. [emphasis added; translation 
by author] (Incumbent party, 2019) 
 
Therefore, poverty and unemployment are the target of our economic 
development strategy. Our strategy relies or focuses on agriculture 
development, first. Why agriculture? Because it can absorb a large pool of 
workers in short amount of time. Furthermore, agriculture sector can produce 
[outputs] in short amount of time. [emphasis added; translation by author] 
(Candidate No. 1, 2014) 
 
in the next five years [we] distribute 10 trillion of research funds with focuses 
on priority sectors; [we] foster the diffusion of knowledge to be absorbed by the 
most important sectors, which are food, energy, transportation, health, and so 
on. [emphasis added; translation by author] (Candidate No. 1, 2014) 
 
We must conduct a ‘triple-helix’ approach within [our] innovation centers 
development. First, the government develops regulations to support any efforts 
to increase knowledge diffusion within our priority sectors. Second, the 
government provides incentives for companies which conduct R&D activities 
and [it] reaches the market. Third, the government releases regulations to foster 
entrepreneurships so that invention meets entrepreneurship becomes an 
innovation that will solve the problem of overflooding import (banjirnya 
masalah impor) into our homeland. [emphasis added; translation by author] 
(Candidate No. 1, 2014) 
 
To advance Indonesian economy. For me, economy is dedicated as much as 
possible for the people’s welfare. That is a self-sufficient economy.  […] But, 
the most important thing, according to the Constitution is that natural resource 
is used as much as possible for the people’s welfare. [emphasis added; 
translation by author] (Candidate No. 2, 2014) 
There are a lot of nations which are developed because of their scientific 
capabilities. There are nations which are developed because of their natural 
resources. Therefore, we, [which] own rich natural resources and rich human 
resources, and an effort through science will bring larger benefits for this 
nation. [emphasis added; translation by author] (Candidate No. 2, 2014) 
 
[…] for our national interest, national research institutes such as BPPN, LIPI, 
if we are discussing about research in food, research in energy, must be the 
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main actor, supported by private parties. Then [we] as an entity is coordinated 
by ministry of research. [emphasis added; translation by author] (Candidate No. 
2, 2014) 
 
There are two important points that we can gather from the presidential speeches and 
the electoral debates presented above. First, there is a strong presence of statements regarding 
natural resource-centric economic development strategy instead of a discussion about 
indigenous manufacturing upgrading. Second, it is framed under a nationalistic sentiment. 
Since the administration of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono until the administration of Joko 
Widodo, the annual presidential State Speech to Commemorate Indonesian Independence Day 
has continuously built the connection between anti-colonialism sentiment, national sovereignty 
and the protection of national resources. Each year, the Indonesian presidents repeatedly deliver 
the same message on a natural resource-centric national economic strategy under those 
narratives.  
 
7.III.c. Observation at the Local Level: Local Research Institutes and Local Government 
Throughout the previous section, I have discussed the presence of economic nationalism 
discourse within Indonesian STI policy through coordinative and communicative channels. In 
this section, I incorporate several local level interviews and field observations at one local 
research institute and local governments from two different cities131 in Indonesia in order to 
highlight the government’s neglection over manufacturing sector within the STI policy. I visited 
one university-based research institute called Centre of Excellence in Automotive Systems and 
Control, Sepuluh Nopember Institute of Technology (PUIPT-SKO ITS) in 2018. Centre of 
Excellences (COEs), both non-university and university-based COEs, are one of the key STI 
agents which conduct STI development activities. Among a total of 45 COEs established since 
2014, there are only two COEs that conduct R&D in medium technology (Ministry of Research 
Technology and Higher Education of the Republic of Indonesia, 2015; Ministry of Research 
 
131 Here I incorporate two cities that represent a city located at center region (i.e., Kota Surabaya) and at periphery 
region (i.e., Kota Bima). Various researches have pointed out large disparities between the center and periphery 
region in Indonesia, particularly due to its archipelagic structure (i.e., between Java and other island), with regards 
to the population size, local government revenue, resource endowments, educational level, labor conditions, etc. 
(ADB, 2010; Nasution, 2016; Talitha, et al., 2019). The decentralization process, started in late 1990s, aimed to 
foster regional development and reduce this disparity. However, as pointed out by Asian Development Bank report 
(2010), decentralization remained ineffective because the distribution of human resource capacities, financial 
resources, and technology between the center and periphery region remain to be unequal. Most importantly, there 
is a coordination problem among the national level and local level governments (ADB, 2010, pp. 40-41). 
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Technology and Higher Education of the Republic of Indonesia, 2016b). One of them is PUI-
SKO ITS132, which was initiated by a research team led by Mr. M. Nur Yuniarto (current 
executive director). I also conducted interview and field observations at two different cities in 
Indonesia from two different regions in 2017: 1) Kota Surabaya as the representation of 
metropolitan city located at center region; and 2) Kota Bima as a representation of rural area 
located at periphery region.  
 
7.III.c.1. The Local Research Institute: Centre of Excellence in Automotive Systems and 
Control, Sepuluh Nopember Institute of Technology (PUIPT-SKO ITS) 
There is no sign [for government support in national automotive industry] in Indonesia. 
If we wait for the signs, it would not be realized. Deputy Director of PUI-SKO ITS 
(Wikarta 2018)  
Overall, the interview and field observation at the PUIPT-SKO ITS discuss a local-level 
R&D institute’s effort to develop medium-technology level in Indonesia and the difficulty that 
they have been facing particularly regarding the lack of national government’s support on this 
sector. The initiator of this research institutes is one of the experts that were involved in the 
failed national car project “Timor Project” in the 1990s133. According to the interview 
conducted with the representative from the PUIPT-SKO ITS, the key problem here is the lack 
of national government’s will to support medium-level technology development for 
manufacturing sector. The representation of the PUIPT-SKO ITS expresses that the domination 
of MNCs within Indonesian automotive market and their large contribution on Indonesian 
economy might contribute to the reluctance of the national government to facilitate the R&D 
outputs to enter the market nor even to provide industrial partners. 
 
 
132 Additionally, the Bogor Institute of Agriculture (IPB), a state-run agricultural university, runs the largest 
number of university-based CoE units.    
133 Hale (2001) provides a complete explanation on various Indonesian national car projects. The Timor Project 
was conducted by the Timor Putra National group, a holding company created and owned by Suharto’s son 
Hutomo “Tommy” Mandala Putra. In 1996, they established a joint venture called Kia Timor Motor with Kia 
Motors of South Korea. The choice to cooperate with South Korean automotive company was provoked by the 
willingness of South Korean firms to transfer the technology and to assist the overseas sales. The project received 
strong oppositions from Japan (whose automotive manufacturers allied with local business group in Indonesia), 
the European Union, and the US as they filed suits with the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO. The 
DSB penalized Indonesia. The 1997/98 Asian Financial Crisis then hit the project harder when the IMF’s economic 
reform program for Indonesia forced Indonesia to abide the WTO’s decision. Meanwhile in South Korea, Kia also 
faced bankruptcy problem (Hale, 2001, pp. 631-635). 
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Pict. 7.1 PUI-SKO ITS (1) 
Source: Author’s documentation 
 
Pict. 7.2 PUI-SKO ITS (2) 
Source: Author’s documentation 
 
COE units in Indonesia, such as the PUI-SKO ITS, have long existed; dating back 
during the time when the Ministry of Research and Technology, and Ministry of Education 
were once two separate entities prior to 2014. The Indonesian government decided to combine 
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the two ministries as an effort to increase technological output disseminations from universities 
to the industrial sector; hence running the triple-helix mechanism. Before 2014, there were only 
a handful of university-based COEs. Overall, there are two types of COEs, the university-based 
and the non-university based COEs. Formally and generally, in order to receive research funds 
from the government, COEs need to have an established network with an industry partner. 
However, in reality, the representation of PUI-SKO ITS states that there are plenty of COEs 
which do not conduct technological development activities, yet they continue to receive 
government budget134.  
 The representative of the PUI-SKO ITS states that the main difficulty faced by COEs 
which develop a medium-level technology is the technology dissemination stages (i.e., to enter 
the market). Most of university-based COEs which have successfully entered the market are 
mostly those who develop low-technology, such as food. The representative argues that one of 
the possible explanations for this is the lack of cooperation between the Ministry of Research 
Technology and Higher Education with the Ministry of Industry within the triple-helix scheme. 
According to him, there is a tendency for the Ministry of Industry to actually listen more 
towards the automotive industry associations, whose member are mostly MNCs subsidiaries in 
automotive sectors. There exists a policy discoordination between the Ministry of Research 
Technology and Higher Education and the Ministry of Industry. The Ministry of Industry 
expects the Ministry of Research Technology and Higher Education to be ready with their 
results first before presenting them to the Ministry of Industry. The Ministry of Industry does 
not supportively facilitate the networking and dissemination of R&D products for automotive 
sector135. 
Another additional problem is the lack of support from the government (e.g., tax 
incentives) for indigenous automotive industries to work with local R&D institutions. They also 
do not provide a networking facilitation between local R&D institutions and automotive MNCs 
(subsidiaries). The deputy expresses his skepticism regarding the opportunities presented by 
the global production network as parts and components suppliers. He argues that since 1980s 
 
134 In the 2017, the Indonesian government decided to create two categorizations for university-based COEs: the 
science-oriented university-based COEs and the product-oriented university-based COEs. The representative of 
PUI-SKO ITS argues that the national government continue to make many compromises for university-based 
COEs due to their need to maximize government budget absorption.   
135 The representative of PUI-SKO ITS argues that mostly the Ministry of Industry conducts market survey and 
researches instead of facilitation for local automotive developers.  
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local suppliers have not been able to keep up with the cost. Overall, an observation at local level 
confirms that the government negligence over medium-technology dissemination to indigenous 
industry. 
 
7.III.c.2. The Local Governments: Training Centre for Education, Training, and Export 
Promotion Department of Industry and Trade Kota Surabaya (East Java) and Department of 
Cooperative Industry and Trade Kota Bima (West Nusa Tenggara) 
While the previous subsection investigates what happens at local-level research 
institute, this section provides a short information on what occurs at local government level. 
The author visited and conducted an interview with the whole team of Training Division of the 
Training Centre for Education, Training, and Export Promotion, Department of Industry and 
Trade (P3E) for East Java Province and the whole Department of Cooperative Industry and 
Trade of Kota Bima, West Nusa Tenggara Province. The interview and fieldwork provide a 
better look into the readiness of local government and local economic actors, particularly the 
micro small medium enterprises (MSMEs) which comprise the majority of indigenous 
enterprises in Indonesia136, within the context of global economy system and global technology 
advancement. This section seeks to highlight that most of the local economic actors captured 
by local government’s development programs are in low-technology sectors. The support given 
by the local government are also limited to marketing facilitation (e.g., product design, online 
marketing) and do not go further towards technology development facilitation. There is a lack 
of cooperation between local government and local research institutes such as university-based 
COEs. In addition, the recent focus for MSMEs development are creative economy sectors137.  
The P3E, located at Kota Surabaya, was established in 2002 under the jurisdiction of 
the Department of Industry and Trade for East Java Province. The primary task of the P3E is to 
support export-oriented MSMEs through a series of training. However, according to the team, 
most of the problem they faced is the low readiness level of these MSMEs which hinders the 
 
136 According to the latest 2016 Indonesian Economic Census, 98.7 percent of total business establishments in 
Indonesia are micro-small size enterprises. In addition, 50 percent of business establishments are located in 
three provinces, West Java, Central Java, and East Java (Indonesian Bureau of Statistics, n.d.).  
137 According to the official webpage of Indonesian Agency for Creative Economy, there are 16 subsectors of 
creative economy in Indonesia: 1) Apps & game developers; 2) Architecture; 3) Interior design; 4) Visual 
communication design; 5) Product design; 6) Fashion; 7) Film, animation, & video; 8) Photography; 9) Craft; 
10) Culinary; 11) Music; 12) Publishing; 13) Advertising; 14) Performing art; 15) Fine art; 16) Television & 
radio (Indonesian Agency for Creative Economy, n.d.). 
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effectiveness of the training program. The team states that most of the P3E’s activities deal with 
human resource building, such as providing local economic actors with insights on marketing 
strategy, penetration strategy, business techniques, business correspondences and so on. The 
P3E also provide exhibition gallery and a place to market their local products. Most of these 
products, however, are in low-technology sector.  
   
Pict. 7.3 Display of MSMEs’ 
Products at P3E Showroom 
Source: Author’s 
documentation 
Pict. 7.4 The P3E Building 
Source: Author’s 
documentation 
Pict. 7.5 Manual Weaving 
Activity by Local 
Indigenous Community at 
Kota Bima 
Source: Author’s 
documentation 
 
Similar pattern can be found from interview and field observation conducted at Kota 
Bima, West Nusa Tenggara Provinces. As a small city located in a peripheral island of 
Indonesia, the Department of Cooperative, Industry, and Trade of Kota Bima have limited 
capabilities to support the local business actors with technological support. The city also still 
relies on traditional natural-resource based product, such as Bima Woven Fabric, as their main 
commodity. As a peripheral region, the local government have limited networks and financial 
access to support market expansion of the local business actors. The regular training program 
that they do are limited to, for example: how to select good raw material; how to increase the 
quality of the product, and traditional mechanism to create products. There is also a lack of 
sufficient infrastructures needed to conduct training activities.  
 
7.IV. Discussion Points: Economic Nationalism Discourse as an Observable Self-
Reproducing Mechanism within Path-Dependence 
 Despite a regime change in the Indonesian political system since the 1998 political 
reform, the government of Indonesia have continued to construct their national economic 
strategy on a natural resource-centric economic development. As we can see from Chapter 4, 
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the nationalism in Meiji Japan and Park Chung-Hee’s regime in South Korea was manifested 
on the idea of industrial catching-up, hence their focus on developing indigenous technology 
from foreign technology. Throughout this PhD dissertation, I propose that political elites face 
different level of urgency to pursue a technology-driven industrial catch-up strategy. The lack 
of urgency to pursue a technology-driven industrial catch-up strategy since the critical juncture 
period is manifested on the selection of other alternative strategy or the other source of revenue. 
In the case of weak and medium level of urgency the presence of natural resource-centric 
strategy is apparent and extended into the STI policy. This chapter shows that natural resource-
centric strategy is framed under economic nationalism discourse, which spread through both 
coordinative and communicative channels.  
A better understanding on policy discourse helps to highlight the intention of the policy 
in question. The current trend on global production network expansion, free trade regime and 
economic regionalism regime such as the ASEAN Economic Community, provide a channel 
for the latecomer countries to increase their indigenous manufacturing technological 
capabilities through triple-helix coordination within STI policy (i.e., government-research 
institutes or universities-industry). Yet, the case of economic nationalism in Indonesia shows 
that the discussion of STI policy have not been about industrial catch-up but rather about 
protection of domestic producers and national resources against foreign competition. The 
political elites frame the discussion under anti-colonialist narration which resonates with the 
public sentiment. It plays with the idea of natural resource protection as a maritime and agrarian 
country. Of course, it is important to note that this occurs with the background of politico-
business oligarchs’ survival. Economic nationalism has become a powerful legitimating device 
for the political elites in Indonesia for the survival of New Order’s patron-client relation under 
the democratic electoral system.   
 Therefore, I would like to highlight three main points. First, the discussion on national 
innovation system needs to incorporate the policy discourse instead of merely evaluating the 
outcomes (e.g., total number of patents, size of government spending on R&D) and the triple-
helix coordination, particularly if we seek to understand its effectiveness for a country’s 
industrial catch-up capabilities. Second, an evaluation of policy stasis then should also involve 
the policymakers’ intention instead of an evaluation over changes in policy programs. My third 
point, in relevance to the overall theme of this PhD dissertation, is that the dynamics of elements 
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within the system will continue to reinforce themselves once a system established. While this 
is often associated with the interaction among actors, this chapter shows that an observation of 
policy discourse can also highlight this mechanism. Economic nationalism manifestation in 
Indonesia can be traced back to their critical juncture period, during the state formation, which 
has been maintained throughout time. In the case of Indonesia, we can use economic 
nationalism as an observable mechanism to evaluate a stasis in national STI policy or national 
innovation system. 
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION 
Urgency to Pursue an Indigenous Technology-Driven Industrial Catch-Up Strategy  
and Its Implications 
 
I start this Ph.D. research with a straightforward question: “Can a country with a 
different political and historical context emulate the recipe for success recipe that was 
constructed upon the specific political and historical context of another country?” The basis for 
this curiosity is the fact that most developing countries remain at middle- or low-income levels. 
Despite numerous policy recommendations that prominent scholars have offered, most of the 
latecomer countries continue to possess weak indigenous manufacturing firms and 
technological capabilities; a successful national income transition and industrial catch-up only 
occurred in a handful of cases. For this reason, I seek a better way to explain the various 
economic development trajectories other than strong government versus weak government. 
 Upon reviewing literature on economic development, specifically on industrial catch-
up and national innovation systems, I found that the one neglected puzzle piece is the political-
historical foundation behind the successful case-based model. Scholars often offer a set of 
policy recommendations from what they perceive as “the successful cases” in economic 
development trajectories, devoting more attention to faster income transition cases that have 
expanded into more rapid indigenous manufacturing upgrading cases. These success cases 
inspired both a quest for duplication of the results and a tendency to use success as an idealistic 
measurement, but as a consequence, other trajectories are perceived as failed cases, and 
different patterns of government behavior are considered weak. This oversight fails to answer 
why “weak governments,” instead of “strong governments,” abound worldwide as well as why 
we can also find predatory behavior (e.g., patron-client relations between political elites and 
large businesses) in successful cases. 
Therefore, can we identify a mechanism that can repress the predatory behavior or 
government inefficiency? By employing a historical-comparative method, I have made two 
stark deductions: the efficient institutional arrangement emerged as a part of political elites’ 
national survival strategy in response to a specific set of global-external and domestic 
circumstances, and the political elites can choose different strategies, when available, in the 
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presence of these global-external and domestic circumstances. Initial conditions during critical 
juncture periods occur beyond the control of the political elites. If we cannot reproduce the 
initial conditions that provoked “institutional efficiency,” can we expect there to be a 
mechanism that can control “institutional inefficiency”?   
As I presented in the Chapter 8, the scholarly consensus on path-dependence logic 
within the historical approach involves three main points: the present is rooted in the past, initial 
conditions before and during the critical juncture period are the key elements, and historical 
lock-in occurs when there is a reproduction of outcomes. Implementation of this approach 
illustrates how the critical juncture period can become the central element in the method of 
comparison. By building on the concept of systemic vulnerability, I incorporate other elements 
from existing scholarly works that complement the first conditions–critical juncture element 
(e.g., colonial experiences, national unity, resource endowment, different socio-economic 
structure). This is how I select key observations within the global-external circumstances and 
domestic circumstances within the method of comparison. 
 In this Ph.D. dissertation, I conduct a qualitative comparative historical approach in 
seven countries from three different regions, and I present the idea of investigating different 
levels of urgency among political elites to pursue indigenous, technology-driven industrial 
catch-up strategies. The examination of critical juncture periods serves to identify at what point 
the political coalitions behind present economic development strategies emerged. Different 
levels of urgency occurred in the critical juncture period, which mostly coincided with the 
modernization and independence turning points; it shaped the national economic strategy, 
which mostly was the political elites’ strategy to gain national revenue. Once this prioritization 
is set, the dynamics in the post-critical juncture period lead to a repetition of economic 
development strategy. I have discussed the three-level of urgency throughout Chapters 4 to 6. 
Level of Urgency Global-External 
Circumstances 
Domestic 
Circumstances 
 
High  conducive conducive Japan & South Korea 
Low unconducive unconducive Argentina & Brazil 
Medium unconducive/mixed unconducive/mixed Malaysia, Thailand, & 
Indonesia 
Tab. 8.1 Seven Country Cases and Their Levels of Urgency 
Source: Author 
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This level of urgency is less of a theory to predict the future and more a pattern that I 
have uncovered upon analyzing each country’s history during its critical juncture period. 
Furthermore, the three different levels of urgency are intended to act as comparative 
measurements for these specific seven cases. I categorize the seven country cases into three 
different levels of urgency: Japan and South Korea represent a high level of urgency; Argentina 
and Brazil represent a low level of urgency; and Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia represent a 
medium level of urgency.  
Different interactions between different circumstances during critical juncture periods 
produced different level of urgency. The high level of urgency faced by the political elites in 
the critical juncture period was the result of an interaction between conducive global-external 
circumstances and conducive domestic circumstances. The low level of urgency was due to an 
interaction between unconducive global-external circumstances and unconducive domestic 
circumstances; here, unconducive circumstances were more favorable for a short-term less-
costly economic strategy (i.e., natural resource-oriented strategy) for an indigenous, 
technology-driven industrial catch-up strategy pursuit. The medium level of urgency was the 
result of an interaction between mixed global-external circumstances and mixed domestic 
circumstances. 
 The three Southeast Asian countries provide valuable insight due to their mixed 
circumstances; these cases strengthen the idea that the high level of urgency that the Northeast 
Asian countries faced is deeply associated with threats to national survival, which is the main 
element of the systemic vulnerability that Doner et al., (2005). While I deliver the same 
emphasis as Doner et al., I note that the absence of good governance (i.e., the developmental 
state arrangement) is not a simple matter that may correspond to the absence of systemic 
vulnerability, hence creating a “failed country.” Rather, the former absence is the result of 
different development paths caused by political elites’ exposure to different economic strategies 
(e.g., indigenous industrialization versus natural resource-centric commodity trade) and 
different industrial development strategies (e.g., indigenous technology-driven manufacturing 
upgrading strategy versus MNC-driven manufacturing growth). In addition, through analysis 
of the element of indigenous manufacturing technological capabilities, the three Southeast 
Asian countries reveal that their political elites did seek to increase the national industrial 
growth during the critical juncture period` due to the change in circumstances. However, the 
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political elites chose to rely on MNCs and foreign technology instead of fortifying their 
indigenous technological manufacturing capabilities. The core element of ASEAN Economic 
Community framework strengthens this strategy by expanding global production networks into 
Southeast Asia. 
 The MNCs-driven manufacturing growth in the three Southeast Asian countries are not 
followed by the government’s prioritization of indigenous manufacturing technology within 
each country’s national STI policy or national innovation system. On one hand, we can see that 
the expansion of global production networks into ASEAN member countries, as the ASEAN 
Economic Community facilitates, provided only the opportunities and channels for the 
indigenous manufacturing sector to absorb and develop foreign technology. On the other hand, 
as Chapters 4 to 6 make clear, the lack of government prioritization of indigenous, technology-
driven manufacturing sector upgrading resulted in the slower growth of indigenous 
manufacturing technology sophistication (e.g., share of medium- and high-technology activities 
in manufacturing exports and manufacturing value-added). Therefore, the industrial 
development in Southeast Asia does not have the same weight as the case of Meiji Japan and 
Park Chung-Hee’s regime in South Korea, both of which were deeply intertwined with the 
national survival of the countries.  
As I presented in the method of comparison, there is one debate over the path-
dependence logic: that of the self-reproducing mechanism. Due to several limitations (see 
Section 3.III), I selected Indonesia as a sub-case study to contribute to this debate. My purpose 
for the sub-case is to explain how the political elites, whom the same political coalitions 
supported, find public legitimation for their economic development strategy. Through public 
legitimation, the political elites maintain their power. This observation adds a layer to a more 
normative explanation, such as rational actor behavior, and therefore, this sub-case also acts as 
the initial step toward the next stage of research. 
 I present the case of Indonesia to highlight the problem of economic nationalism 
discourse’s manifestation in the country’s national STI policy in Chapter 7. This chapter shows 
that economic nationalism in Indonesia is associated with the protection of its natural resources 
and natural resource-based sectors instead of indigenous technology-driven manufacturing 
upgrading. This coincided with the survival of the natural resource oligarchs in post-New Order 
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Indonesia. The above differs from the manifestation of nationalism in the Meiji government 
and the Park Chung-Hee regime. There is one continuous thread among the seven cases: the 
presence of patron–client relations between the political elites (patron) and the large businesses 
(client). Political elites build close relations with large businesses because the elites seek to 
maintain their popularity with the public through popular policy (i.e., populism), especially 
under a democratic political system. What differentiates these countries are clients, namely, 
whether the large businesses are based in natural resources or in the manufacturing industrial 
sector.  
As the seven country cases exhibit, the similar behavior of the political elites across the 
different countries follows the simple logic of human behavior: a long-term strategy will only 
be produced in the presence of constraints. An industrial catch-up in the latecomer countries 
only occurs when the survival of the political elites and their clients is aligned with national 
survival. When the survival of the political elites and their clients is not threatened, the elites 
are less likely to construct a broad coalition to pursue a costly, long-term strategy, such as an 
indigenous technology-driven industrial catch-up. The presence of national unity and socio-
economic structure also influences the likelihood that elites will choose such a strategy. 
However, the political elites can also opt to rely on these MNCs to drive the industrial sector 
and to continue to offer jobs to the people in the current global production network settings.  
My main purpose in this Ph.D. dissertation is to re-contextualize industrial catch-up for 
the other non-developmental states, particularly the Southeast Asian countries. I endeavor to 
demonstrate that the neglect over political and historical context have led to an oversimplified 
judgment of successful and failed cases in industrial catch-up trajectories. This is often followed 
by a normative policy recommendation, in which most scholars continue to emphasize the role 
of triple-helix coordination, the size of government spending on R&D, the growth of national 
patents, or the specific type of economic policy (e.g., export-led industrialization and 
subcontracting mechanisms). Despite the abundance of these policy recipes, the “successful 
cases” remain rare. Southeast Asian countries, for example, have yet to follow the success of 
Japan.  
If we accept that policymakers faced different levels of urgency in their critical juncture 
periods, we might have to rethink the way scholars have often associated the notion of economic 
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development with the notion of industrial catch-up, including the notion of developmental 
government as an ideal picture. Most prominent scholars (e.g., Johnson, Amsden, and Wade) 
have popularized the idea that developing countries need to follow developmental states’ 
actions to duplicate these states’ success. When developing countries fail to replicate these 
successes, there is a tendency in comparative study to blame the predatory nature of the state 
(i.e., institutional differences), including what caused it such as different colonial legacy (e.g., 
Kohli, Acemoglu et. al., and Vu). As Haggard recommends, scholars need to provide a better 
understanding of the foundation of both developmental states and non-developmental states, 
and they should avoid pragmatism as they construct policy prescription based on “best 
practices.”  
Developed from Doner et al.’s (2005) systemic vulnerability, the method of comparison 
in this dissertation does not seek to provide answers to policymakers by presenting a set of 
policy recommendations; rather, this method analyzes the policymakers themselves. The 
method is intended to provoke a scholarly discussion on whether a policy recommendation, 
constructed upon the “successful” or “ideal” case, can be replicated in another country, and the 
answer is somewhat pessimistic. A policy is the result of policymakers’ choices in a specific 
context, and if we eliminate the context, we then eliminate the initial conditions that contributed 
to the policy’s “success.” By using the case of industrial catch-up, this Ph.D. dissertation shows 
that the key initial conditions are not those that can simply be recreated or replicated (e.g., 
government spending on R&D, access to the international market, access to foreign technology, 
the presence of FDI, and democratic electoral systems) but are instead those that occur beyond 
the control of political elites (e.g., the presence of external threats and the lack of natural 
resources).  
Development study has mostly centered on economic development, particularly during 
the wave of decolonialization following World War II. The concept of economic development 
is often associated with the role of government in improving people’s welfare, which economic 
growth primarily measures. Industrialization thereby becomes the accepted goal for developing 
countries. If we acknowledge, however, that industrial catch-up demands efficient government 
intervention in and facilitation of the latecomer countries’ indigenous technological upgrading, 
then we must also acknowledge that the government, as policymakers, behaves differently in 
different contexts. If we accept that governments face different levels of urgency in their critical 
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juncture periods, including the path-dependent nature embedded within it, then we have to 
rethink the tendency among scholars to use a success–failure dichotomy in industrial catch-up 
studies.  
This Ph.D. dissertation has limitations because it relies on secondary data, particularly 
from historical works of literature. This means that I have relied on the narratives and facts that 
prominent historical scholars have provided; in other words, I rely on the credibility of the 
authors. I chose to ignore the possibility of a debate over the specific historical narrative (i.e., 
historiography) because my primary purpose is to provide a broad picture of what happened at 
the elite political level during each country’s critical juncture period. In addition, a related 
limitation is the availability of the data. Due to the fact that some critical juncture periods began 
in the 1800s, I experienced difficulty finding a primary source for every historical event that 
occurred prior to the 20th. For example, I was unable to access primary data over government 
spending on agriculture or industrialization in the 1800s. The data that I have presented is the 
most representative data that I was able find.  
With critical juncture periods as its focus, this Ph.D. dissertation acts as the foundation 
that opens the door for future development. As I have presented with the sub-case study, further 
research on self-reproducing mechanisms within path-dependence logic is necessary. The 
method that I employ on one sub-case can and must be expanded for use in analyzing the other 
cases. However, this analysis demands time and cooperation among scholars with specific 
expertise in local politics. The predominant reason why I started with critical juncture periods 
in this Ph.D. research is because scholars need to acknowledge that the events of critical 
juncture periods were not merely predatory behavior but rather political elites’ conscious 
choices in response to specific uncontrollable initial conditions. The repercussions of the 
economic development strategies chosen during these periods continue to the present day in 
various policy manifestations, including STI policies. After examining this topic in this Ph.D. 
dissertation, I seek to develop future research by centering on an observation of self-
reproducing mechanisms in the present or post-critical juncture politics, and my selection of 
Indonesia as a sub-case study provides the groundwork for this observation. 
On a final note, through this Ph.D. dissertation, I would like to stress the importance of 
a multidisciplinary approach to understanding different economic development trajectories. 
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This dissertation stands somewhere between international and domestic issues and between 
political and economic issues in its examination of urgency levels. In doing so, it is clear that 
normative policy recommendation is mundane, especially when this recommendation 
originates from an insularity, and that seeking a universal recipe for “success” is futile; the 
seven country cases demonstrate that context is paramount in determining success and failure. 
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX 1  
Selected Statements from President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and President Joko Widodo’s State Speech to Commemorate Indonesian 
Independence Day at the Annual Session of the Parliament of the Republic of Indonesia 
 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono President Joko Widodo 
In a strong relation with our effort to defend our national sovereignty 
from all possible disruptions and threats, we have no other option other 
than to build up our defense sector. […] We continue to increase a 
defense cooperation with our partnering countries, including in the 
defense industry sector. We want to achieve a self-sufficiency in weapon 
system in the future. […] What we want to build up the essential power 
to secure all of our sovereign territories. [emphasis added; translation 
by author] (Yudhoyono, 2006) 
 
An increase in people’s prosperity cannot be separated from the 
agricultural sector performance, rural economy, as well as food 
security. In this regard, the government have proclaimed a revitalization 
program for agriculture, fisheries, and forestry sectors. [emphasis added; 
translation by author] (Yudhoyono, 2006) 
 
Alternative energy development becomes a crucial option, both to 
reduce dependency in oil, with its price continue to rise, and also to solve 
the problem of poverty, unemployment and environmental management. 
[…] Our country possesses various source of energy alternative in a 
large scale, for example gas, coal, hydro power, geothermal, solar power, 
and so on. […] The government continue to construct plan to develop a 
biology-based alternative energy or biofuel. These national programs 
have started this year, started with a research in palm-oil-based, sugar-
cane-based, cassava-based, and castor-bean-based energy. [emphasis 
added; translation by author] (Yudhoyono, 2006) 
Today’s economic situation, at the global level and national level, is less 
favorable to us. This is not the first time we experience this type of economic 
turbulence. We have withstood unfavorable economic situation so many 
times. We are optimistic that we will be able to surmount them. There are 
many fundamental issues require solutions. In the food sector, we have not 
achieved food sovereignty; we are still vulnerable to harvest failure; and we 
are still prone to volatile food prices. In the infrastructure sector, there 
remains a lack of mode of mass transportation in every region and many are 
less integrated. In the maritime sector, illegal fishing and the plundering of 
marine resources have brought big financial loses to the state. In the energy 
sector, we are still facing the issue of electricity supply to support the lives of 
the people and economic development. (Widodo, 2015a) 
 
We have achieved a consolidated democracy. Now, for the sake of national 
interests, we will conduct a fundamental national economic transformation. 
The paradigm of consumptive development must be shifted into a productive 
one. Development must begin from the regions and rural areas, from the 
villages, by increasing labor productivity, capitalizing on science and 
technology, and by a creative, innovative and persistent mental attitude. 
Through these measures, we will be able to maximize our national resources 
for the people’s welfare. [emphasis added; translation by author] (Widodo, 
2015a) 
 
We are also building more units of traditional market to act as a buffer for 
economic growth, to boost up the people’s welfare, as well as to provide fiscal 
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 incentives for productive economic activities. In line to this objective, the 
government also accelerates the speed of Special Economic Zone and the 
Industrial Zone establishment outside Java, especially for agricultural and 
mining industries. The government is working hard to ensure that various 
development action programs develop the people’s capacity and innovation. 
The development action programs, especially for the creative economy 
sector, should prioritize the expansion of employment opportunities, the 
improvement of national welfare, and the national mastery of science and 
technology. (Widodo, 2015a) 
 
I would like to prove that we must never turn our back on the ocean or the 
sea. Our vast seas have economic, defense, and unity potentials. Our marine 
environment now being threatened by the climate change needs to be 
salvaged. We have to protect our seas from the security threats, such as illegal 
fishing and plundering of marine resources. Any vessels that are caught 
stealing our fish must deal with our stern actions, including by being sunk. 
International laws are also against illegal fishing and plundering of marine 
resources. […] Along with that, we also have to explore maritime culture and 
maritime identity of the Indonesian nation further. We have to demonstrate to 
the world that Indonesia is a maritime nation. A nation which preserves and 
empowers her seas sincerely. This is our initial effort to be the World’s 
Maritime Fulcrum. The Maritime Fulcrum initiation is not only a matter of 
national defense, but also regional and global defense. This strategy is being 
hammered out and will be incorporated into the Indonesian National Marine 
Policy. [emphasis added; translation by author] (Widodo, 2015a) 
 
We will also build a strong national defense by empowering the primary 
weaponry defense system with domestic products. We must not only possess 
a mere minimum essential force, but defense forces to secure and maintain 
the sovereignty of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, as well as 
protecting her approximately 250 million people. (Widodo, 2015a) 
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Fifty years ago, when our country was only 12 years old, on August 17, 
1957, President Sukarno stated “Our heart sometimes is racing. Will we 
sink in this 1957? Or will we stand string as a country?” […] There are 
four pillars that become our values and fundamental consensus that 
support our beloved Republic of Indonesia, which are Pancasila, 1945 
Constitution, the Republic of Indonesia, and Unity in Diversity. 
Throughout the history of our nation, there is always challenges to the 
main pillars of our nations. In the era of globalization and national 
transformation, we continue to face challenges against those four pillars. 
(Yudhoyono, 2007) 
 
To be honest, the 2008 was a difficult year, it filled with challenges. The 
oil price reached its highest price in history. Food price across the world 
soared. The world economy has been threatened by recessions. The 
World Bank predicted that these specific circumstances in energy and 
food sectors have the potential to provoke a social, economic, and 
political crisis in 33 countries and cause 100 million people across the 
world to fall back into poverty. A high increase in oil price and world 
food price quickly affected our national subsidy budget for energy and 
food sector. Of course, the government will continue to suppress its 
negative impacts for the people. [emphasis added; translation by author] 
(Yudhoyono, 2008) 
 
Under the current global food crisis, we need to strengthen our national 
food stock. The government have declared that the national rice stock 
needs to be increased to 3 million tons, from the previous 1 million tons. 
[emphasis added; translation by author]  (Yudhoyono, 2008) 
 
Our national development paradigm is now shifting from being consumptive 
into being productive, and from a ‘Java-centric’ to an ‘Indonesia-centric’. 
Regulations have become more efficient and bureaucratic inefficiencies have 
been reduced with the implementation of Information and Communications 
Technologies. We are also ready to encourage infrastructural development 
for the remote areas across the country, particularly in the rural and marginal 
areas, as well as the border towns, in order to strengthen national 
connectivity. [emphasis added; translation by author] (Widodo, 2016) 
 
 
Independence is the golden bridge, that was what our first President, 
our independence proclamator, Bung Karno stated. Through that golden 
bridge, the nation of Indonesia has left the darkness of colonialism 
peeiod and entered the independence realm filled with lights of hope. 
[…] We need to be proud, because the Indonesian revolution of 
On many occasions, I have always been repeating [the message] that we are 
a great nation. Once again, Indonesia is a great nation. Indonesia is great 
not only for its 250 million populations. Indonesia is great not only for its 
17,000 islands. Indonesia is great not only because of its abundant resources. 
[emphasis added; translation by author] (Widodo, 2017) 
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independence was one of the largest revolutions in the 20th century, 
which played parts in the world transformation. [emphasis added; 
translation by author] (Yudhoyono, 2009) 
 
First, Indonesian future economic development must use a combination 
of resource approach, knowledge approach, and cultural approach. 
Indonesian economy, the economy of 230 million populations will 
continue to expand. An eight million hectares of homeland economy also 
needs sustainability. Economic growth that we choose, and follow, is an 
equal growth that can truly bring along justice. In the future, we must 
strengthen our domestic economy, domestic market, and we cannot 
depend on export power as our source of growth. Therefore, an export-
oriented strategy obviously is not our choice. On the other hand, national 
economy must have a territoriality dimension, in which the economic 
growth [needs to] occur across the homeland. Local societies have to be 
the power source for local economies. Domestic investments need to be 
strengthened. Self-sufficiency and resilience for specific economic 
sectors continue to be empowered, particularly food and energy. 
[emphasis added; translation by author] (Yudhoyono, 2009) 
 
 
 
We still have more promises to deliver. As we reflect upon ourselves, we have 
to admit that it would be impossible for Indonesia to become an advanced 
nation if the people all over the countries have yet to enjoy electricity at their 
houses. It would be impossible for us to become a competitive nation if the 
cost of our logistics are high. It would be impossible for us to become a 
Global Maritime Fulcrum if we do not possess seaports where large ships 
that transport our products can be berthed. It would be impossible for us to 
reach self-sufficiency in food sector if the number of dams and irrigation 
channels that irrigate our agricultural fields all over the country are limited. 
[emphasis added; translation by author] (Widodo, 2017) 
 
We may not hesitate to protect our sovereignty, to protect our seas, to protect 
our borders, to protect our natural resources. We have to be brave to fight 
against any plundering activities againts our marine resources. We have to be 
brave to sink illegal vessels to protect our fishermen. We have to be brave to 
protect every square inch of our land to bring prosperity for our own people. 
[emphasis added; translation by author] (Widodo, 2017) 
 
In the midst of rapid and extreme globalization wave, Indonesia’s 
independence is one very important pillar to support people’s prosperity and 
to uphold social justice. The government will continue to work hard to 
achieved self-sufficiency in food by increasing the production of strategic 
foodstuffs, mainly rice, corn, beef, chilies, and shallots. [emphasis added; 
translation by author] (Widodo, 2017) 
 
 We must not be trapped in a short-term pragmatism that would slow down 
our steps in the future. We must not be trapped in the status as a middle-
income country. We must not be stuck by a middle-income trap. Instead, we 
must be able to transform into a developed country, to become a developed 
Indonesia. (Widodo, 2018a) 
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Firmness is crucial to protect our natural resources so we maintain 
sovereignty over our natural resources. We continue to maintain our maritime 
sovereignty encompassing the seas, bays, and oceans. We are very serious in 
dealing with illegal fishing that used to be rampant in our waters. We do not 
stop there. After decades run by foreign [hands], the Mahakam Oil and Gas 
Block, Sanga-Sanga Oil and Gas Block, Rokan Oil and Gas Block are finally 
reverted to the owner, and the majority of Freeport shares have returned to 
our country, all for the welfare of the people. [emphasis added; translation by 
author] (Widodo, 2018a) 
Notes: The transcripts are retrieved from two different sources. The transcripts for President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s speech (2006-2009) 
are retrieved from the official webpages of the Ministry of National Development Planning of the Republic of Indonesia. The transcripts for 
President Joko Widodo’s speech are retrieved from official webpage of Cabinet of Indonesia. 
Source: Compiled and translated by author  
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APPENDIX 2  
Selected Statements within Presidential Debate Contents on Related Topics under Economic Nationalism Discourse 
A. Indonesian General Election, 2019 
Debate Series 
(Topic) 
Actor 
(Incumbent; 
Opposition; 
Moderator) 
Statements on general economic development or 
industrial development issues in Indonesia 
Statements Related to Science, Technology, 
Innovation (STI) issues in Indonesia 
2nd Debate, 17 
February 2019 
(Infrastructure, 
Food, Energy, and 
Environment) 
Opposition 
(Prabowo 
Subianto) 
Tonight, we are gathering here to discuss the most 
important issues for the nation, which are 
infrastructure, food, energy, natural resource, and 
environment. These are the key problems within our 
life as a nation state. We have visions to seriously 
build up our independency in these sectors in order to 
be a successful country. We must stand upon our own 
feet. We must achieve self-sufficiency in food, in 
energy, in water, in order to survive as a nation. The 
United Nations have stated that these are the three 
keys that indicate a country’s success. A country is 
successful when they can provide food for its people, 
energy for its people, and water without importing 
them. Later if we rule the country, Insya Allah [we] 
receive people’s mandate, we will guarantee the 
availability of affordable food for all of the people of 
Indonesia and we will guarantee that producers, 
farmers, stock farmers, pond farmers, fisherman will 
receive sufficient income, which is our commitment. 
We will immediately prepare fertilizer ready as much 
as needed by the farmers. This is our commitment. We 
believe that Indonesia can stand on our own feet. We 
will secure all national economic sources. We will 
protect Indonesian economic wealth and prevent it 
from flowing out from the country. The fundamental 
All of us understand the tremendous impact of 
industry 4.0 development that will come along 
with artificial intelligence, this robotic 
development will have impacts. A factory that 
often operate, an automotive factory in German, 
that often employs fifteen thousand workers now 
can be replaced with robots and only employs less 
than fifty workers. This will have some impacts, 
but the key point that I seek to deliver is that 
[while] we are talking about industry 4.0, we have 
yet able to protect our own farmers. This is what 
we need discuss. We have yet able to guarantee an 
affordable food price for our own people. This is 
the problem that I concern about. It is good that we 
discuss industry 4.0 but I prefer to be able to 
guarantee that Indonesia can achieve self-
sufficiency in food without importing it from any 
other countries. [emphasis added; translation by 
author] 
 
It is correct that palm oil is important commodity 
for us and it also a promising one because we can 
also use it for biodiesel and biofuel. And I have 
discussed with the experts, the people involved, 
and the businessmen in this sector. It is correct that 
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problem of our nation is that our wealth does not reside 
in our republic. [emphasis added; translation by 
author] 
 
As I was saying earlier, we welcome every direction, 
every effort to achieve self-sufficiency in energy. 
Therefore, we can also acknowledge that Mr. Jokowi’s 
and his administration have conducted positive things 
in that sector, have you not? I can also acknowledge a 
person’s good effort, but we also need to criticize what 
are missing. Therefore, we support a healthy 
discourse. Once again, we support you. If you ask me 
what my strategy is, my answer is our strategy is to 
push palm oil, it is not limited to palm oil, but also 
palm sugar, cassava, and even ethanol from sugar. We 
shall use everything we have in order to avoid 
importing energy from outside. That is our strategy. 
[emphasis added; translation by author] 
 
Yes, while we respect all of government’s effort, we 
need to be alert that there are large companies, 
multinational, which think that they are strong, that 
they are above the law, that they are not afraid to the 
Indonesian government, they can do whatever they 
want. [emphasis added; translation by author] 
 
We understand that maritime is very much important, 
but we are also concerned that our ports under your 
administration are operated by foreign companies, sir. 
We find that this is not the correct strategy. [emphasis 
added; translation by author] 
 
we are moving toward B20 [biodiesel] but Brazil 
have already achieved B90 and so on. We are not 
pessimistic, sir. I am very much optimistic that we 
are more than able to achieve self-sufficiency in 
energy. Hence the high potentials of the palm oil. 
We can use all our palm oil products to be 
transformed into biofuel and biodiesel. And this 
will increase the income level of our farmers, 
which is currently falling. We can increase its price 
and we have to be responsible to improve their 
welfare. [emphasis added; translation by author]  
 
Currently, our problem is the poor fishermen who 
do not have access to ships, do not have access to 
capital, and who are constrained by complex 
regulations that hinder smaller-scale fisherman to 
go to sea and work. Therefore, for us, our strategy 
is for the state to be presence there. We will create 
maritime and fisheries sector specific State-owned 
Enterprises in order to manage the fishermen, to 
train them with the correct technology, to grant 
them with an access to ships, capital, and to 
provide them with cold storage and food-canning 
mechanism, and so on. And the government also 
supports their marketing. [emphasis added; 
translation by author] 
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 Incumbent 
(Joko Widodo) 
I want the Indonesian people to know that currently, 
Indonesian palm oil production has reached 46 
million per year, which involve more or less 16 million 
farmers. I think this is a significant number. And in 
order to inform Mr. Prabowo, we already started the 
B20 [biodiesel] and the production process has 
reached 98 percent of what we expected. This means 
that B20 is finished. We are moving towards, what we 
called, B100. Therefore, we expect that 30 percent of 
palm oil’s total production will go to biofuel. We have 
already explained the plan in a rigid and clear way. 
This is what we are working on to avoid oil imports 
dependency. [emphasis added; translation by author] 
 
Sea is the future of our nation’s economy. In the past 
four years, we have chased 7000 foreign ships, illegal 
fishing, who conduct illegal fishing, who stole our 
fishes in our seas. We have drowned and burnt 488 
units of ship. Currently, those 7000 ships are no longer 
in sight. This provides opportunities for our fishermen 
to explore our maritime resources, especially fishes, in 
order to support their welfare. [emphasis added; 
translation by author] 
 
 
 
And I believe that with a well-prepared human 
resource, our nation is ready to face industry 4.0. 
For example, farmers. The farmers need to be 
introduced to an online marketplace that bring the 
farmers and their consumers closer. We also need 
to prepare small businesses, micro businesses, 
supermicro businesses to understand how to 
maximize the benefit from this online system. A 
development of both offline and online ecosystem 
needs to be achieved in a relatively shorter amount 
of time. These are what we have been working on 
at the field level so that our country does not loose 
against other country in the wave of industrial 
revolution 4.0. [emphasis added; translation by 
author]   
 
I believe that we will welcome industry 4.0 
optimistically. As we can see, currently farmers’ 
products already enter marketplace called 
TaniHub. TaniHub already markets farmers’ 
products from the producers directly to consumers, 
hence the price cut. Another example is various 
peer-to-peer financial credit scheme by Fintech 
[start-up company] given directly to farmers. 
[emphasis added; translation by author] 
 Mediator Since the New Order era, infrastructure development 
have been relying on government and private 
initiatives, but it also tends to neglect people’s 
involvement and people’s need. This is shown by the 
large amount of agrarian conflicts, such as evictions, 
land grabbing, the loss of people’s livelihood and local 
wisdom. The question is, what are your future strategy 
The question is, currently we are entering 
industrial revolution 4.0., which is marked by for 
example the development of internet, artificial 
intelligence, drone, robots, which creates 
significant impact in various aspect of social, 
economy, and cultural sectors. The question is, 
what is your strategy to face industrial revolution 
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to create an inclusive infrastructure development, 
which does not neglect marginal groups. [translation 
by author] 
 
Indonesia is an archipelago country with a maritime 
economic potential of one point thirty-five trillion 
USD. This can be our asset to achieve national 
prosperity and people’s welfare. However, these 
potentials have yet to be maximized and, furthermore, 
around 25 percent of poor people lives in coastal area. 
The question is how the direction of your roadmap 
strategy able to bring prosperity and welfare for the 
people of Indonesia? [translation by author] 
 
4.0. in agriculture sector, fisheries sector, and 
animal husbandry sector, in which most of its 
actors are in a small-scale and use traditional 
method? [translation by author] 
 
The question is that, palm oil, is a strategic 
commodity because it provides the largest amount 
of foreign exchanges in agricultural sector and its 
potential as alternative energy. Furthermore, 
currently, oil palm plantation land reaches 14 
million hectares. However, palm oil’s management 
system still provokes social and environmental 
problems. The question is, what is your strategy 
and policy to solve the problem of palm oil 
management to reach the B20 biodiesel target? 
[translation by author] 
 
 
Debate Series 
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(Incumbent; 
Opposition; 
Moderator) 
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industrial development issues in Indonesia 
Statements on Specific Science, Technology, 
Innovation (STI) issues in Indonesia 
5th Debate, 13 
April 2019 
(Economy and 
Social Welfare, 
Finance and 
Investment, and 
Trade and 
Industry) 
Opposition 
(Prabowo 
Subianto; 
Sandiaga Uno) 
We find that currently our nation walks, and has been 
waking, towards wrong direction and if this continues, 
it would not bring real prosperity for Indonesia. This 
is already proven by the fact that we already deviate 
from the original idea of our founding fathers as 
drafted on 1945 Constitution, which clearly state that 
we cannot let national wealth flow out from the 
country. […] Furthermore, we experience 
deindustrialization. If we see other countries 
experience industrialization, we experience 
deindustrialization. Now we the nation of Indonesia 
I remember the story from a guy name Rahman, a 
young millennial whom I met in Sidrap, South 
Sulawesi. He uses technology for agriculture 
industry. When [I] work in Jakarta, local-level 
SOEs called Food Station bought rice from these 
millennials who now enter agriculture industry. I 
admire that they are committed to this. Despite that 
there are a lot of millennials who leave rural area 
to go to city, there are these millennials like 
Rahman. Together with Prabowo-Sandi, we will 
create the next Rahman across Indonesia. We must 
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produces nothing, and we can only accept the products 
from other nations. This is wrong. [emphasis added; 
translation by author] 
 
Mr. Jokowi has been in power for four and a half years, 
why do you allow farmers’ import to be destroyed. 
Why don’t you do industrialization but instead you put 
your focus on infrastructure? It is possible that this 
infrastructure eases the flow of foreign products to 
enter Indonesia instead of the opposite. This is the 
problem that, in our opinion, requires a strategic 
reorientation. It requires a stern strategy to stop the 
money flowing out of the country and then be focused 
to build industry in various sector. I agree with a 
downstream process but why haven’t you release a 
permit for this for four and half years? Instead you 
allowed foreign commodities to easily enters 
Indonesia. [emphasis added; translation by author] 
 
China eradicated their forty-years of poverty. We must 
bravely learn from the mighty. I am not putting the 
blame on you. This is our mistakes together. We are 
losing our ways and we need to go back to the 1945 
Constitutions, Article 33. We must be brave to create 
industrialization, open more jobs, protect our farmers, 
protect our fishermen. That is what we need to do. 
[emphasis added; translation by author] 
 
I am focusing my future policies for basic elements 
that answer basic needs. Indonesian people’s need for 
food. Indonesia needs to improve agriculture 
productivity, to improve farmers’ income level, to 
protect the livelihood of blue-collar workers and 
be able to do this. Young people with digital 
technology, agriculture-related technology. Their 
mechanizations can increase our agriculture 
productivity. We cannot accept a high food price 
anymore, but we must be able to dream that 
Indonesia can export foods. It is time that 
Indonesia must become a powerhouse in food 
economy and energy sector. [emphasis added; 
translation by author] 
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contractual teachers. Those are my focuses. Digital 
things are good, but our people need self-sufficiency 
in food. Food in an affordable price. We must reduce 
the prices. Our people are suffering. We need to 
protect Indonesia’s wealth. Those are my focuses. 
[emphasis added; translation by author] 
 
For flights to Japan, 60 percent of them are ANA, thus 
what is left for Garuda [Indonesia]? This means we 
cannot make any profit. Those holding schemes 
cannot be managed well. We are very much anxious 
that our prideful SOEs, for example Pertamina that 
supposed to be a national and world champion, now 
lost its confidence because they are always been 
beaten by foreign company. Airspace is our nation’s 
asset, but it is enjoyed by others. Why do you let our 
prideful Garuda, which we gave birth through 
struggles, to be in such messy circumstance? 
[emphasis added; translation by author] 
 
Incumbent 
(Joko Widodo; 
Ma'ruf Amin) 
It is correct that for too long we have been relying on 
foreign market and for too long we have been 
exporting raw materials, such as rubber, palm oil, 
fisheries, and also agriculture commodity. Therefore, 
the future strategy is downstream and 
industrialization. We need to build fishery industry as 
many as we can, food-canning industry so that we can 
export final goods, which are processed and labelled 
by local brand here. This strategy is also applicable 
for forestry commodities. In the future we need to do 
downstream in order to avoid exporting raw materials. 
Instead we need to be able to send final or intermediate 
products. Also, for agriculture-related products, we 
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know that the younger generation now is already able 
to build online ecosystem, which can be extended to 
offline ecosystem for agriculture-related products in 
order to facilitate farmers to connect with consumers 
through digital economy. [emphasis added; translation 
by author] 
 
Mediator Indonesia is known as a maritime and agrarian 
country. However, farmers and fishermen’ purchasing 
power in rural area are declining due to the low 
commodity prices, such as rubber, coconut palm and 
sugar, and also fisheries commodities in general. This 
is caused by, for example, an aggressive economic 
policy from advanced countries and our conventional 
way of managing agriculture and fisheries. The 
question is, what is your concrete strategy to maintain 
the stability of commodity price in agriculture and 
fisheries sector so that it attracts millennials to 
actualize Indonesia into a world-renown maritime and 
agrarian country. [translation by author] 
 
 
 
B. Indonesian General Election, 2014 
Debate Series 
(Topic) 
Actor 
(Candidate No 
1; Candidate No 
2; Mediator) 
Statements on general economic development or industrial development issues in Indonesia 
2nd Debate, 15 
June 2014 
(Economic 
Development and 
Social Welfare) 
Candidate No 1 
(Prabowo 
Subianto) 
We will be a strong country. We will be a respected country precisely because we become a country which 
rule our own wealth. The nation’s wealth in Indonesia must be dedicated for the people of Indonesia and 
we cannot allow it to leak or flow outside the country. [emphasis added; translation by author] 
 
Therefore, poverty and unemployment are the target of our economic development strategy. Our strategy 
relies or focuses on agriculture development, first. Why agriculture? Because it can absorb a large pool of 
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workers in short amount of time. Furthermore, agriculture sector can produce [outputs] in short amount of 
time. [emphasis added; translation by author] 
 
Candidate No 2 
(Joko Widodo) 
I stand here because I met Mrs. Heli, a laundress from Menado, North Sulawesi. I met Mr. Abdullah, a 
fisherman from Belawan, North Sumatera. And when I went to Banyumas, I met Mrs. Satinah, a farm labour 
who works every day at the rice field. And I also met Mr. Asep, a teacher from West Java. And millions of 
people across the country, who passed me messages, left us their dreams to develop a better economy. To 
advance Indonesian economy. For me, economy is dedicated as much as possible for the people’s welfare. 
That is a self-sufficient economy.  […] But, the most important thing, according to the Constitution is that 
natural resource is used as much as possible for the people’s welfare. [emphasis added; translation by 
author] 
 
 
Debate Series 
(Topic) 
Actor 
(Candidate No 
1; Candidate No 
2; Mediator) 
Statements on Specific Science, Technology, Innovation (STI) issues in Indonesia 
4th Debate, 29 
June 2014 
(Human Capital 
Development and 
Science and 
Technology) 
Candidate No 1 
(Hatta Rajasa) 
The preamble to the 1945 Constitution mandated us to educate the life of nation, which means [we] very 
much rely on the quality of human resources and S&T capacity […] In S&T sector, it is obvious that the 
government is responsible to advance the S&T sector in order to advance the civilization and to prosper 
human well-being. There are three keywords for the S&T sector, [first], how does our S&T develop nation’s 
competitiveness. Second, how does our S&T able to answer, to response, the sustainability of our natural 
resource management, both non-biological and biological. Third, how does our S&T able to prepare [an 
actualization of] critical and innovative Indonesian people in order to answer the tough challenges of 
globalization. Prabowo-Hatta prepare an inclusive and equal development. First, we increase our budget for 
university particularly with regard to S&T function; [we] double the future’s management fund support; in 
the next five years [we] distribute 10 trillion of research funds with focuses on priority sectors; [we] foster 
the diffusion of knowledge to be absorbed by the most important sectors, which are food, energy, 
transportation, health, and so on. [emphasis added; translation by author] 
 
We must conduct a ‘triple-helix’ approach within [our] innovation centers development. First, the 
government develops regulations to support any efforts to increase knowledge diffusion within our priority 
sectors. Second, the government provides incentives for companies which conduct R&D activities and [it] 
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reaches the market. Third, the government releases regulations to foster entrepreneurships so that invention 
meets entrepreneurship becomes an innovation that will solve the problem of overflooding import (banjirnya 
masalah impor) into our homeland. [emphasis added; translation by author]   
 
Prabowo-Hatta genuinely, if [we] receive people’s mandate, then we genuinely want to put forward all our 
natural resources, we must manage [it] based on value added. We can no longer develop an economic 
development approach that neglects knowledge. Therefore, as consequences, we need innovation to 
approach industrial development that seek to reduce import-dependency, particularly for raw material and 
intermediate goods, in which 78 percent of our import are raw material and intermediate goods. [emphasis 
added; translation by author] 
 
We must increase our research budget, which only reaches 0.1 percent of our GDP. We are committed to 
increase at the very least 10 trillion to foster knowledge diffusion into the market within our priority sector, 
food, energy, transportation, health, advanced materials, and defense. [emphasis added; translation by 
author] 
 
Because innovation is invention, findings, research outputs that is diffused in the sectoral level; and that 
produces quality seeds that currently enters the market. That is innovation. It is a fundamental innovation, 
concerning our national food. The fact that we are still importing [food], probably as acknowledged by Mr. 
JK, we truly have achieved self-sufficiency in food, in rice. However, there are always some slots available 
for imports, for the foreigners who demands specific type of rice. But, [for] our basic needs, we have 
achieved self-sufficiency in food. Except under extreme climate circumstances, when our country often 
faces extreme climate that disturbs our production, then we import [food] for incidental purpose. Therefore, 
in my opinion, our future research agenda is to build, to develop researches that truly relates to food and 
energy sustainability. [emphasis added; translation by author] 
 
Candidate No 2 
(Jusuf Kalla) 
There are a lot of nations which are developed because of their scientific capabilities. There are nations 
which are developed because of their natural resources. Therefore, we, [which] own rich natural resources 
and rich human resources, and an effort through science will bring larger benefits for this nation. [emphasis 
added; translation by author] 
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[…] for our national interest, national research institutes such as BPPN, LIPI, if we are discussing about 
research in food, research in energy, must be the main actor, supported by private parties. Then [we] as an 
entity is coordinated by ministry of research. [emphasis added; translation by author] 
 
Mediator We realize that Indonesia has become a market for foreign technology products, despite that we have 
hundreds of universities, research institutes, and industries. However, we have seen yet a synergy between 
those institutions that benefits people’s prosperity. What went wrong? [translation by author] 
  
Notes: In the 2004 Indonesian General Election, there was no presidential debate. Due to the limitation of data, this essay can only incorporate 
two of the latest presidential debates (2014 and 2019) 
Source: Compiled and translated by author 
 
